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  • English
    10/01/16
    The two theorists, following different trajectories, reached a common conclusion: that the real content of socialism is the complete control of labour by the workers themselves.

     

    Letter 1: Pannekoek to Castoriadis

    I offer you many thanks for the series of eleven issues of Socialisme ou Barbarie that you gave to comrade B… to give to me. I read them (though I haven’t yet finished) with great interest, because of the great agreement between us that they reveal. You probably remarked the same thing when reading my book Les Conseils ouvriers. For many years it seemed to me that the small number of socialists who expounded these ideas hadn’t grown; the book was ignored and was met with silence by almost the entire socialist press (except, recently, in the Socialist Leader of the ILP). So I was happy to get to know a group that had arrived at the same ideas through an independent route. The complete domination by workers of their labor, which you express by saying: “The producers themselves organize the management of production,” I described in the chapters on “the organization of workshops” and “social organization.” The organisms the workers need for deliberations, formed of assemblies of delegates that you call “soviet organisms,” are the same as those that we call “conseils ouvriers,” “arbeitrrate,” “workers councils.”

    Certainly there are differences. I will deal with them, considering this as an essay in contribution to the discussion in your review. While you restrict the activity of these organisms to the organization of labor in factories after the taking of social power by the workers, we consider them as also being the organisms by means of which the workers will conquer this power. In the conquest of power we have no interest in a “revolutionary party” that will take the leadership of the proletarian revolution. This “revolutionary party” is a Trotskyist concept that (since 1930) has found adherents among many former partisans of the Communist Party who have been disappointed by the practice of the latter. Our opposition and criticism go back to the first years of the Russian Revolution, and were directed at Lenin and were caused by his turn towards political opportunism. We have remained outside the Trotskyist road: we have never been under his influence. We consider Trotsky the most able spokesman for Bolshevism, and he should have been Lenin’s successor. But after having recognized in Russia a nascent capitalism, our attention was principally on the western world of big capital where the workers will have to transform the most highly developed capitalism into real communism (in the literal sense of the word). By his revolutionary fervor Trotsky captivated all the dissidents that Stalinism had thrown out of the Communist Parties, and in inoculating them with the Bolshevik virus it rendered them almost incapable of understanding the great new tasks of the proletarian revolution.

    Because the Russian Revolution and its ideas still have such a strong influence over people’s spirits, it’s necessary to more profoundly penetrate its fundamental character. In a few words, it was the last bourgeois revolution, though carried out by the working class. “Bourgeois revolution” signifies a revolution that destroys feudalism and opens the way to industrialization, with all the social consequences this implies. The Russian Revolution is thus in the direct line of the English Revolution of 1647, and the French Revolution of 1789, as well as those that followed in 1830, 1848 and 1871. During the course of these revolutions the artisans, the peasants and the workers furnished the massive strength needed to destroy the ancien régime. Afterwards, the committees and political parties of the men representing the rich strata that constituted the future dominant class came to the forefront and took control of governmental power. This was a natural result, since the working class was not yet mature enough to govern itself. In this new class society, where the workers were exploited, such a dominant class needs a government composed of a minority of functionaries and politicians. In a more recent era, the Russian Revolution seemed to be a proletarian revolution, the workers having been its authors through their strikes and mass actions. Nevertheless, the Bolshevik Party, little by little, later succeeded in appropriating power (the laboring class being a small minority among the peasant population). Thus the bourgeois character (in the largest sense of the term) of the Russian Revolution became dominant and took the form of state capitalism. Since then, due to its ideological and spiritual influence in the world, the Russian Revolution has become the exact opposite of a proletarian revolution that liberates the workers and renders them masters of the productive apparatus.

    For us the glorious tradition of the Russian Revolution consists in the fact that in its first explosions, in 1905 and 1917, it was the first to develop and show to the workers of the whole world the organizational form of their autonomous revolutionary action: the soviets. From that experience, confirmed later on, on a smaller scale in Germany, we drew our ideas on the forms of mass action that are proper to the working class, and that it should apply in order to obtain its own liberation.

    Precisely opposed to this are the traditions, the ideas, and the methods that come from the Russian Revolution when the Communist Party takes power. These ideas, which only serve as obstacles to correct proletarian action, constituted the essence and the basis of Trotsky’s propaganda.

    Our conclusion is that the forms of organization of autonomous power, expressed by the terms “soviets” or “workers councils” must serve as much in the conquest of power as in the direction of productive labor after this conquest. In the first place this is because the power of the workers over society cannot be obtained in any other way, for example by what is called a revolutionary party; in the second place, because these soviets, which will later be necessary for production, can only be formed through the class struggle for power.

    It seems to me that in this concept the “knot of contradictions” of the problem of “revolutionary leadership” disappears. For the source of contradictions is the impossibility of harmonizing the power and the freedom of a class governing its own destiny, with the requirement that it obey a leadership formed by a small group or party. But can such a requirement be maintained? It clearly contradicts the most quoted idea of Marx’s, i.e., that the liberation of the workers will be the task of the workers themselves. What is more, the proletarian revolution can’t be compared to a simple rebellion or a military campaign led by a central command, nor even to a period of struggle similar, for example, to the great French revolution, which itself was nothing but an episode in the bourgeois ascension to power. The proletarian revolution is much more vast and profound; it is the accession of the mass of the people to the consciousness of their existence and their character. It will not be a simple convulsion; it will form the content of an entire period in the history of humanity, during which the working class will have to discover and realize its own faculties and potential, as will as its own goals and means of struggle. I attempted to elaborate on certain aspects of this revolution in my book Les Conseils Ouvriers in the chapter entitled “The Workers’ Revolution.” Of course, all of this only provides an abstract schema that can be used to bring to the forefront the diverse forces in action and their relations.

    It’s possible that you will now ask: Within the framework of this orientation what purpose does a party or a group serve, and what are its tasks? We can be sure that our group won’t succeed in commanding the working masses in their revolutionary action: besides us there are a half-dozen or more groups or parties who call themselves revolutionary, but who all differ in their programs and ideas, and compared to the great Socialist Party, these are nothing but Lilliputians. Within the framework of the discussion in issue number 10 of your review it was correctly asserted that our task is essentially theoretical: to find and indicate, through study and discussion, the best path of action for the working class. Nevertheless, the education based on this should not be intended solely for members of a group or party, but the masses of the working class. It will be up to them to decide the best way to act in their factory meetings and their Councils. But in order for them to decide in the best way possible they must be enlightened by well-considered advice coming from the greatest number of people possible. Consequently, a group that proclaims that the autonomous action of the working class is the principal form of the socialist revolution will consider that its primary task is to go talk to the workers, for example by means of popular tracts that will clarify the ideas of the workers by explaining the important changes in society, and the need for the workers to lead themselves in all their actions, including in future productive labor.

    Here you have some of the reflections raised by the reading of the very interesting discussions published in your review. In addition, I’d like to say how satisfied I was by the articles on “The American worker,” which clarifies a large part of the enigmatic problem of that working class without socialism, and the instructive article on the working class in East Germany. I hope that your group will have the chance to publish more issues of its review.

    You will excuse me for having written this letter in English; it’s difficult for me to express myself satisfactorily in French.

    Originally written on November 8, 1953.

    Reprinted from Viewpoint Magazine.

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  • Ελληνικά
    10/01/16
    Οι δύο θεωρητικοί, ακολουθώντας διαφορετικές διαδρομές, κατέληξαν στο ίδιο συμπέρασμα: ότι το αληθινό περιεχόμενο του σοσιαλισμού είναι η πλήρης διαχείριση της εργασίας από τους ίδιους τους εργάτες.

    Σας ευχαριστώ πάρα πολύ για τα έντεκα τεύχη του Σοσιαλισμός ή Βαρβαρότητα που δώσατε στον σύντροφο Β… , για να μου τα δώσει. Τα διάβασα με μεγάλο ενδιαφέρον, επειδή αποκαλύπτουν την μεγάλη μεταξύ μας συμφωνία. Πιθανώς παρατηρήσατε το ίδιο πράγμα όταν διαβάζατε το βιβλίο μου Τα εργατικά συμβούλια. Για πολλά χρόνια πίστευα ότι ο μικρός αριθμός σοσιαλιστών που ανέπτυξε αυτές τις ιδέες δεν είχε αυξηθεί. Το βιβλίο αγνοήθηκε και αντιμετωπίστηκε με σιγή σχεδόν από όλο τον σοσιαλιστικό τύπο. Επομένως, χάρηκα που άρχιζα να γνωρίζω μία ομάδα η οποία έφτασε στις ίδιες ιδέες από μία ανεξάρτητη διαδρομή. 

    1ο γράμμα: Πάννεκουκ προς Καστοριάδη

    Σας ευχαριστώ πάρα πολύ για τα έντεκα τεύχη του Σοσιαλισμός ή Βαρβαρότητα που δώσατε στον σύντροφο Β… , για να μου τα δώσει. Τα διάβασα (αν και δεν τα έχω τελειώσει ακόμη) με μεγάλο ενδιαφέρον, επειδή αποκαλύπτουν την μεγάλη μεταξύ μας συμφωνία. Πιθανώς παρατηρήσατε το ίδιο πράγμα όταν διαβάζατε το βιβλίο μου Τα εργατικά συμβούλια. Για πολλά χρόνια πίστευα ότι ο μικρός αριθμός σοσιαλιστών που ανέπτυξε αυτές τις ιδέες δεν είχε αυξηθεί. Το βιβλίο αγνοήθηκε και αντιμετωπίστηκε με σιγή σχεδόν από όλο τον σοσιαλιστικό τύπο (με την πρόσφατη εξαίρεση του Social­ist Leader του ILP). Επομένως, χάρηκα που άρχιζα να γνωρίζω μία ομάδα η οποία έφτασε στις ίδιες ιδέες από μία ανεξάρτητη διαδρομή. Την απόλυτη διαχείριση της εργασίας τους από τους ίδιους τους εργάτες, την οποία εκφράζετε λέγοντας: «Οι ίδιοι οι παραγωγοί οργανώνουν τη διαχείριση της παραγωγής», την περιέγραψα στα κεφάλαια για την «οργάνωση των χώρων εργασίας» και την «κοινωνική οργάνωση». Οι οργανισμοί που σχηματίζονται από συνελεύσεις των αντιπροσώπων και τους χρειάζονται οι εργάτες για συζητήσεις, τους οποίους εσείς αποκαλείται «σοβιέτ», είναι οι ίδιοι με εκείνους που εμείς ονομάζουμε «εργατικά συμβούλια».

    Σίγουρα υπάρχουν διαφορές. Θα ασχοληθώ μαζί τους, θεωρώντας αυτό το κείμενο ως μία συμβολή στη συζήτηση του περιοδικού σας. Ενώ εσείς περιορίζετε τη δραστηριότητα αυτών των οργανισμών στην οργάνωση της εργασίας στα εργοστάσια μετά την κατάληψη της κοινωνικής εξουσίας από τους εργάτες, εμείς πιστεύουμε επίσης ότι οι οργανισμοί θα είναι αυτοί μέσω των οποίων οι εργάτες θα καταλάβουν την εξουσία. Για την κατάληψη της εξουσίας δε μας ενδιαφέρει καθόλου ένα «επαναστατικό κόμμα» το οποίο θα αναλάβει την ηγεσία της προλεταριακής επανάστασης. Αυτό το «επαναστατικό κόμμα» είναι μία τροτσκιστική ιδέα, που (από το 1930) έχει βρει υποστηρικτές ανάμεσα σε πολλούς πρώην υποστηρικτές του Κομμουνιστικού Κόμματος απογοητευμένους από την πρακτική του τελευταίου. Η αντίθεση και η κριτική μας ανάγονται στα πρώτα χρόνια της Ρωσικής Επανάστασης, κατευθύνονται στον Λένιν και προκλήθηκαν από την στροφή του προς τον πολιτικό καιροσκοπισμό. Εμείς παραμείναμε εκτός της Τροτσκιστικής γραμμής: ποτέ δεν ήμαστε υπό την επιρροή του. Θεωρούμε ότι ο Τρότσκι είναι ο πλέον ικανός εκπρόσωπος του Μπολσεβικισμού και ότι αυτός θα έπρεπε να είναι ο διάδοχος του Λένιν. Αλλά, αφού είχε αναγνωριστεί στη Ρωσία ένας εκκολαπτόμενος καπιταλισμός, η προσοχή μας εστιάστηκε κυρίως στον δυτικό κόσμο του μεγάλου κεφαλαίου όπου οι εργάτες θα πρέπει να μετατρέψουν τον πιο αναπτυγμένο καπιταλισμό σε πραγματικό κομμουνισμό (με την κυριολεκτική σημασία της λέξης). Με την επαναστατική θέρμη του ο Τρότσκι γοήτευσε όλους τους αντιφρονούντες τους οποίους ο σταλινισμός πέταξε έξω από τα Κομμουνιστικά Κόμματα, και εμβολιάζοντάς τους με τον μπολσεβίκικο ιό, τους κατέστησε σχεδόν ανίκανους να κατανοήσουν τα νέα μεγάλα καθήκοντα της προλεταριακής επανάστασης.

    Επειδή η Ρωσική Επανάσταση και οι ιδέες της εξακολουθούν να έχουν μια τόσο δυνατή επιρροή στις σκέψεις των ανθρώπων, είναι απαραίτητο να διεισδύσουμε βαθύτερα στο θεμελιώδη χαρακτήρα της. Με λίγα λόγια, ήταν η τελευταία αστική επανάσταση, παρόλο που διεξήχθη από την εργατική τάξη. Η «αστική επανάσταση» υποδηλώνει μια επανάσταση που καταστρέφει τη φεουδαρχία και ανοίγει το δρόμο προς την εκβιομηχάνιση, με όλες τις κοινωνικές επιπτώσεις που αυτό συνεπάγεται. Η Ρωσική Επανάσταση βρίσκεται επομένως σε ευθυγράμμιση με την Αγγλική Επανάσταση του 1647, και τη Γαλλική Επανάσταση του 1789, καθώς και με αυτές που ακολούθησαν το 1830, 1848 και 1871. Κατά τη διάρκεια αυτών των επαναστάσεων οι τεχνίτες, οι αγρότες και οι εργάτες βρήκαν την τεράστια δύναμη που απαιτούνταν για να καταστρέψουν το παλαιό καθεστώς. Αμέσως μετά, οι επιτροπές και τα πολιτικά κόμματα των εκπροσώπων των πλούσιων στρωμάτων, εκείνων που αποτελούσαν τη μελλοντική κυρίαρχη τάξη, ήρθαν στο προσκήνιο και πήραν τον έλεγχο της κυβερνητικής εξουσίας. Αυτό ήταν φυσικό απότοκο, δεδομένου ότι η εργατική τάξη δεν ήταν ακόμη αρκετά ώριμη για να αυτοκυβερνηθεί. Σε αυτήν την κοινωνία εκμετάλλευσης των εργατών, η κυρίαρχη τάξη χρειάζεται μια κυβέρνηση αποτελούμενη από μία μειοψηφία λειτουργών και πολιτικών. Σε μία πιο πρόσφατη εποχή, η Ρωσική Επανάσταση φάνηκε να είναι μια προλεταριακή επανάσταση, με τους εργάτες να είναι οι συντάκτες της μέσω των απεργιών και των μαζικών δράσεων. Παρόλα αυτά το Μπολσεβίκικο κόμμα, λίγο-λίγο, πέτυχε αργότερα ιδιοποίηση εξουσίας (με την εργατική τάξη να είναι μία μικρή μειοψηφία ανάμεσα στον πληθυσμό των αγροτών). Έτσι, ο αστικός χαρακτήρας (με την ευρεία έννοια του όρου) της Ρωσικής Επανάστασης επικράτησε και πήρε τη μορφή του κρατικού καπιταλισμού. Από τότε, λόγω της ιδεολογικής και πνευματικής της επιρροής της στον κόσμο, η Ρωσική Επανάσταση έχει γίνει το ακριβώς αντίθετο της προλεταριακής επανάστασης που απελευθερώνει τους εργαζόμενους και τους καθιστά κύριους του παραγωγικού μηχανισμού.

    Για μας η ένδοξη παράδοση της Ρωσικής Επανάστασης συνίσταται στο γεγονός ότι στις πρώτες εκρήξεις της, το 1905 και 1917, ήταν η πρώτη που αναπτύχθηκε και έδειξε στους εργάτες όλου του κόσμου την οργανωτική δομή της αυτόνομης επαναστατικής δράσης: τα σοβιέτ. Από αυτή την εμπειρία που επιβεβαιώθηκε αργότερα, σε μικρότερη κλίμακα στη Γερμανία, αντλήσαμε τις ιδέες μας σχετικά με τις μορφές μαζικής δράσης που είναι κατάλληλες για την εργατική τάξη, και που θα έπρεπε να εφαρμοστούν προκειμένου να αποκτήσει τη δική της ελευθερία.

    Ακριβώς αντίθετες σε αυτό είναι οι παραδόσεις, οι ιδέες και οι μέθοδοι που προέκυψαν από τη Ρωσική Επανάσταση, όταν το Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα κέρδισε δύναμη. Οι ιδέες αυτές, που χρησίμευσαν μόνο ως εμπόδια στη διόρθωση της προλεταριακής δράσης, αποτελούσαν την ουσία και τη βάση της Τροτσκιστικής προπαγάνδας.

    Το συμπέρασμά μας είναι ότι οι μορφές οργάνωσης της αυτόνομης εξουσίας, που εκφράζονται με τους όρους «σοβιέτ» και «εργατικά συμβούλια», πρέπει να χρησιμεύσουν τόσο στην κατάκτηση της εξουσίας όσο και στην καθοδήγηση της παραγωγικής εργασίας μετά από αυτή την κατάκτηση. Κατ’ αρχάς αυτό συμβαίνει επειδή η δύναμη των εργατών πάνω στην κοινωνία δε μπορεί να διατηρηθεί με κανέναν άλλο τρόπο, για παράδειγμα με ένα επονομαζόμενο επαναστατικό κόμμα. Δευτερευόντως, επειδή αυτά τα σοβιέτ, τα οποία αργότερα θα είναι απαραίτητα για την παραγωγή, μπορούν να σχηματιστούν μόνο μέσω της ταξικής πάλης για την εξουσία.

    Μου φαίνεται ότι σε αυτό το σχέδιο ο «κόμβος των αντιθέσεων» του προβλήματος της «επαναστατικής ηγεσίας» εξαφανίζεται. Για την πηγή των αντιφάσεων, είναι η αδυναμία να εξισορροπηθεί η εξουσία κι η ελευθερία μιας τάξης η οποία κυβερνά η ίδια την τύχη της, με την αξίωση να υπακούει μια ηγεσία σχηματισμένη από μια μικρή ομάδα ή ένα κόμμα. Αλλά μπορεί να διατηρηθεί μια τέτοια απαίτηση; Αντιτίθεται εμφανώς στην πιο γνωστή ιδέα του Μαρξ, ότι δηλαδή η απελευθέρωση των εργατών θα είναι έργο των εργατών των ίδιων. Επιπλέον, η προλεταριακή επανάσταση δε μπορεί να συγκριθεί με μία απλή εξέγερση ή μια στρατιωτική εκστρατεία που πραγματοποιείται από μία κεντρική διοίκηση, ούτε ακόμη με μια περίοδο αγώνα όμοια, για παράδειγμα, με την σπουδαία Γαλλική Επανάσταση, η οποία δεν ήταν τελικά τίποτα παρά ένα επεισόδιο στην αστική άνοδο προς την εξουσία. Η προλεταριακή επανάσταση είναι πολύ πιο μεγάλη και βαθιά· είναι η ένταξη της μάζας των ανθρώπων στη συνείδηση της ύπαρξής τους και του χαρακτήρα τους. Δε θα είναι μία απλή αναστάτωση· θα διαμορφώσει το περιεχόμενο μιας ολόκληρης περιόδου στην ιστορία της ανθρωπότητας, κατά την οποία η εργατική τάξη θα πρέπει να ανακαλύψει και να συνειδητοποιήσει τις δικές της ικανότητες και δυνατότητες, όπως επίσης και τους στόχους της και τα μέσα του αγώνα. Προσπάθησα να επεξεργαστώ ορισμένες πτυχές αυτής της επανάστασης στο βιβλίο μου Les Conseils Ouvriers στο κεφάλαιο με τίτλο «Η Επανάσταση των εργατών». Φυσικά, όλο αυτό παρέχει μόνο ένα αφηρημένο σχήμα που μπορεί να χρησιμοποιηθεί για να φέρει στο προσκήνιο τις διάφορες δυνάμεις στη δράση και τις σχέσεις τους.

    Είναι πιθανό να ρωτήσετε τώρα: Στο πλαίσιο αυτού του προσανατολισμού, τι σκοπό εξυπηρετεί ένα κόμμα ή μια ομάδα, και ποια είναι τα καθήκοντά της; Μπορούμε να είμαστε σίγουροι ότι η ομάδα μας δε θα καταφέρει να διοικήσει τις μάζες των εργατών στην επαναστατική τους δράση: εκτός από εμάς υπάρχει άλλη μισή ντουζίνα ή και περισσότερες ομάδες ή κόμματα που αυτοαποκαλούνται επαναστατικά, αλλά όλα διαφέρουν στα προγράμματα και τις ιδέες τους, και που σε σύγκριση με το μεγάλο Σοσιαλιστικό Κόμμα, αυτά δεν είναι παρά μόνο Λιλιπούτειοι. Στο πλαίσιο της συζήτησης στο δέκατο τεύχος της επισκόπησής σας, σωστά υποστηρίχθηκε ότι η συμβολή μας είναι ουσιαστικά θεωρητική: να βρει και να υποδείξει, μέσα από τη μελέτη και τη συζήτηση, την καλύτερη πορεία δράσης για την εργατική τάξη. Παρ’ όλα αυτά, η εκπαίδευση δε θα έπρεπε να προορίζεται αποκλειστικά για τα μέλη μιας ομάδας ή ενός κόμματος, αλλά για τις μάζες της εργατικής τάξης. Θα εναπόκειται σε αυτούς να αποφασίσουν τον καλύτερο τρόπο για να ενεργήσουν στις συνελεύσεις των εργοστασίων και στα Συμβούλιά τους. Αλλά για να μπορούν να αποφασίσουν με τον καλύτερο δυνατό τρόπο, θα πρέπει να διαφωτίζονται από καλά μελετημένες συμβουλές προερχόμενες από τον μεγαλύτερο δυνατό αριθμό ατόμων. Κατά συνέπεια, για μια ομάδα που διακηρύσσει ότι η αυτόνομη δράση της εργατικής τάξης είναι η κύρια μορφή της σοσιαλιστικής επανάστασης, θα θεωρείται ότι το κύριο καθήκον της είναι να πάει να μιλήσει με τους εργάτες, για παράδειγμα με τα μέσα δημοφιλών φυλλαδίων τα οποία θα ξεκαθαρίζουν τις ιδέες των εργατών, εξηγώντας τις σημαντικές αλλαγές στην κοινωνία, καθώς και την ανάγκη για τους εργάτες να αυτοοργανωθούν σε όλες τις δράσεις τους, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της μελλοντικής παραγωγικής εργασίας.

    Εδώ λοιπόν έχετε μερικές από τις σκέψεις που θέτει η ανάγνωση των συζητήσεων που δημοσιεύτηκαν στο περιοδικό σας. Επιπροσθέτως, θα ήθελα να εκφράσω την ικανοποίησή μου από τα άρθρα στο «The American worker» που αποσαφηνίζουν ένα μεγάλο μέρος του αινιγματικού προβλήματος της εργατικής τάξης χωρίς σοσιαλισμό, και το διδακτικό άρθρο για την εργατική τάξη στην Ανατολική Γερμανία. Ελπίζω ότι η ομάδα σας θα έχει την ευκαιρία να δημοσιεύσει περισσότερα άρθρα αυτής της επισκόπησης.

    Θα με συγχωρήσετε που έγραψα αυτό το γράμμα στα αγγλικά, αλλά μου είναι δύσκολο να εκφραστώ ικανοποιητικά στα γαλλικά.

    Μεταφράστηκε και δημοσιεύτηκε απο το περιοδικό Βαβυλωνία, Τευχος 14, Απρίλης 2104

    Αναδημοσιεύτηε απο το babylonia.gr

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  • French
    07/01/16

    Le titre « Coopératives contre capitalisme » indique de la part de l’auteur l’intention de ne rester ni aux mouvements coopératifs comme solutions ponctuelles et locales, répondant la plupart du temps au défaut de capitalistes, ni à la seule addition de ces mouvements comme solution globale. Le titre annonce le prisme par lequel Benoît Borrits analyse minutieusement ce qui est déjà à l’œuvre dans la société.

    Si l’auteur fait la démonstration du caractère actuel de la nécessité de s’engager vers une appropriation collective des grands moyens de production,  à l’aide d’exemples positifs, je retiendrai personnellement, un exemple qui en illustre tant d’autres, où au contraire, la question a fait défaut. J’ai en mémoire les deux types de réactions  quand Mittal a décidé de larguer les amarres d’Arcelor: celle des salariés, précisant que Mittal n’avait jamais mis le nez dans le concret de la production d’acier – qu’ils s’étaient débrouillés tout seuls (cela c’est moi qui l’ajoute), et ils en tiraient la conclusion …qu’il fallait un repreneur et n’envisageaient pas de s’y substituer collectivement. Dans la même période, Montebourg, alors ministre, répondait à un journaliste,  « qu’en matière de nationalisation, l’Etat n’était pas un bon gestionnaire »… « Mais qui parle d’Etat ? » aurait rétorqué Benoît Borrits. Et d’aborder la différence entre nationalisation, version étatique, telle que le XXème siècle nous l’a légué, forme soviétique ou française, et appropriation sociale.

    Il montre la différence de logique entre une entreprise pilotée par la logique des actionnaires ou par celle pilotée par ceux qui ne sont alors plus tout à fait des salariés. Mais est-ce que l’addition des entreprises mises en coopérative suffit à faire de l’appropriation sociale ? C’est dit-il le « verre de vin à moitié plein ». Comment empêcher que chacune d’elle ne se fasse récupérer par des logiques qui lui sont contraires et comment peuvent-elles « coopérer entre elles au point de régler la production selon un plan commun ? » «La meilleure réponse est la généralisation des reprises d’entreprises en coopérative de travail».

    L’analyse de conditions de production montre que le compromis de classes qui avait longtemps prévalu, est devenu impossible. Cela souligne la nécessité d’orienter les luttes vers autre chose et conduit l’auteur vers la recherche de « transition ». Le point névralgique en est le concept de cotisation. La nécessité réside dans le fait qu’il existe des services et des politiques publiques qui ont besoin d’être financés. La possibilité réside dans une mutualisation des plus-values, qui permet cohérence et péréquation. C’est partiellement déjà le cas : sur quelle valeur ajoutée marchande finance-t-on l’Education nationale ? Pour électrifier les campagnes et les zones de montagnes, EDF a fourni du travail à perte, au sens marchand du terme (ces exemples sont de moi). Evidemment, pour une telle politique et une augmentation des salaires, il ne faut pas compter sur l’abnégation des actionnaires et mieux vaut se fier aux salariés (et aux usagers ajoute le dernier chapitre) ce qui suppose droits et pouvoir sur l’entreprise. Ce principe de la cotisation ne se limite pas aux salaires et au « social » mais participe aux investissements. On en trouve déjà des ébauches dans des projets syndicaux ou d’associations, précise l’auteur. Un tel fonds, en dépassant l’horizon de la revendication salariale « préfigure une appropriation collective des moyens de production ». Vient alors une étude précise des rapports entre salaires, garanties sociales, cotisations à partir des profits des entreprises et de la péréquation rendue possible.

    Le travail de Benoit Borrits ne se situe pas dans l’abstrait : à partir des expériences dont il prône la généralisation, il interroge directement les impasses actuelles de « la gauche de gauche » et du syndicalisme. Il met sur le métier des questions qui pourraient faire sauter des verrous de la situation actuelle, pourvu que l’on s’y affronte.

    Le livre se termine sur un appel à une suite : la coopérative ne peut se suffire à elle-même et il s’agit de produire du commun. Quid alors d’un dépassement de la dissociation travail/activités dites hors travail, de l’émancipation et autoproduction de pouvoir et du dépassement progressif de l’Etat ? Dans un second tome ?

    Association Autogestion
    7 janvier 2016
    http://www.autogestion.asso.fr/?p=5689

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  • English
    06/01/16
    A chronicle of the founding of the IWC in the 1960s, at a time when major trade union struggles were being waged against a capitalist reorganisation involving mergers, takeovers and closures.

    In the year 2003, Ken Coates collected together and had published a number of articles which he had written in the 1960s and 70s on industrial democracy and entitled the book, Workers Control Another World is Possible. He obtained contributions from the newly elected leaders of two of the largest unions, Derek Simpson of the Engineers Union and Tony Woodley of the Transport & General Workers, together with supporting introductory messages from five other unions, the journalists, the firemen, the communications workers, the bakers, and public and commercial services unions. This initiative from Ken was most particularly encouraged by the inaugural speech of Tony Woodley on his election as leader of the T&G, which he spoke of as giving ‘A Mandate for Change’. This was in the sixth year of the so-called ‘New LabourGovernment of Tony Blair, which was committed to the abandonment of many of the principles of the Labour Party; social ownership, industrial democracy, public welfare services, and regulation by the United Nations of international disputes. In welcoming the ‘rebirth of the trade union spirit’, Tony Woodley had singled out victory in the struggle for industrial democracy, which was yet to come.

    The founding of the Institute for Workers’ Control (IWC) at the sixth annual conference on WorkersControl, held at Nottingham University in 1968, followed a series of earlier conferences among trade unionists, left-wing Labour Party members, and university lecturers in Industrial Studies, which were initiated by Ken Coates, himself an ex-coal miner and then an extra-mural tutor in adult education at Nottingham University. The background to this initiative was the return of a Labour Government, in 1964, under Harold Wilson as Premier after thirteen years of Conservative rule, but with a very small majority, somewhat increased at a further election in 1966, but still without the commitment to socialist advance and trade union involvement that many in the Labour Party were looking for. Ken Coates initiative in founding the Institute really built on a campaign promoted over a number of years by Voice of the Unions, a monthly journal sponsored by left-wing MPs and trade unionists. On the initiative of Ernie Roberts, Assistant General Secretary of the Engineers Union, Voice of the Unions had organised two conferences, one in 1964 in Nottingham, which attracted 80 participants, one in London in 1965, with the support of the London Co-operative Society, which had  manmorparticipants. A further conference, on

    ‘Opening the Booksof companies to trade union review, was jointly organised, later in 1965, with the Manchester-based paper Labours Voice. A conference in early 1966 in Nottingham, convened by the Centre for Socialist Education, attracted more participants. This took place at the same time as major trade union struggles were being waged in the demand of steel workers for renationalisation of the steel industry, in the demand of the seamen for opening the books, epitomised in a strike pamphlet, Not Wanted on Voyage, written by John Prescott and Tony Topham, and in the demand of the dockers for workers control in The Dockers Next Step an Anti- Devlin Report, challenging the Governments proposals for rationalisation.

    In this situation it was not surprising, perhaps, that the next Workers’ Control conference, in 1967 in Coventry, had 500 delegates and included seminars on the Health Service, the steel industry, the Coal Board, the motor industry, the docks, the aircraft industry, municipal buses, the big corporations, and education. John Hughes of Ruskin College introduced a session at the conference on the results of the Labour Partys study group on industrial democracy. He spoke on behalf of Jack Jones, who had chaired the study group and was to become General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers’ Union and a strong supporter of the Institute for Workers’ Control. Big questions were raised about the possible loss of independence by unions participating in management, and particularly in their having to take responsibility for decisions on redundancies. There was much discussion, therefore, at the conference about the presentations to be made by supporters of workers control at the forthcoming Labour Party Conference in Scarborough. Ken Coates made a most moving reply to the debate, insisting on the importance of the demand for workers control, that ‘it is the practical foundation of the new life we are going to build together’. The conference ended with agreement to establish regional activities and conferences in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Cardiff, London, Nottingham, Manchester and Sheffield, and conferences and seminars on the following industries; aircraft, docks, steel, mines, buses, motors, and the student movement, with convenors assigned for each. First drafts of proposals for each of these industries were collected together with chapters on the controllers of the economy in private business and in government, and published as a paperback by Sphere Books in 1968 under the title of Can the Workers Run Industry? (available from www.spokesmanbooks.com).

    A series of annual IWC conferences followed the founding of the Institute at the Nottingham Conference of 1968. The number of delegates exceeded one thousand, stimulated by a great number of pamphlets, particularly by Ken Coates, Tony Topham, John Hughes and myself. Not only the TUC, but also the Labour Party itself had entered the discussion of workers control and its relation to the German system of mitbestimmung and British war- time Works Councils. The IWC argument was concerned with preserving the independence of trade unions, and therefore critical of any scheme for workersparticipation without built-in safeguards for the unions. This applied equally in the private sector and in the nationalised industries, where proposals were being advanced for trade union officials being considered for membership of boards of management at different levels. The IWC view was that workerscontrol should be seen as an extension of collective bargaining, not as an alternative to it. Critics of the IWC, in the Communist Party, for example, saw the whole IWC movement as a diversion from traditional trade union-organised resistance to arbitrary management.

    What had begun to activate trade unionists in the late 1960s was the impact of capitalist reorganisation involving mergers and take-overs and accompanying closures. A paper which I had prepared on ‘The Controllers of British Industry was considered at the 1967 Workers Control conference in relation to a paper by Tony Topham on the current role of the increasing numbers and importance of union shop stewards. Tony showed that trade union shop stewards main activities were concerned not with questions of wages less than a third of their time but of job security, safety, and working conditions. At the same time, in 1967, Ken Coates was reminding us of Marxs warning to workers that fighting with the effects of their employment conditions was not the same as fighting the causes of those effects. A fair days wage for a fair days work was a laudable aim, but it fell far below the revolutionary watchword, ‘the abolition of the wages’ system’. In  responding to  th2011  riots in  English cities it  is  worth remembering how it is that, even among those who are employed, most men and women at work are not in control of their activities, but involuntarily and arbitrarily subordinated to the will of an employer. Workers control remains a claim to human freedom, and that was what Ken Coates was reasserting in 2003 in recalling the struggles of the 1960s and 1970s

    In 2003, in Workers Control: Another World Is Possible, one important contribution to the case for workers control was added by Ken Coates in an essay on ‘Education as a lifelong experience’. This essay not only expounded the case for life-long learning, through adult and continuing education, which had been the occupation of Ken himself and of many of those involved in the founding and development of the IWC; it also put forward a case for a different connection between work and education. In this vision the aim of education should not be a preparation for employment in a division of labour organised by owners and controllers of capital, but rather a development of the capacity of all men and women to build a co-operative commonwealth, in which human labour is not divided but united. The training of shop stewards in the development of workerscontrol could be seen in this light as something very different from the perfection of work study and scientific management espoused by F.W.Taylor in the Ford factories in the United States. Ken had found much evidence of the dehumanising of work processes in a book by my father, written in the 1930s, The Machine and the Worker, based on what my father had learnt from his students who had come on from working lives to Ruskin College, where he was the Principal. I found that things had not changed much when, in the 1970s, I became the founding Principal of the Northern College, the ‘Ruskin of the North’.

     After 1968, the responses of workers trade unions through work-ins and sit-ins as the alternative to plant closure were proposed and tried. The most famous took place in 1971 at Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS), in the shipyards on the Upper Clyde River in Scotland, but it had been preceded, in 1969, by a proposed sit-in at the General Electric Company (GEC) Merseyside plants, which Tony Benn visited when he was Minister of Technology. From that time on, Tony became fully involved in the work of the IWC and a close association developed between him and Ken Coates. Tony Benn had met the GEC shop stewards and been most impressed by their arguments, although the takeover was ultimately annulled. Two years later, as Shadow Industry Minister following the 1970 General Election, when the UCS workers, facing a shut down, voted unanimously for a similar takeover to that proposed at GEC, Tony Benn visited Clydeside and gave every encouragement to the shipyard workers. The IWC prepared pamphlets in support of a work-in and defended the workers case in various forums, including the Heath Government Inquiry, which was established. An important volume was contributed by Robin Murray, who included a comparison with workers control in the Split shipyards of Yugoslavia. A major victory was achieved when, in the end, public funding was obtained for a surviving nationalised shipyard complex. At the Labour Party Conference in1971, the visiting UCS delegation received an ecstatic welcome.

    Workers’ control is not something which is exercised in the abstract. It has to be related to fulfilling actual needs. These needs had been distinguished by researchers quoted by Ken as comprising all elemental needs of food, clothing and toiletries, environmental needs, such as housing, leisure, transport, and needs related to the person, such as education, sports, health, and cultural provision. Determining the priority of such different needs encouraged the concept of a social audit, which I examined in an IWC pamphlet in 1971 (UCS The Social Audit). This considered all the effects on employment opportunities, benefit costs, lost taxation and so on of plant closures. This principle was then applied to other plant closures coal mines in Yorkshire, steel works in Sheffield, Imperial Typewriter factories in Leicester and Hull, and Chrysler motors in Coventry. But the most imaginative application of this concept came from the Lucas Aerospace workers, who, beginning in 1974, drew up a detailed blueprint of the alternative uses in socially useful provision to which their skills could be applied. The whole range of products, from a hob cart for paralysed patients with spina bifida to coaches which could travel on road or rail, gave rise to many technological advances.

    By 1974, enthusiastic support for workerscontrol came from the accession to leading positions in their unions of the two trade unionists, Jack Jones of the Transport and General Workers and Hugh Scanlon of the Engineers, who were strong supporters of workers control. This led Harold Wilson to promise, in the General Election of 1974, to socialise the nationalised industries and set up a Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy. This was duly set up under the chairmanship of Lord Bullock, who had been the head of an Oxford College. The IWC submitted its own recommendations concerned with preserving the essential independence of the unions. Stuart Holland and I had already presented to the IWC conference in 1973 a ‘Model for Developing Workers Control’, where management would consist of equal numbers of representatives of employers, or of government in the case of nationalised industries, and of trade unions, with a chairman acceptable to both sides, subject to veto. Bullocks solution was to propose boards for companies consisting of equal numbers of representatives of shareholders and of trade unions, plus a third group of mutually agreed technical representatives. This proposal was countered by a highly divisive proposal that consumers should also be represented but how could they be selected? Ken responded that the problem could be met by the establishment of planning agreements democratically reached by government consultation on specific issues. Little came of this on a national scale, but many local authorities, especially in the north of England, developed this kind of planning agreement. By 1977, some Yorkshire County Councillors associated with the Northern College were walking about with badges proclaiming ‘The Socialist Republic of South Yorkshire’.

    Efforts to proceed along these lines at a national level petered out under Callaghans premiership in 1977-9, however, and the Bullock commission came to nothing. But a whole number of Workers’ Producer Co-operatives were established, often with the direct ministerial support of Tony Benn, before he was removed from his post as Secretary for Industry. His successor, Eric Varley, had once written a pamphlet for the IWC on self- management in the coal industry, but did not follow that up with support for worker co-operatives. None the less, a good number survived for a period, such as the Triumph Meriden motor cycle company, joining other longer-standing co-operatives and worker-owned enterprises such as the Scott Bader Commonwealth, which operated a chemical factory in Wellingborough. Opposition to such developments came, perhaps surprisingly, from the Communist Party, which argued, going back to Marx, that such co-operatives formed a diversion from revolutionary aims. Other Marxists, such as the Belgian Ernest Mandel, a good friend of Kens and mine, argued in favour of all attempts at social revolution, even modest ones, and this view was strongly supported by Ken himself.

    When Ken comes to sum up the experience of those who struggled to realise the aims of the IWC, this is what he wrote:

    ‘If they had any criticisms of democratic institutions, those criticisms would emphasise the need for fuller, not less stringent, accountability and openness. But they did show, both in their many brilliant individual initiatives and in their courageous joint activities, a burning need for quite new institutions, from which none could be excluded from the means to the fullest moral life available to any. The rebirth of socialism, which is what we are talking about, will be a true renaissance of individual human freedom, if it takes its growth points from such people as these. Precisely in so much as shipbuilders, coalminers, clerks and engineers are determined to widen the areas of choice and the material scope for self-fulfilment which are available in their own personal lives, and in so much as their combined actions serve these individual goals, the new commonwealth itself begins to come to life.’

    This was written in 1981, in Work-ins, Sit-ins and Industrial Democracy (Spokesman Books), when there were three million unemployed under the new Thatcher regime, which had followed the disastrous Winter of Discontent’ in the last year of the Callaghan Government of Labour, that followed Harold Wilsons retirement. What Mrs Thatcher set out to do was not only to destroy the power of the unions and the central role of mining and manufacturing in the economy, substituting services and, most particularly, financial services, but, above all, to replace the search by workers for individual freedom through a form of commonwealth with a purely individualistic freedom of private property starting with house ownership. ‘There is no such thing as society, only individuals and families’ she declared. And this became the accepted goal throughout the long Thatcher years, followed by Majors premiership, and no less enthusiastically embraced by Blairs New Labour. Recovering the goal of a commonwealth would not be easy, but Ken never lost hope.

    The massive number of IWC publications during more than 20 years – the regular Workers’ Control Bulletins, more than 90 pamphlets, dozens of books, the three annual issues of the 300 page Trade Union Register, with reports from several industries of strikes, sit-ins and other demonstrations of workers’ solidarity, plus a diary of events and current employment and unemployment statistics the annual conferences and innumerable seminars in different industries, all attest a vibrant organisation reflecting a deeply felt need that will not disappear.

    Many popular organisations, concerned about climate change and community involvement, some under the leadership of Transition Towns’, have recently been advancing a major challenge to the power of finance capital and, recently, Glasgow University students sitting in to protest arbitrary cuts made by management in their syllabuses, recalled the inspiration of the workers at Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, quoting from the University rectorial address, in 1971, of Jimmy Reid, one of the UCS leaders:

    ‘Alienation,’ he said, ‘is the precise and correctly applied word for describing the major social problem in Britain today it is the cry of men who feel themselves the victims of blind economic forces beyond their control. It is the frustration of ordinary people excluded from the processes of decision making.’

     

    Such memories do not die but are deeply treasured. The alternative to choice left to a market dominated by giant capital and its hangers-on is conscious choice by men and women in the situations that they know and come to understand case by case.

    Reprinted from www.spokesmanbooks.com

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  • English
    06/01/16
    This is the first in a series of pamphlets published by the Institute for Workers Control since the late 60s, arguing in favour of the workers assuming control of the british industry.

    The whole question of workers' control is once again becoming an important issue in the British Labour Movement. In some ways, the situation today is analogous to that before the First World War. Expansion of Industry, coupled with inflation, in the years up to 1914, provided the basis for aggressive union action and the growth of ideas concerning workers' control, culminating in a historic pamphlet, the 'Miners Next Step'. It provided the impetus for the growth of the Shop Steward Movement, which arose during the war years itself.

    The depression of the inter war years, with the resultant high unemployment, produced a largely defensive struggle by the labour movement, with the unions concentrating on the vital function of attempting 'to defend minimum national rates of pay. In these adverse conditions, the demands for workers' control over their environment and industrial destinies, died hard. The T.U.C. in the 1930's was formally converted to the Morrisonian concept of the running of nationalised industries, as exemplified in the London Passenger Transport Bill. This denied direct workers' representation, a view only arrived at after long and bitter debate. Modifications to Morrison's views had to be made in the 1930's due to the strength of the opposition from many trade unions which called for 'workers participation through their Trade Unions in the direction and management of nationalised industry at all levels.'

    After the 2nd World War, 'the T.U.C. reverted to its earlier position 'by abandoning demands for direct representation except on consultative 'bodies, for nationalised industries. This was a position that the then Labour Government in office fully shared. It is significant that in these years, dissident voices were raised, including unions such as the Union of Post Office Workers and the N.U.R., who had full experience of the type of 'Joint Consultation' practised in the nationalised industries. The only unionists on the Board of nationalised industries, as laid down in policy agreed by the T.U.C., were those who had formally severed connection with their own

    union. Direct representation by workers in management was completely excluded. The A.E.U. then, as now, rejected this approach. The A.E.U. spokesman at the 1948 Labour Party Conference stated that "we have always argued in the Socialist Party that brains are not a monopoly of any particular class. I certainly believe and am convinced that there are sufficient brains within the Trade Union and Socialist movement to warrant a greater proportion of seats on the governing bodies of nationalised industries". There was an increasing recognition that if it were merely a case of trade union appointment by government there was great doubt whether such a change would influence ordinary workers, since there was no more of a direct link with new nominees than with the present ones.

    The debate was interrupted, for all effective purposes, by the return of a Tory Government in 1951. Current interest can now be said to have revived not only because of the return of a new Labour Government, but because of important changes in the Labour Movement which can be seen as a product of the boom period itself. The British Labour Movement has changed from the days of the thirties. Never has the labour movement in this country been stronger, more confident and more experienced largely as a result, not only of technological change, and the integration of white collar 'specialists' within the Labour Movement, but because of relatively full employment. Trade Union membership has doubled since the 1930's and the increased confidence of workers has reflected itself in the development of strong shop floor organisations, which have been able not only to bargain very effectively for increased earnings at a local level, but also question the 'prerogative of management'.

    There already exists, particularly in fully unionised industrial concerns, a considerable degree of workers' control in individual factories if 'workers' control' is defined as effective control by organised workers over the arbitrary powers of management. This is indeed 'the seeds of the new society inside the old'. Shop Stewards prefer, and seem to get more out of, workshop bargaining than the type of 'consultation' favoured by management. 'Joint consultation' committees tend to be limited by the assumption that management should only agree to share responsibility on controversial and common interest issues, like manning, it cannot do more than consult'.[1] But workshop representatives see things very differently. Shop Stewards 'tend to believe that any subject which affects their members is a fit and proper matter for negotiations and agreement; they also are inclined to think that conflicts of interest can just as easily arise over questions such as the introduction of new machines or output levels as they can over wages and hours'.[2]

    'This radical move away from the defensive mentality of the past is graphically shown in the facts concerning the causes of industrial disputes. It has been shown that between 1940 and 1960, the proportion of strikes, (excluding strikes in the mining industry) not directly concerned with wage increases but connected with disputes such as about working arrangements, rules and discipline have risen from about one-third to three-quarters of the total. In 1960, a T.U.C. survey showed that only 32 % of strikes were directly about money; 29% were about dismissals alone.

    In this brief survey it is dear that the changes in the Labour Movement since the thirties is making nonsense of the concept of a purely 'economic man', limited to actions in defence of his standard of living. Far wider issues are involved today.

    Yet even the extension of the current type of 'workers control' can be seen as holding only a watching and limiting function on the 'rights' of management. Workers are demanding an effective voice in management policy. This aspiration is particularly concentrated in regard to the nationalised industries, where obviously the greatest scope is offered for the demand that management 'be obliged to obtain the consent of workers in all matters of industrial policy. Trade unions envisage a radical extension of the scope of collective union action, from a point beyond wages and salaries to human conditions of employment in its broadest aspects.

    It is in this light that union proposals on the structure of a nationalised steel industry, for example, are being based. The National Craftsmen's Co-ordinating Committee for the Iron and Steel Industry has submitted detailed proposals. Thus, at the Combine or group level it is proposed that the appointment of a head for the Operating Board should be subject to ratification by a Group Workers' Council. These Workers Councils, according to the N.C.C.C. proposal should 'be elected on a half and half basis from the appropriate trade unions and from shop, mill or office committees, and they should have the power to receive reports on all policies and to ask for detailed costing of all departments. At plant level, both the chairman and management representatives should be ratified by departmental committees or by the Workers Council, while ha1l the membership should be drawn from elected workers' representatives. At shop, mill and office level, the proposals are even more radical. Indeed they urge that democratically elected committees should subject to ratification the appointment of shop managers and foremen, the deployment of labour, promotion, the hiring and dismissing of workers, safety, welfare and disciplinary matters. They should also have special responsibilities for training and education, and other responsibilities delegated from the combine or group workers council.

    The machinery suggested gives workers and unions both the powers of scrutiny and of veto, and so allows for the extension of workers influence on management beyond the limitations of defensive collective bargaining. Yet even on the most democratic system of workers' influence on management beyond the limitations of defensive such as the steel industry, serious problems must be faced. One problem is of course the perpetual dilemma of trade unions in discussing the question of work s' self-management, in that trade unions cannot easily double the part of protective agencies, democratically responsible to their members and required to carry out their membership's wishes, on the one hand, and joint policy makers and managers of industry; responsible to the public at large for efficiency and increased production, on the other.

    But perhaps the most immediate problem so far as workers' control in the nationalised industries is concerned, is the position of these industries in a predominantly private enterprise economy. The evidence is overwhelming that nationalised industries in the pas t have been used primarily for the benefit of private industry. There is the problem of the run-down of some of these industries, such as coal. In the case of steel, the Benson Committee estimated that while the industry produced 27 million tons of steel in 1965 with 317,000 workers, in 1975 the estimated figures are 35.3 million tons with 215,000 workers. This one example underlines a fundamental dilemma; what is to happen to workers in a declining industry and how would the problem be approached and solved under workers' control?

    So one is forced to take a wider view than that of workers' control in the present nationalised industries. It is questionable whether such control can ever be effective within a specific sector without the 'commanding heights' of the economy coming to public ownership. Indeed. without public ownership of the major sectors of industry, a rational basis for effective planning, which will allow a full system of workers' self-management and control, cannot be fully implemented. If the nationalised industries are dependent on the working of the Whole economy and if the economy is dominated its largest sectors, by private ownership, even the most democratic system of workers' control in an industry such as steel has built-in limitations.

    So we are compelled to examine the prospects for workers' control in the major, private sectors, of the economy. Even in the most 'progressive' firms in the private sectors, 'workers participation' tends to run up against a brick-wall when it comes to the most vital aspects of company policy and managerial functions. Workers are held to have 'rights' to welfare, representation of grievances, and a share in those aspects of policy-making which do not challenge profit-making, While employers have 'rights' to dispose of their property, including the labour they hire, according to managerial policy. This conception gives rise to the 'separate spheres of interest' formulation which undermines all schemes for workers' participation and thus limits the scope of joint consultative bodies. There is still, in all essentials, the preservation of financial, technological and long term planning functions from any workers' veto.

    Full consultation of this nature, though progressive, can only be a pale shadow of workers' full participation. Obviously trade unionists should support any method of consultation in private industry that limits the arbitrary decision-making of management and extends social accountability. But recent developments have sharply outlined that the power of management to unilaterally take decisions completely contrary to workers' needs and aspirations is in reality unchanged. The recent spate of big mergers and their methods of 'rationalisation' place the most elementary needs of jab-security in danger. The example of the A.E.I. closure at Woolwich shows the futility of a blind faith that these giant monopolies will acknowledge pressures for social accountability. Only full public ownership can give both workers and the general public control over these vast combines. Only through nationalisation of these giant monopolies can both effective planning on a national level, and an effective system of industrial democracy, to supplement the shell of political democracy (itself a product of the struggles of the working-class movement) be properly and effectively carried forward. The nationalisation of the basic industries under 'workers' control at all levels' is official A.E.F. policy. The Labour movement cannot rest contented with a tenuous and limited say merely in the functioning of welfare facilities. This is particularly true in the present industrial climate of larger and larger monopolies, only really accountable to their own shareholders, who may well become a threat to political democracy itself. In this connection the slogan of 'open the books' to allow accredited workers' representatives to pursue the financial ramifications of these vast combines is a concrete first step towards the development of social accountability.

    One cannot give any kind of detailed blueprint for such a radical transformation as a transition to a socialist society under full democratic workers' self-management; what we can do is to analyse certain tendencies and safeguards that can be the basis of proposals to map our route without falling into the twin traps of .local. fr -for-al1s and excessive centralisation. Certainly with nationalisation, workers must not the made to feel, as they certainly do at present, that there is only a political change while there remains an industrial status quo. Fundamentally, the aim within public ownership is the wearing down of sides in industry, with no 'superiors' or 'inferiors' but only differences and functions based on knowledge and ability. Only through public ownership could there be this real will to cooperate.

    There need be no real contradiction between the necessity for integration and centralisation of resource planning in a modern developed economy, and a structure of democratic decision-making that allows flexibility and the development of local initiative. It seems a false assumption to counterpose the two. Indeed the decentralised 'market' criteria of the Yugoslav pattern constrain the workers' freedom in work (irrespective of works-council decisions) and hamper the development of the economy. A caricature of a market economy cannot give workers effective decision-making powers over an economy. At the other extreme, a 'national plan' run purely by a small circle of bureaucrats at the top, as well as being unacceptable to the democratic aspirations of the British labour movement, is also economic nonsense in an advanced, highly complex industrial system. The consumer, although having no formal industrial rights, has a vital part to play in exercising controls over prices, quality and choice. Indeed the election of consumer committees at all stages of price and production determination would help to direct industry to the service of the community. The impetus that a nationalised, planned economy would provide to the expansion of consumer industries makes vital this type of full democratic participation in decision-making by both workers and consumers not only for the democratic, but in the economic interests, of the public.

    A central planning medium needs the democratic participation of works committees and consumers, as well as specialist advice. Communication in industry in national, as well as plant planning, is a necessity. Ideas, aspirations and. intentions need to have full access and be encouraged upward, whilst explanations, snags and problems should move downward for discussion and .the creation of an informed working populace. The works committees, rising through industry to national planning, need the safeguards of all political democracy in order to discuss and decide upon alternatJ.ve plans for economic and structural development. Even where there is full workers' control in the industrial plants, workers will be discuss, and draw up the central plan itself, and have the opportunity to modify or change it in tune with changing circumstances or needs. Here the element of flexibility becomes all-important.

    There must obviously be a recognition that specialists would play an important, and possibly more vital role under a structure of workers' self-management. Staff appointments, carrying such duties as design, experiment and research would remain with a high degree of autonomy in their research. Managers with over-all operative duties could work under the guidance and eventual control of representative bodies of workers, holding the power of appointment, promotion and dismissals. Every workshop or department could elect, by secret ballot, representatives to deal with managerial functions and in tum consult frequently with workers. Large factories might require interdepartmental committees, but for smaller plant, the next stage would probably 'be factory administration. Administration would embrace different functional divisions, com­ prising members of primary committees together with consumers. Administrative factory committees could 'be endowed with power to select managers who in turn would appoint supervisory grades, at least in the initial stages. Representatives from Factory Commit­ tees, elected to Industrial Councils could be enabled to work out policies relating to the whole industry, and provide a link with other industries and planning authorities. The necessity for control must be balanced by the freedom which enables individuals to apply their own ideas, while keeping in mind, and making allowances for, the wider needs of the community.

    It has often been argued that a centralised planning medium of MUs character will 'inevitably' lead to a new ruling caste of managers and bureaucrats. This is obviously a point that needs to be carefully examined, in particular to see what safeguards, both organisationally and inherent in the structure of the society itself , would militate against this. Obviously the maintenance of political freedom to democratically discuss conflicting views of planning would be a powerful safeguard. But this by itself is not enough. The trade unions' role in a nationalised economy can also be an important factor in this direction. There is an essential need to preserve trade union independence. The unions must not 'be directly involved in controlling industry. The value of the unions will lie in their ability to take independent action to redress industrial grievances and act as a media for protection against injustice. Even in the content of a plan, there is scope for unions to act as bargaining agents and to play a role in determining wages.

    Institutional checks can 'be introduced to halt any tendency towards an irresponsible bureaucracy. The right of recall of representatives by the membership and the interchangeability of positions would go a long way in this direction. However the main check to the growth of administrative autonomy by specialists would be provided by the benefits of a socialised economy itself. It has always been a basic socialist thesis that a planned economy would lay the basis for a tremendous increase in material resources, leaving room not only for a swift reduction in the working day (with the use of automation) but allowing, on the foundations of rapid economic growth, for a great extension in educational facilities. Obviously one cannot induce democratic involvement in industry by a stroke of the pen, but an effective participation needs a technologically educated work force. One cannot afford to examine the viability of workers' self-management in a static sense; techno­logical advance could more than be equalled by cultural advance through the growth not only of administrative experience but of vastly improved educational resources. A reduction in the working day to allow time for study would greatly accelerate this process.

    Workers already have the knowledge necessary to effectively increase this country's material resources. We have probably the most industrially experienced work-force in the world. But why should workers bring forward constructive ideas for the efficiency of a plant if it means their employers' gain and with the possibility of their work mates being made redundant as a result? Democratic self-management of industry by the workers themselves would release the long dammed up potential of the worker's hard-won experience. They would see that their creative ideas and suggestions would work, purely and simply for their benefit, and for the benefit of the community. This provides the basis for a new psychological attitude towards work, and thereby a raising of both cultural and material levels.

    The British Labour Movement has the industrial and organisational experience of generations behind it. We can learn from the experience of other countries that have undergone a transition to the beginnings of a socialist society. And we can remember that as a highly advanced country, with such a strong working-class movement, such a transition can be accomplished more swiftly and easily in Britain. It can genuinely lead to the development of workers' control in industry and politics. We have the opportunity and the potential to make realisable the old socialist aspiration of a society geared, not to the exploitation of man by man, but simple administration by free men over the material abundance of the World.

    Endnotes:

     

    [1]. Cf. W. McCarthy, Evidence to the Royal Commission on Trade Unions.

    [2]. Ibid.

    Originally published on 31st March 1968

    Reprinted from http://www.socialistrenewal.net

    Many more of the IWC pamphlets can be found online here.

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  • French
    05/01/16

    Le passage d’une entreprise en Scop est à chaque fois un cas d’espèce qui dépend de nombreux facteurs comme le pays où a lieu ce passage, le moment du passage, la mobilisation dans l’entreprise et hors de l’entreprise, la force de l’organisation syndicale, les lois sociales et les législations commerciales et même aussi le fait que le statut de Scop n’existe pas dans la législation de certains pays. Par ailleurs, les salariés sont parfois peu formés pour construire un dossier de création d’entreprise avec un « business plan » et d’autres pièces légales. Par ailleurs, l’idée de se retrouver « sans patron » peut provoquer, si ce n’est une panique, au moins une inquiétude. Vendre sa force de travail est une pratique classique alors que prendre le risque financier sans garantie en est une autre.

    Il faut aussi, la plupart du temps, pouvoir mobiliser un capital non négligeable, ce qui est rarement à la disposition des salariés d’une entreprise. Il n’existe pas toujours des fonds institutionnels et les banques sont peu disponibles pour amener leurs ressources dans la corbeille de mariés. Certains pays sont dotés de législation du travail avec des services publics de l’emploi et surtout des indemnités de chômage qui permettent de constituer le capital de démarrage mais d’autres pays n’ont rien dans ce domaine. On dit souvent qu’il n’y a pas de modèle mais il y a quand même des obstacles à franchir.

    Chaque cas est particulier mais il y a des « invariants » qui sont autant d’obstacles à franchir

    Quand une entreprise ferme il y a des causes qui sont variées : le marché qui a changé, l’incompétence du patron, une crise économique, parfois la recherche de plus grand profit en « réalisant un potentiel immobilier » qui devrait permettre de « faire un bon coup ». Le passage d’un savoir-faire à un autre que constitue une coopérative n’est pas une chose simple et nécessite une formation qui est aussi une cause d’angoisse pour des salariés qui n’ont pas toujours vécu leur période scolaire avec bonheur.

    Un exemple : le monde de l’imprimerie et du livre qui a connu plusieurs grandes mutations depuis 40 ans. Le passage des presses typos aux presses offset a été un changement radical de technologie et donc de savoir-faire, certes faisable, mais qui a souvent été perçu comme un échec probable et humiliant. De même, le passage de la composition au plomb et le montage des pages à la main à la photocomposition avec l’usage de techniques numérisées, c’est-à-dire l’informatique avec visualisation sur écran, était aussi une grande source de difficultés dans les années 1970 et,  aujourd’hui, les techniques sont encore loin d’être stables. Cette mutation a été en grande partie réalisée mais elle a été l’occasion de nombreuses luttes en France, en Europe et d’une façon générale partout dans le monde. Ce n’est pas un hasard si c’est un secteur où de nombreuses coopératives se sont créées.

    On pourrait aussi citer ce qui s’est passé dans bien d’autres secteurs comme l’horlogerie, la chimie, la métallurgie, la construction automobile, l’agriculture voire l’informatique qui est particulièrement mouvante. J’en passe et des meilleures.

    Une autre cause est la spéculation financière et les manipulations économiques qui ont frappé de nombreuses fois. L’exemple le plus connu est l’Argentine où la catastrophe a été considérable mais où les travailleurs ont trouvé les ressources pour maintenir leur emploi par la création des coopératives. Le film « The Take » de Naomi Klein relate nombre de ces exemples.

    Les problèmes tels qu’ils se posent

    Le premier des invariants est donc la faillite avec ses causes variables et la nécessité de maintenir son emploi. Vient ensuite la nécessité d’une formation, ce qui suppose de régler la double question : qui paye le prof et qui paye l’élève ? Il faut une réelle force syndicale ou une forte mobilisation pour assurer cette étape.

    Créer une coopérative revient à créer une entreprise, ce qui amène à se coltiner les problèmes législatifs, trouver un local et des machines, des matières premières qui permettront de réaliser une marchandise. Pour faire tout cela il faut des financements qui ne tombent pas facilement.

    Il faut aussi prendre en compte la réalité du marché et développer un service commercial et un service logistique. Dans certains cas, il faudra aussi organiser et soutenir un service après-vente. Toute erreur dans ce domaine se paye comptant pour une SCOP.

    Créer un SCOP place chaque salarié au même rang de pouvoir selon le principe « un salarié une voix » ce qui est plus facile à dire qu’à faire car souvent il existe de « vielles dettes » qui traînent et qui doivent être surmontées. La règle démocratique s’impose donc rapidement et comme l’entreprise existe dans un monde où les salaires sont variés, il faut donc trouver sur cette question des réponses viables, notamment sur le long terme. Mais entre les assemblées générales où le principe égalitaire existe, il y a le quotidien qui impose des décisions et une direction élue. Enfin il y a la nécessité de faire circuler l’information ce qui est relativement facile à dix ou vingt mais devient rapidement plus complexe quand le nombre des salariés est plus important.

    Ça vaut la peine de prendre le risque

    Sans diffusion de l’information il n’y a aucune possibilité de faire évoluer le statut des uns ou des autres dans l’entreprise. C’est souvent par ce biais que se développe une bureaucratie qui amène à croire que les rôles des uns ou des autres est immuable.

    Je n’ai fait que rappeler les réalités sans entrer dans les détails et souvent « le diable se cache dans les détails ». En plus, quand une SCOP est crée il faut qu’elle vive, c’est-à-dire qu’elle puisse résoudre les problèmes qui se posent. En bref une coopérative c’est beaucoup de travail mais se passer d’un patron est un vrai plaisir qui vaut la peine de prendre le risque.

    Association Autogestion
    5 janvier 2016
    http://www.autogestion.asso.fr/?p=5682

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  • English
    02/01/16

    Worker-controlled companies often apply the principle "production for use, not for profit", using their existing skills and machinery to switch production towards the fulfilling of human needs and away from environmentally and socially hazardous products.

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  • English
    02/01/16
    A paper that traces the emergence of Argentina's recuperated workplaces as responses to the neoliberal restructuring and appraises their achievements and the challenges they face.

    The worker-recovered enterprises (empresas recuperadas por sus trabajadores, or ERT), defined as productive business units abandoned or emptied by their owners and put into operation once again by their workers under self-management, are a relatively new phenomenon in Argentina and, on the whole, in Latin America. As such, they have attracted much world attention, especially after the Argentine crisis of December 2001.
    Nevertheless, the ERTs represent much more than a series of 
    labour conflicts that culminate with the taking of factories and enterprises by workers. It is important to understand this process within the context of the almost total destruction of the nations productive apparatus and the sentencing of millions of workers to unemployment and structural marginality. Putting ERTs back into production signifies much for the almost 10,000 ERT workers that havengaged in these important and novel struggles, both from an economic as well as from a political and cultural point of view. In support of these workers, a research project out of the University of Buenos Aires has been developed to explore the historical, social, and economic contexts of the issues leading to the ERT movement and their particular characteristics and challenges. This research includes not only quantitative and qualitative data (detailed in the book The Recovered  Enterprises in Argentina (Buenos Aires: Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, University of Buenos Aires, 2005 ) but also a conceptual analysis pivoting on the concept of social innovation rooted in self-management. Fundamentally, we have come to understand this social innovation to include the strategies and methods destined to generate forms of productive units outside of the paths dictated by the capitalist form of economic organization.

    We present these ideas as a contribution to the panel on recovered factories and enterprises iArgentina.

     

    The thinking and imagination of intellectuals and popular movements from around the world were greatly impacted by the Argentine rebellion of December 2001, especially in Latin America. During the 1990s, Argentina was presented as an exciting experimental laboratory for neoliberalism, where, in actuality, one of the strongest of the so-called “welfare states” established on the continent was rapidly and ferociously dismantled. It was a dismantling that converted a broad system of organisms of public assistance, social security, and state enterprises into a state reduced to its most minimal of expressions.

     

    In reality, the Argentine state was re-rationalized towards other ends by using mechanisms of control that reaffirmed the hegemony of an economic power block bound up in imperial interests. In this sense, many popular organizations had confused a particular characterization of the Argentine situation: The state was not scrapped, as many believe, sold off as if outdated. Rather, the processes that Argentina was subjected to fundamentally reconfigured the state, returning the goods and services that Argentine society had managed to secure under the orbit of the state, by way of myriad struggles and political expressions, to a new oligarchy (a remodeled version that was qualitatively different from the old agro- exporting oligarchy). Throughout the 90s, this regression that opened up the floodgates to a conservative liberalism, with echoes that reached back at least half a century, was set upon a base of neoliberal global hegemony that, in its turn, rested on the victory of imperialism during the Cold War and a hitherto unheard of electoral and media consensus. Never before had Argentine society accepted the official discourses of the political and economic right so totally and in such a disciplined way. The reelection of Carlos Menem in 1995 was a categorical expression of this sentiment.

     

    This is why the rebellion of December 19 and 20, 2001 took more than one observer, including the militant blocks of Argentinas social and popular movements, by surprise. The social explosion that occurred during those days completely escaped the possibility of being conducted by political parties, unions, or any type of popular organization. At the same time, the social sectors that took part in the militancy of December 19 and 20 were so broadly mobilized that they did not appear to respond to any type of program or strategy. Not even the firmest of theoretical speculations of conspiracy (as sketched out by some analysts and journalists) could show, beyond the intention of or the real existence of certain manipulations and maneuvers, that any particular Argentine political or economic power possessed an apparatus of such magnitude and capacity effective enough to provoke such a national rebellion. To date, the following question has always remained: If such a political apparatus large enough to mobilize such rebellion ever did exist, how can it be explained that this force was never exercised in the past or since? There is no other explanation for Dec. 19 and 20 besides concluding that this rebellion was actually a social convulsion of massive proportions, where different sectormobilized because of the perception that the country was in the midst of a national disaster of unheard of proportions, made possible by the brutal rupture of the hegemonic neoliberal ideological consensus of the 1990s.

     

    These impact-filled days in reality were the expression of a confluence of several socio-economic factors: the desperation and hunger of the most neglected classes; a fury over the levels of structural unemployment not experienced in a country such as Argentina until that moment; the indignation of middle class sectors due to the confiscation of their savings; the perception that life projects and the much-promised possibility of rising in social status that dream of the grand” and “empoweredArgentina that had enraptured generations had disappeared, witnessed in the rise of individualism and the loss of the most entrenched forms of social solidarity; and political manipulations that saw existing apparatuses of power casting out their nets. All of these factors meshed with the astonishing stupiditof a government that did not understand what was going on and that stubbornly clung to a standard of political life that turned its back on reality.

     

    While this panorama provoked a regime of accumulation that produced a critical clash of intersecting economic, political, social, and cultural forces, no popular organization or movement proposing fundamental changes to the social and economic structures of Argentina could take advantage of this scenario. And while it is also true that the insurrection helped put the brakes on the inexorable journey to ruin that the old Argentina was on, it did not, nor did it know how to, lay the foundations for constructing a new society. Now, more than four years after those events, a new government that originates from the same sectors that formed part of the power structures of the 1990s (granted, a secondary part) still continues to demonstrate the inheritance of those days even within the new limits it is bound up in. That is, even though the new hierarchical power-base has succeeded in notably disabling the force of earlier social mobilizations, it operates within the limits sketched out by those earlier social mobilizations when necessity and public opinion demands it to not return to the visible symbols of neoliberalism.

     

    The social phenomenon that we have been succinctly discussing thus far (one that, of course, deserves a much more profound analysis than space permits here) gave visibility to the real consequences of the neoliberal political model within a dependent country and, as such, showed the weaknesses of this model. At the same time, it permitted the vast tapestry of organizations and popular experiences to expose through its threads the light that emanated from the Argentine mobilization of 2002. In this way, popular assemblies, unemployed workers’ movements, barter clubs, cooperatives, and other expressions of popular movements organized because of the political and economic defenselessness of society, emboldened as they were, placed themselves within the national and international publics’ consideration. One of these popular expressions has become the centre of much discourse the world over: the recovered factories and enterprises that were occupied by workers in light of owner abandonment or fraudulent bankruptcies and put back into production by workers under the rubric of workers’ cooperatives or some other form of self-management.

     

    The excitement of seeing thousands of workers take into their own hands the management of their enterprises and start production under their own control has provoked a plethora of articles and reflections that have characterized this phenomenon as a revival of the European workers’ councils of the early years of the 20 th century, or as a stimulating return of the vanguardist workers’ struggles that seemed to have disappeared with the coming of the neoliberal storm, or even as a profound expression of the anti-globalization movement. This phenomenon, known in Argentina as the worker-recovered enterprises movement (el movimiento de empresas recuperadas por sus trabajadores, or ERT), constituted as it is by self-managed workers, has become a stimulant for theoretical debates concerning the challenges of constructing the politics and economics of a new working class power-base, the dynamics of the newest social movements, and the possibilities for the solidarity economy. Meanwhile, with the passage of time, the other social phenomena that became visible after the Argentine December have mostly faded away: the barter nodes have converted themselves into a parallel monetary network that has mostly withered away in light of the recovery of the formal economy; the neighbourhood assemblies have evaporated in light of the mistaken tactics of some of the organizations of the left but, principally, because of the progressive disinterest of the neighbours” due to the institutional and economic normalization of the country; and the unemployed workers movements (movimiento de trabajadores desocupados, or MTD), better known as the piqueteros, have gradually converted themselves into organizations tied to preexisting political sectors, causing the MTD to be discredited from public opinion, molded as this public opinion is by the mass media and by a lack of collective middle class mindfulness. This last point deserves to be clarified briefly: The middle class no longefelt linked to the MTDs because they are, for many in this social sector, a troublesome and unremitting presence that discomfortingly reminds them of the existence of great masses of the population that have remained marginalized and humiliated. In contrast, the recovered enterprises have become a durable social and economic phenomenon that has garnered the adherence of, or at least the comprehension of, a populace that has revalorized the practices of defending the sources of work and the struggle for the recuperation of the productive mechanisms of the country.

     

    During these years, the number of worker-recovered enterprises in existence has risen from around twenty in the year 2000 to more than 160 ERTs to date, employing more than 9000 workers.  These cases have placed into discourse not only the working and everyday lives of these workers and their families, they have also provided a model of production for an economy that is just emerging out of neoliberal catastrophe, a strategy of political and economic action for the working lass of Argentina and Latin America, and examples of practices of popular solidarity. This is no small feat, considering that over the past 15 years the Argentine labour movement has only succeeded in barely defending itself

    and negotiating pacts with established power that is, as long as this power was willing to negotiate. Moreover, these protections” were at the expense of the marginalization and hunger of millions of workers, the same workers that are now beneficiaries, or victims, of social assistance plans or that thicken the ranks of the movements of the unemployed, urban recyclers, cartoneros, social delinquents, or all of them simultaneously.

     

    At this point, something else must be stated up front: The theoretic consequences and the resultant political practices that can be discussed from the perspective of an analysis of the experiences of ERTs must not be debated from visions extraneous to reality. We believe that the ERTs constitute a dignified case study that can be discussed and debated by the entire ensemble of popular Latin American movements. We believe they provide characteristics that can help to rethink some of the ideas with which the working class is conceived in addition to its possibilities for carrying out political and economic action. But we also believe that this rethinking must be based on a foundation of consistent actuality, substantiated by a solid reading of concrete experience. If we were to begin from another perspective, we would merely be discussing imaginary hypotheses, as imaginary as those that saw the days of 2001 as a revolution, the barter clubs as an anti-capitalist economic network, and the germ of new soviets in the neighbourhood assemblies. After all, those who now occupy bankrupted enterprises are real, flesh and bone labourers, ideologically and politically formed within the traditional Argentine labour movement, or in no movement at all, and who are obligated to initiate the road to self- management despite the enormous struggles that that necessity implies within a dependent capitalist system in crisis such as Argentinas. These workers are forced to choose this long and risky road because of their circumstances and the impossibility of doing anything else other than take their future into their own hands. While these circumstances are, in some ways, similar to what Marx began to indicate in the Communist Manifesto of 1848, they are, perhaps, in other ways, very different from the future-oriented and powerful working class revolutionary organizations that have subsequently tinted world history.

     

    The sinuous paths of self-management

     

    The processes of self-management spearheaded by workers have a long history, beginning with the first experiences with cooperatives in the industrialized England of the mid-18 th century. In Argentina and Latin America, even when they emerged out of situations of labour conflicts, these processes occurred in only a few cases and in exceptional political and economic contexts (such as in Chile during the Popular Unity government).  If we exclude the vast and deeply-rooted, but somewhat differentexperiences of the cooperative movement, the experiences of workers taking over enterprises iArgentina were few, mostly scattered cases throughout the 70s and 80s.

     

    The phenomenon of the recovered enterprises as we know it today that is to say, the phenomenon of workers restarting production in otherwise legitimately or fraudulently bankrupted firms as a reaction to the threat of being hurled into structural unemployment is a process associated with another type of socio-economic situation that emerges out of the hegemonic and regressive neoliberal politics of the 90s. The experiences of ERTs are, therefore, about the responses of workers to a situation of extreme necessity in the middle of a seemingly irreversible process of deindustrialization. Traditional union methods, inefficiently positioned to offer any type of efficacious response that would prevent the passage of the Argentine worker into conditions of virtually permanent unemployment, together with the experiences of unemployed workers’ quotidian struggles for subsistence, gave way to a new, costlyand conflictive strategy that was, nevertheless, perceived by its protagonists as the only possible way of preserving jobs. This marks a major difference with all preceding processes of self-management, demarcated and politically conceived as the ERTs are by more offensive, rather than defensive, labour postures within conjunctures favourable to the development of practices that put capitalism into question.

     

    As an economic phenomenon, the recovered enterprises are a consequence of the deindustrialization that submerged the productive structure of Argentina beginning in the early years of the 1990s. In almost all of the cases that we have analyzed as part of our investigative team, the productive unity in question experiences a long process of deterioration that, at the moment of occupying or recuperating the enterprise, contains considerably less workers than it did before the takeover. Furthermore, its machinery is generally obsolete, its installations precarious, and the fleeing boss has usually left a heap of debt, not least of which usually includes the unpaid salaries of workers and the indemnifications of unemployed workers.

    The phenomenon of the abandonment of enterprises owes its conditions not only to the macroeconomic policies of Domingo Cavallo and his minions,  but also to the fraudulent maneuvers realized by impresarios in tune with the reigning model of financial valorization.  This provoked situations in which, rather than a take in the traditional sense insisted upon by the history of labour movements, the occupation of the factory by its workers appears as a response to the capitalists abandonment of workers within an empty factory, a factory without capital and devoid of work.

     

    To be more precise, the workers who confront these socio-economic and -political situations in thiway do not necessarily engage in these processes as offensive moves but, more correctly, as moves that are activated by the reality of being left to their luck within a hostile environment, an environment that renders completely sterile the traditional weapons of the unionized working class. Not only did the successive governments of Carlos Menem and Fernando de la Rúa charge themselves with destroying the labour victories that were up until that time entrenched in Argentine legislation, but, in addition, there were no official outlets in place for workers to appeal for compensation, nor were there anplaces of employment left for them to offer their labour. In a country where work became a scarce resource, unions were practically left without a role to play. If we add to this the fact that the union leadership had converted itself, in the majority of cases, into a mafia-like appendix of business bosses, the scenario that the worker was confronted with could be characterized as being the most catastrophic in over 40 years.

     

    The characteristics that see occupied establishments eventually become ERTs have revealed to militants and intellectuals of the left interested in such cases dramatic moments rarely seen. However, beforeven thinking about constructing another system or fighting for the control of the means of production, for workers, remaining in their places of work constituted a plank of salvation that prevented thefrom shipwrecking in a shark infested sea. That plank was, however, slippery: the law condemned these workers, the economy risked drowning them, and the political class ignored them, concentrating as it did in its own salvation. Hence, the solidarity of the left was received by the desperate as one of the only sources of support indeed, they were not only thankful but were valorized by this solidarity in the face of no other support.

     

    The year 2002 saw a multiplication of cases of recovered enterprises embodying the same characteristics weve been presenting. In the film by Avi Lewis and Naomi Klein,  despite attempting to show something else, one can clearly see what weve been currently discussing in the case of the Forja San Martín factory. There was little political discussion amongst its workers and the workers’ organization of the occupation seems to clearly come from their desperation at the prospect of loosing their places of work. This clearly contrasts with the case of the Zanón ceramics factory and even with the Brukman textile plant, both symbols at the time of the lefts tendency to demand for the control of the means of production by workers. The documentary framed Forjas triumph of securing the temporary law of expropriation by its workers as an example of the possibilities that undergird the struggles of ERTs for the greater global battle against neoliberal capitalism. Nevertheless, if the documentarians had continued to follow the case up until the present their optimistic conclusions would have mutated into very different ones. Forja San Marn eventually closed itself off to the solidarity of the neighbourhood and the movements that link themselves to ERTs. The personalities that appear to lead the struggle in the film were eventually expelled from the cooperative and the plants leadership was ultimately replaced by the politically reactionary worker who is mocked in the film for sympathizing with Carlos Menem. Also, the agreement with the tractor manufacturer, Zanello, ultimately failed. Moreover, the film has been repudiated by a considerable number of cooperatives affiliated with one of the largest ERT organizations for favouring a “foreign-looking vision of struggle rooted in the anti-globalization, Marxist-leaning class.

     

    Not all cases are like this one, of course. The case of Forja is possibly one of the more extreme ones considering that the change in workers’ subjectivities that many social psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists identify as one of the principle consequences of the ERT experience is not asignificant as many of us would like. Many workers have not substantially modified their perception of the world that surrounds them, even given the experiences of deep change that they have lived through within these processes. Many others, already accustomed to the presence of cameras, journalists, and investigators, orient their discourse towards what they think each visitor wants to hear. Paradoxically, this situation played itself out in the case that the emblematic representatives of the worlds movement against globalization chose for attempting to demonstrate that the world can take another path from the one which obligates us to carry on within the global capitalist system. If they had chosen another case, perhaps they would have succeeded in getting closer to what they were looking for in post-2001

    Argentina. The problem does not reside with choosing an exemplary case study, but rather with not understanding the ERTs in the context that gives them their origins. Such understanding relies on anchoring them onto a social, economic, political and cultural process that is profoundly inserted in the history of Latin America and the particularities of Argentinas capitalist system that is informed by the greater experience of the struggles of the countrys working class. To begin the analysis of the ERTs within this latter context provides one with the understanding that would indeed inform the global fight against globalizing capital. Approached from any other perspective, we think that one could arrive at sympathetic yet completely false conclusions.


    A few particularities in the recovery of enterprises by their workers in Argentina


    Defining what a recovered enterprise is is not as easy as it might first appear. It is a concept that emerges out of the heat of struggle and from its very worker protagonists who, with use of that specific nomenclature, hope too put into relief the difficult events that surround the recovery of workplaces. That recovery is, moreover, more than just about the recuperation of jobs it is also about the recovery of the embattled economy of the country. In situating themselves thusly, ERT protagonists position themselves within the historical trajectory that is not linked to the anti-capitalist working class struggle but, rather, to the struggle rooted in traditional Peronist syndicalism.

     

    Nevertheless, that workers should recover an enterprise that capital has abandoned or self- destroyed, or bankrupted, emptied, or however else one would like to denominate the process by which impresarios abandoned or left an enterprise in the hands of its employees is not looked upon with any sympathy by the economic powers-that-be. Inserting workers within the kingdom of private property even when the proprietors have left the terrain open (although a terrain resembling more a scorched field) has provoked proprietors to react indignantly and fearfully towards the acts of worker-led workspace recoveries.

     

    If dominant power in Argentina behaves permissively with regards to recovered enterprises it does so only because of the social legitimacy that ERTs have, in addition to the relative economic weakness of ERTs. To the proponents of the classical liberal right, such as, for example, Juan Alemann, an ex- minister of the military dictatorship,  the ERTs are all about simple, vulgar, and dangerous thefts. It is, inverting Proudhons assertion, a theft against property. After a series of arguments based on various legal points (the very legality that was imposed genocidally) and the logic of business (the same logic that collapsed the countrys economy), these proponents end their critiques by pronouncing that the self-managed enterprises are a lazy-persons paradise.”

     

    In a conversation with technocrats of the Inter-American Development Bank (IBD) who were setting up a proposal for rotating funds for ERTs in mid-2003, some of us from the investigative team at the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters at the UBA were surprised when they told us that “Washington” had rejected the term “recuperado” (recovered), preferring the term “self-managed” enterprise. That is, self-management does not seem to scare technocrats of international financial organisms, but recovery does. This is due to the fact that self-management, understood as cooperativism or the social economy – “the economy of the poor” – does not bother big business and the dynamics of entrenched capitalism. But to “recover” a firm, with the appropriation of a once capitalist enterprise by simple workers, is another matter.

     

    In attempting to advance a definition, we can consider recovered enterprises as a social and economic process that presupposes the existence of a previous company that functioned under the model of a traditional capitalist enterprise (which may include cooperative forms) and whose process of bankruptcy, being emptied out, or its lack of viability, pushed its workers into a struggle to start production once more under self-management. We chose the word recovered” (when self- management or recovered under self-management could appear to be more precise terms) because it is a concept that the very workers, the protagonists of the process, use and because, as we have already alluded to, it implies the notion of the occupation of a previously functioning firm. It is about a process and not an “event.” Recovered enterprises are not only ones that are producing again, or ones that have been expropriated, or that have formed into a formal work cooperative, or whatever other criteria one wants to use to reduce the case to a single aspect without considering its totality. Rather, a recovered enterprise is a productive unit that traverses a long and complex process that eventually brings it to be collectively managed by its workers.

     

    The ERT movement returns workers, who actually live in the bosom of production, to the centre of the scene; it returns workers to the centre of the very fight for which economic model will prevail, in concrete terms. The movement once again situates the social and political struggle for work at the centre of societys contradictions that is, the struggle that exists between labour and capital. In that sense, it is fundamental to realize that ERTs are not a phenomenon that can be completely assimilated into the so-called social economy or solidarity economy.” The social economy, in addition to being driven by international monetary organisms as a way of mediating the inevitable effects of neoliberal reforms, is also driven by NGOs and sometimes the very state as a wall of containment in the face of social ruptures, as has been the case in Argentina. At the same time, these social economic solutions often succeed in prolonging the dependency of the most neglected sectors of society on donations or state subsidies. Furthermore, they often entrench NGOs too-tightly into the system, which, long-term, only serves to impede the struggle for returning unemployed workers to the formal structure of productivity.

     

    As we have seen, ERTs overflow the notion of the social economy after all, they are involved in the struggle for resituating workers within the productive apparatus and they do it in a way that also permits them to debate the social relations in which they participate in within the greater political and economic discourse that they find themselves in. If they do successfully return the firm to production, they have to insert themselves into and contend with a hostile capitalist marketplace and its traditional rules. Regardless of how strong the relations of solidarity are inside of and ERT, they necessarily must confront the problem of inserting themselves into relations of the marketplace that have nothing to do with a solidarity economy.

     

    At the same time, the so-called social economy, from this perspective, is not a phenomenon that should be discarded wholesale. It is, after all, a potential social space of debate where ERTs, with their explicit or implicit questioning of private property, have something important to say. The relations between ERTs and certain sectors of the solidarity economy are necessary relations with much political and economic potential for the future. In sum, it could very well be that the discourse that the movement of recovered enterprises is putting on the table critically questions the failed attempts to separate social struggle from the political clash of classes that neoliberalism has attempted to impose as a model.


    ERTs as productive units


    In the book The Recovered Enterprises in Argentina (Las empresas recuperadas en la Argentina) – based on an exhaustive study of over 70 cases of recoveries which was carried out throughout 2004 and published in 2005 we have sketched out a general picture of the characteristics and situations of ERTs as social, economic, and political phenomena. In synthetic form, we present in the following

    paragraphs a few of what we believe to be the most important findings for understanding the general problematics of the movement before we tackle a few of its more specific current problems.

     

    To start with, we are looking at a phenomenon that is found throughout Argentina and in numerous industrial and service sectors. The distribution of ERTs within the countrys regions and industrial sectors is not random but has a tight relation with countrys economic structure and with the hardest hit sectors of the neoliberal offensive of the 1990s. This is reflected in the fact that 60% of ERTs are clustered within metropolitan Buenos Aires and the majority of the ERTs in the interior of the country are concentrated in the most industrialized areas of the provinces of Santa Fe and Córdoba. Fifty percent of ERTs belong to metallurgical industries or other manufacturing industries, 18% fall into the foods sector, and 15% to non-industrial service sectors such as health, education, and lodging. Onl12%of ERTs correspond to enterprises that were founded after 1990; indeed, a high percentage (65%) had plants in operation before 1970, the great era of Argentine industry.

     

    Furthermore, if we were to mainly focus on how many workers the average ERT employs, the majority of ERTs can be categorized as small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)   on average, ERTs have just over 20 member-workers. This having been said, the number of workers employed is certainly not the only possible criteria for classifying the importance of an ERT. We must also consider the enterprises productive capacity and production turnover, among other factors. However, both of these factors are difficult to calculate for ERTs because they are enterprises in the midst of being recuperated and because they usually have installation capacities that supercede actual production (on this latter point, this is not only a situation that has afflicted the worker-managed firm, it has also plagued the firm in its final days as a traditional enterprise). These are considerations that obviously extend to productive turnover and revenue generation. In addition, categorizing an ERT by how many workers it has can undervalue the importance of the enterprise, given that many of them lost salaried workers in the course of its crisis for various reasons, not least of which was the fact that a substantial number of workers could not endure the process of struggle that undergirds the recovery of a firm. When we jointly consider these facts we come to better understand why it is that there are shortages of workers in most ERTs when compared to the potential productive capacity of each enterprise.

     

    If we compare the number of workers that these enterprises employed in their most expansive moments with the enterprise after recuperation, we see on average a diminution of almost 70% of its labour capacity not attributable to technological change or business reforms.  This diminishment parallels the long process of deterioration of Argentinas economy and industrial-base, and especially the precarization (euphemistically labeled flexibilization) of labour conditions prior to the conflict. Workers that manage to survive these processes and crises and ultimately succeeded in occupying and restarting production under self-management, usually find themselves confronted with further

    structural difficulties the most urgent being the need to be able to provide for the everyday necessities of their families. In the face of these needs, and heightened by the nagging presence of the possibility

    of the destruction of their lives and the lives of their families, all potential resources for the firm become valid. This is especially in a country submerged in the most significant crisis of recent history.

     

    The long process of occupation and the return to production, which averages several months (more than nine months for recoveries that were initiated in 2001, 15 months for recoveries that occurred in 2002, and seven months for those recovered in 2003 and 2004 ), is a substantial obstacle for retaining the most qualified workers or workers who possess the most marketable skills, such as administrative or managerial personnel. That is why in most cases the group of labourers that remain working in ERTs are those that dont have any other choice but to stay on until the very end. As such, ERTs tend to lose those workers that have the best skills to reposition the firm back into the market. What is more, the improvement of the Argentine economy over the past two years has provoked this problem for many ERTs: Those ERTs with highly specialized workers that had the chance to market their skills

    somewhere else tended to abandon the self-managed firm in light of higher salaries in competing firms. Some of these more marketable workers, rather than limiting themselves by matching their salaries

    with those that are perceived to be less qualified than they are, have found greater returns by becoming self-employed or even by contracting themselves back out to the ERT.

     

    The problem of equality

     

    This last point brings us to one of the main problems that confront the internal economic and social dynamic of ERTs. The traumatic process of occupation and the conflict surrounding the recovery of a productive unity moulds the drive for worker equality within the collective, which moves it beyond leadership statuses or differences in seniority or hierarchical positions that were present in the previous iteration of the firm. Subsequently, the notions of equivalent salaries  and equal hours worked have become grounding political principles for the organization of self-management within most ERTs.

     

    Nevertheless, as the ERT recovers its business capacity differences begin to emerge between qualified and unqualified workers, in the number of hours worked by each worker, in the different responsibilities assumed by each worker, etc. These differences are not minor since those workers that feel like they are burdened with the weight of managing the firm or carrying out the most concrete aspects of the firms’ work perceive equal pay as unfair in scenarios where the actual work load is unequally distributed. Furthermore, the mechanisms of collective dispute resolution in these internal conflicts do not always work, mainly because most workers have not practiced or experienced the responsibilities of management before, let alone self-management. Moreover, because many workercontinue to think like salaried employees, those who assume the responsibility of conducting the affairs of the ERT run the risk of transforming themselves, in the eyes of the rest of the workers, into new bosses, even when they make the effort not to do so.

     

    These problems are not unique to ERTs but are rather related generally to the recent social history of Argentina. The rejection of hegemonic politics and the reaction against the betrayal and inefficiencies of the so-called political class” have obscured the sense of personal responsibility towards the countrys most recent events. That is to say, if Menem destroyed the country during his ten-year government tenurship, he was able to accomplish this in part because the majority of the population tolerated it, even while millions of compatriots were being condemned to misery and structural marginalization. The late reaction to this process in very few cases included the self-criticism of this attitude. The fault for Argentinas socio-economic descent was, on the whole, laid on the doorstep of those politicians” thatstole everything,” while everyday corruption and the lack of organization and mobilization by the majority of the population against these politics of privatization did not form part of, in general, the cry of ¡Que se vayan todos! (Everyone should leave now!”). In some ERTs, this boss of social conduct reproduced itself in small scale, especially in the bigger factories with more than 100 workers, where the lack of working capital and the negligible attention paid to them by the state (or even the outright boycott of the ERT by the state) produced enormous difficulties for starting or continuing production. This dilemma is heightened by the fact that these bigger firms necessitate greater volumes of capital to stay afloat. As such, many grave conflicts between workers have subsequently been unleashed in many of these ERTs, conflicts that, mind you, are not unlike those that may naturally arise within trade unions situated in traditional firms. In these cases, the ERTs workers’ councils are characterized by the rest of the workers as the boss,” without taking into account that this boss was elected by them, often without further considering that the very structure of the entire workers’ cooperative may be carrying within it the actual institutional baggage they are railing against, and often without coming to understand the enormous difficulties that the factory is submerged in.

    As we have said before, we do not find a great degree of change in worker subjectivity: The majority of workers continue to work and wait for their pay cheques at the end of the month with the expectation of safeguarding the same approach to their jobs as before. Most workers not only lack a general understanding of their new collective responsibilities, they also lack commitment to the tenets of the very self-management they must take up. In actuality, when the workers’ council or leaders in question have made a mistake or have acted dishonestly, the majority of workers are co-responsible for the lapse due to their own omissions or lack of commitment.  In addition, these situations tend to nourish the maneuvers and ambitions of certain organizations, spokespersons, or officials that have learned to, rather than assist in resolving an ERTs economic hardships, profit from the instability of the firm. The solutions” they proffer essentially consist of managing the ERT, thus taking away the responsibility of managing the firm from workers. Having said this, some workers are glad to give up such responsibilities because they only desire to work, thus willingly giving up the opportunity to negotiate jobs and otherwise manage the ERT. This acquiescent attitude, however, too often means that workers give up control of the firm to an unscrupulous cohort.

     

    If financial difficulties help create these types of internal conflicts, provoking reactions reminiscent of syndicalist tendencies on the part of some workers, the drive for economic efficiency can lead to other kinds of problems that force some cooperatives to find solutions that pull them into scenarios that resemble those they faced when they worked for a boss. Even when the productive recovery of the ERT has been efficiently undertaken due to favourable macroeconomic circumstances that allowed it to rapidly reinsert itself into the market (especially when type of enterprise that it is has allowed it to survive the crisis), when the installations remain in fairly good working order after the crisis, or even when the reorganization of the firm is a good fit with self-management (almost always due to much personal sacrifice on behalf of the workers), the ERT still must face the challenges that either stagnatit or permit it to grow. Taking on these challenges is necessarily linked to how the firm reinvests revenues back into the firm in order to improve and maintain its machinery and installations, as well as incorporate new workers.                                           

    Rather than being a test of the efficiency of self-management and a mark of the success of the workers’ in managing the enterprise with effectiveness and solidarity, this last point has frequently become a nodal problem. It is here where the following question gets tested: Is the ERT truly a self-managed firm ensconced in solidarity, or is it beginning to take steps back to becoming a new kind of hierarchical organization under a new type of bossWorkers that were present during the crucial days of the struggle often feel, perhaps with some grounds, that they areowners” of the recovered enterprise. These workers subsequently become apprehensive of any new workers because they are perceived to be a threat to their own jobs. This apprehension is usually linked to the view that these new workers have not had to go through all of the problems that older workers and their families have had to endure. While this perception, of course, tends to ignore the difficulties that these new workers have most likely gone through somewhere else when they became unemployed, more fundamentally, such views might be indicative of unequal forms of conduct that do not bestow on new workers the same treatment that the original workers established for themselves. Following are a few common scenarios that illustrate some of these asymmetrical dynamics: the trial period of new workers might get prolonged indefinitely; the cooperative might subcontract other workers under salaried or labour contracts that are less favourable than those bestowed to cooperatives’ members; workers might continue to perceive and point out substantial differences between workers that do the same job; new workers might be excluded from the political

    rights that other members of the cooperative enjoy; and so on. Sometimes, these asymmetrical practices are written into the cooperatives statutes, acting as precautionary measures that are consciously taken before accepting new workers into the cooperative as full members. Atother times, these same practices serve as steps towards creating a collective of employers, simultaneously driven by the fear of losing their much-struggled-for jobs while also being stamped with the mark of exploitation. These are some of the problems that ERTs currently face, two to three years or so after the period where it seemed that each week one or two plants were being taken by their workers as they struggled to convert them into recovered enterprises. The present period in the history of ERTs in Argentina is marked more by quotidian struggles than by political struggle. Once workers’ control of the enterprise is obtained, most affinities with organizations of solidarity that lie beyond the walls of the plant, be they with neighbours or other social movements or even other ERTs, takes on secondary importance.

     

     Once the ERT is past the urgencies of its initial conflicts, the internal life of the enterprise, with all of its challenges and complexities, becomes the main concern. The organizational movements that in various ways represent the ERTs via their organizational intentions to help form into a unified social- political sector and with their hegemonic pretensions and politics subsequently become vague and ill-determined external reference points for ERTs. At times, these representative organizations have become types of surrogate managerial bodies for those ERTs where its workers feel more at ease leaving managerial duties in the hands of experts or where they accept being subjects of clientelistic practices in return for solutions to certain legal and political problems. This structure is mostly linked to the personal leadership style of a certain lawyer, Luis Caro, and the organization he leads, the National Movement of Worker-Recovered Factories (MNFRT). The other major organization, the National Movement of Recovered Enterprises (MNER) has practically disintegrated, thrashed as it has been by the internal disputes of its leaders (the majority of whom have never worked in an ERT before), its cooptation by and its battle with the national government, and due also to the lack of political vision by these leaders. At core, however, what has driven these situations, it must be emphasized, is the low level of worker commitment towards the continuation of the movement beyond each workers own enterprise.

     

    These scenarios of fragmentation are not that different from the situation we find in other social movement sectors in Argentina. The main difference between these social sectors and the ERT movement is that the organizations that form its core are, while mostly positive for the ERT movement, weak enough so as not to provoke the wrath of the state. Up till now, the ERT movement has not threatened the capitalist state system because it lacks a common political strategy, especially in the demands that these organizations that represent ERTs make of the state. Each recovered enterprise or factory is also an entity onto itself, and its success or its failure is dependant on, first and foremost, its own workers rather than the organization and solidarity that the collectivity of ERTs can muster as a sector. The divisions between and within the organizational movements (that is, MNER, MNFRT, etc.), their different politics, and their confrontations, place ERTs as a social sector in a fragile situation that lessens their capacity to pressure the greater system. This works against the possibility of an ERT movement that has internal solidarity and that practices mutual assistance, thus impeding thinking through comprehensively and collectively the problematics they jointly face. On the other hand, and at the same time, the existence of these organizations has permitted ERTs to put forward its demands to various state organisms with a certain level of constancy. Furthermore, the type of support and advice they receive from these organisms, linked to the consistency of their lobbying efforts, have been crucial to ERT workers, especially in the first stages of their struggle which are the most difficult and decisive stages in not only the process of taking over the plant but ensuring the viability of workers’ control. Fragmented and all, the existence of these representative organizations have also given public visibility to the greater ERT movement, as well as transmitting experiences and providing indispensable political contacts to budding ERTs so that every new case of workplace recovery can assimilate the experiences of its predecessors and not have to rediscover everything once again, which would be a costly and a potentially fatal waste of time for any infant ERT.

     

    Social innovation

     

    The critical overview of the actual situation of recovered enterprises that we have laid out thus far has aimed to contribute to the discourse concerning the problems and the potentialities of the Argentine experiences of its ERTs as a reading of its challenges and concrete processes. Nevertheless, we do not claim that the efforts of thousands of workers have led to, as a final and irrevocable destiny, the reinsertion of bankrupted enterprises into the capitalist marketplace, the conversion of myriad workers into new impresarios or proto-impresarios, or the formation of a new managerial bureaucracy. While ERTs could transform themselves into these traits, the contrary is also possible that is to say, it is possible that the phenomena of ERTs are alluding to the coming into being of a new form of enterprise, under the collective management of workers, where solidarity is the preponderant and creative value, and, breaking through the enormous difficulties they face, where alternatives to exploitative labour relations are experimented with.

     

    But critical analyses of crude interpretations of ERTs’ experiences does serve to alert us against the frequently held attitude of bestowing onto these workers protagonists all, given their novel processes

    the absolute responsibility of profound social change. After all, there is no change more difficult than the one that concerns transforming economic relations, the Gordian knot of capitalism. At the same time, such crude visions permit us to better valorize the real processes of transformation actually attained by this group of workers: a series of concrete social innovations in which the self-management of production and the formation of solidarity networks, once-absent from business life, have been put into play.

     

    Those who approach the reality of these enterprises are surprised and fascinated by the extraordinary surge of these islands of collectivism in the sea of savage capitalism that has transformed Argentina since the genocidal dictatorship of 1976-1983. But once the real, but still nascent, possibilities offered by ERTs are contextualized, they must be played down once one goes deeper into these processes of change, as we’ve endeavoured to do in this text. This contextualization should, however, obscure the real processes of change that have actually been realized and that lie at the heart of these enterprises. Thelp conceptualize these changes, we propose putting these processes into focus as social innovations, differentiating them from the social innovations that correspond to techno-scientific fields.

     

    Some authors, in particular, a group of Brazilian thinkers,  have used the concept of socio- technological fit to analyze the processes engaged with by ERTs. Their work takes off from the premise that the technological organization of production under capitalism needs to be adapted to the new social conditions of self-management. As such, to fully develop workers’ self-management, so these writers theorize, one needs to produce a socio-technical fit that permits utilizing technology in ways that help foment relations of solidarity within production. Of course, in order to maximally accomplish this socio-technical fit, ERTs need to be surrounded by a different social system that permits the development of technologies that are specifically thought through from the perspective of collective management. As is more than obvious, we are far from that scenario. How do we, then, find this fit in order not to continue to reproduce old forms of production that, in the short or long term, end up imposing the logic of capitalism on ERTs?

     

    Perhaps the response to this crucial questions is that this is impossible under current conditions if we continue to rely on old technological guidelines and think through ERTs as an absolute responsibility of the workers that protagonize them. To do so is, as we have already stated, to impart absolute responsibility for social, political, and intellectual change to workers workers which, as we have also already explained, were, because of the economic and situational necessity that burdened them, forced to take the path of self-management. This is a conundrum that, to use a concrete historical example, the Soviet Union was not even able to resolve.

     

    Nevertheless, the reality of the social innovations that have been spearheaded by ERTS, without proposing changes in technologies or the organization of production, surprises us. Notwithstanding the transformations that were forced onto ERTs by precarious contexts, rather than by the will of workers or by their capacity to construct a different productive logic, ERT protagonists have succeeded in sketching out business structures that have different masters from those laid out by capitalist business models. These innovative practices are consistent to most the recovered enterprises. They start with the very act of intending to self-manage capitalist-abandoned enterprises without the mediating role of revolutionary processes. The control of an enterprise by workers within the mark of capitalist crises and without revolutionary pretensions such as those instances that occurred in other countries throughout

    the 20 th century is, one must say, something novel. When we consider the socio-economic and socio- political conditions that drove these cases, the novelty is even more pronounced. Contrary to the cooperative or associative will that motivates the majority of enterprises within the so-called solidarity economy, ERTs emerge from forced situations that give them impetus to form relations of solidarity in the face of an adversity that compels them, in some way, to create solutions to seemingly insoluble problems.

     

    For them, the business logic of capitalism must be broken, although perhaps the protagonists of ERTs do not necessarily think about what they are doing in this way. We call these ruptures in the conceptualization of business practices social innovations. They are not or, better said, they tend not to be technological innovations but, rather, different social mechanisms used to operate a business that continues to function within the context of a market. And we must remember that we are talkinabout a market that belongs to a society that has been subdued by neoliberalism, with its ripped knitting of social containment that lies in the midst of a critical situation lived through by society in its entirety. Moreover, these social innovations exceed the practices of collective management and the egalitarianism of the workers who live them (and whose difficulties and challenges we have already discussed). They are mainly about the opening of the factory to the community, about the socialization of business secrets, including, more than a few times, business costs, the state of machinery, and the productive capacity of the enterprise. Many ERTs, for example, have adopted as one of their principal articles of faith aligning themselves with the notion of theopen factory. This article of faith contrasts with the notion of the factory of the impresario, always remaining closed to all, including the state and, especially, in myriad ways, to its very workers.

     

    This open factory has its roots in the emergent conditions of the recovered enterprise, whose workers had to appeal to social solidarity in order to save their jobs under the rubric of the occupation of the firm. In order to develop recovered plants as a productive unities that have survived bankruptcy, abandonment, or its emptying, with all of the well-known difficulties this process includes, ERTs have had to travel down a sinuous path that, in most cases, does not follow the economic logic that demarcates capitalist rationality. Indeed, no capitalist enterprise thinks of opening up its plant to the community that surrounds it by means of using its physical space for communal activities. These practices are not only unheard of in the capitalist enterprise, they are contrary to the very logic of capital. To open up cultural centres in a factory is not only not to be expected from a capitalist enterprise, it is anti-economic. And, moreover, this practice has nothing to do with technological fit within new conditions of management. It is simply a social or cultural innovation. And, furthermore, in various cases, this type of innovation, contrary to economic rationality, is a condition for the survival of the ERT. Thus, with this social innovation, we find ourselves, in reality, with a new economic

    rationality that is essentially different from the capitalist one.

     

    With many ERTs, opening up to the activities of solidarity has served to socially legitimate the process that pressures, from a position of greater force, political power and the judicial system to award the plant to its workers. With some ERTs, these practices are about returning the space to the community in thanks for the solidarity of the neighbourhood that supported, in myriad ways (including economically), the occupation of the establishment. In some cases, the opening of these spaces to economic activities very different to what was originally carried out in them had a dynamic effect on the group of workers that permitted them to more easily take over production from the previous enterprise. In all of these cases, we find ourselves with an innovative new road that merges away from the business paths established by the established systems rules of the game.

     

    These are the profound processes that make ERTs a point of rupture in workers’ experiences of struggle, irrespective of how the process continues to unfold. Even if the system were to close the breach that has permitted these exceptional situations, this fracture, as impossible as it was for many to have conceived of beforehand, has indeed already occurred. And the fracture occurred outside of revolutionary workers’ offensives, in the middle of an imperial hegemony that imposes its rules of play across the planet.

     

    As in other small or massive social, political, or economic fissures that have occurred in other latitudes, the recovered enterprises show the ensemble of social movements and popular organizations that fractures of the status quo are possible and although nothing assures us that the road will be easy that they must be taken advantage of. By pouncing on the opportunities that these fissures opened up, the Argentine working class has invented practices of social, economic, and cultural transformation almost without realizing it. And, they are coherent experiences of struggle already encompassing a rich yet still unfolding history of conquests, martyrs, triumphs, and defeats.

     

    For the first time in years, Argentine workers have begun to signal towards new roads of struggle and political and economic advance within our society. Most extraordinarily, these advances have happened not only despite the myriad difficulties they face within their the socio-economic conjuncture and the concrete implications of taking charge of an enterprise, but also despite workers’ lack of political and ideological development. After years of being on the defensive, some few thousand workers with their backs against the wall have begun to confront the forces mounted against them rather than continue to look for fissures in the wall in which to hide.


    Bibliography 

     

    Azpiazu, D., Basualdo, E. y Schorr, M., La reestructuración y el redimensionamiento de la producción industrial argentina durante las últimas décadas” (Buenos Aires: SUTNA, FETIA y CTA, 2000).

     

    Basualdo, E., Aspiazu, D., Abeles, M., Arza.C, Forcinito, K., Pesce, J., y Schorr, M.,El proceso de privatización en Argentina (Buenos Aires: Página/12 y Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 2002).

     

    Briner, M., and Cusmano, A.,Las empresas recuperadas en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. Una aproximación a partir del estudio de siete experiencias, en Hecker, E., Kulfas, M., Sanchez, F., Briner y Cusmano, Empresas recuperadas. (Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Secretaría de Desarrollo Económico, Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 2003).

     

    Dagnino, R. y Novaes, H. T., Mapeando mudanças em empresas recuperadas sob a óptica do Conceito de Adequação Sócio-Técnica (Sao Paolo, Brasil: Ponencia presentada al Encuentro Naiconal de Econoa Solidaria, 2004).

     

    Dávolos, P. y Perelman, L., La intervención sindical en las empresas recuperadas. Un estudio de caso” (En VI Congreso Nacional de Estudios del Trabajo, ASET, 2003).

     

    Fajn, G.,“Fábricas y empresas recuperadas. Protesta social, autogestión y rupturas de la subjetividad” (Buenos Aires: Centro Cultural de la Cooperación, 2003).

     

    Galera, J., Marnez, C., Nordvind, A., Pizzi, A., Ruggeri, A., Trinchero, H., y Valverde, S. Las empresas recuperadas: una experiencia de la clase trabajadora argentina,” En Galafassi,G. (Compilador), Nuevas prácticas insumisas en Argentina: aprendizaje para Latinoamérica. (Buenos

    Aires: Libros en red, 2003).

     

    Ghioldi, C., Supermercado Tigre: cnica de un conflicto en curso (Rosario, Argentina: Prohistoria,

    2004).

     

    Heller, P., Fábricas ocupadas. Argentina 2000-2004 (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Rumbos, 2004).

     

    Kulfas, M., El contexto económico. Destrucción del aparato productivo y reestructuración regresiva, en Hecker, E., Kulfas, M., Sanchez, F., Briner y Cusmano Empresas recuperadas (Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Secretaría de Desarrollo Económico. Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 2003).

     

    Lavaca, Sin patrón: Fábricas y empresas recuperadas por sus trabajadores:  una historia, una guía

    (Buenos Aires: La Vaca Editora, 2004).

     

    Lewis, A. & Klein, N, The Take: Occupy. Resist. Produce. Ottawa/Toronto: National Film Board of

    Canada, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Klein Lewis Productions (2004).

    Luxemburgo, R., “¿Reformismo o Revolución? en Obras escogidas (Madrid: Editorial Ayuso, 1978). Magnani, E., El cambio silencioso: Empresas y fábricas recuperadas por los trabajadores en la

    Argentina (Buenos Aires: Prometeo, 2003).

     

    Martínez, C., Procesos de autogestión en empresas recuperadas” (Ponencia al II Congreso Nacional de

    Sociología, 2004).

     

    Marx, C. El Capital. Tomo 3 (México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1992).

     

    Novaes, H.T., Para além da apropriação dos meios de produção? O processo de Adequação Sócio- Técnica em Fábricas Recuperadas.” Tesis de Maestría (Universidad de Campinas, 2005).

     

    Petras J., Veltmeyer H, Volnovich J.C., Hazaki, Pichetty V., Castel R. y otros, Produciendo realidad. Las empresas comunitarias . (Buenos Aires: Topia Editorial, 2002).

     

    Facultad de Filosofía y Letras (UBA), Programa Facultad Abierta, Informe del relevamiento de empresas recuperadas por sus trabajadores. En www.recuperadasdoc.com.ar (2003).

     

    Rebón, J. Desobedeciendo al desempleo. La experiencia de las empresas recuperadas. (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Picaso/La Rosa Blindada, 2004).

     

    Rebón, J. y Saavedra, I. Empresas recuperadas. La autogestión de los trabajadores (Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual, 2006).

     

    Ruggeri, A. Gatic: una empresa recuperada o una estafa más al pueblo y al Estado. En www.argenpress.info (2004).

     

    Ruggeri, A., La potica en las Empresas recuperadas (Ponencia al II Congreso Nacional de

    Sociología, 2004).

     

    Ruggeri, A.,Los trabajadores toman el control: Implicancias políticas de las empresas recuperadas en la Argentina”. Pensar a Contracorriente 2 (La Habana, Cuba: Editorial Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Cubano del Libro, 2005).

     

    Ruggeri, A., Marnez, C. y Trinchero, H., Las empresas recuperadas en la Argentina Buenos Aires: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2005).

     

    Sancha, J., Recuperación de fuentes de trabajo a partir de la autogestión de los trabajadores,” Documento de trabajo, Central de Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA) (2003).

     

    Schorr, M., Industria y Nación (Buenos Aires: Editorial Edhasa 2004).

     

    Ruggeri, Marnez, & Trinchero, Las empresas recuperadas en la Argentina.

     

    These figures represent the number of known ERTs and its worker protagonists as of February 2005 (Ruggeri, Martinez, & Trinchero, Las empresas recuperadas en la Argentina). According to the Ministry of Labours records, as of March 2006 there were roughly 183 ERTs throughout the country.

     

    Of course, we are talking about labour struggles within the bosom of a capitalist society. The case of Cuba is different because state power was taken and society was restructured based on a socialist model.

     

    Menems super-minister of the economy, Cavallo was the author of the celebrated law of convertability that fixed the peso to a 1-1 exchange rate with the US dollar. The interventions of this representative of the most concentrated sectors of the economy established crucial landmarks in Argentinas subordination to finance capital and the consequent debacle of the national economy. In

    1982, as the president of the Central Bank during the last years of the military dictatorship, he nationalized the external debt of private corporations. In 2001, the decadent government of then president Fernando de la Rúa again placed him at the helm of the national economy. This move came to have the disastrous conclusions that have subsequently become well known.

     

    Basualdo et al., El proceso de privatización en Argentina.

     

    Cases in which unions tried to cover up the questionable maneuvers of business owners and bosses were not few and far between by any means. Indeed, unions were far from protecting the interests of workers. Indeed, some unions have gone as far as reacting violently towards ERTs, with, of course, mixed results.

     

    The case of Brukman in this respect is informative. The bosses abandoned this textile factory in Buenos Aires right in the middle of the debacle of December 2001, asking the few workers that remained to take care of the factory. In the midst of the desperation of the workers, the solidarity of the parties of the Trotskyist left was the only support that the Brukman workers found early on in their struggle. The use of their tactics and political platform meant that the Brukman workers were presented before the press as vanguards in the fight for workers’ control, while they failed to form a cooperative like most other ERTs. This tactic exposed them to a sharp reaction by the impresarios within the

    judicial system, which carried over into a violent expulsion of the Brukman workers who then ended up camping out for months in front of the closed factory. The appearance of the right-leaning lawyer Luis Caro, who came with a proposal based on a solution that included forming a cooperative and entering into negotiations with the judge presiding over the case (a solution that was accepted by the majority of the workers), provoked the overthrow of Brukmans left-leaning supporters. Presently, the factory is functioning under much difficulty and their workers mostly support Caro, with only a small minority of workers identifying with the left.

     

    Lewis & Klein, The Take.

     

    See the web page of the National Movement of Recovered Factories (MNFRT):

    www.fabricasrecuperadas.org.ar. La Razón, Oct. 2, 2003.

    All data was gathered and realized by the team of researchers under the auspices of the University of Buenos Airess Open Faculty Program in 2002 and 2004 (Ruggeri, Martinez, & Trinchero, Las empresas recuperadas en la Argentina).

    In Spanish, SMEs are known as pequeñas y medianas empresas,” or PyMEs.” Ruggeri, Martinez, & Trinchero, Las empresas recuperadas en la Argentina. Ibid.

    This improvement of the Argentine economy is connected to the policies surrounding a weaker Argentina peso and the higher exchange rate, which drives exports while discouraging the importation of goods that can be produced within the country.

     

    Technically, there are no salaries per se in workers’ cooperatives but, rather, withdrawals (retiros). Nevertheless, in the minds of workers it is about salaries it is about taking home what in Argentina is called la quincena,” or the fortnightly pay cheque.

     

    While these scenarios have been observable in all types of ERTs, the bigger factories with more than

    100 workers are particularly susceptible to these dynamics. IMPA and Gatic San Martin (CUC) are two concrete examples that we are most familiar with.

     

    Taking on these challenges carries with it an opportunity cost because it also necessarily means that the workers’ collective must decide not to distribute all of its revenues amongst the ERTs workers. While these decisions may be suicidal for the ERT short-term, such decisions have nevertheless been made by many ERTs.

     

     

    Amongst others, Renato Dagnino and Henrique Novaes, investigators at the University of Campinas (UNICAMP), have, in various texts, attempted to work through the concept of socio-technological fitin relation to the ERTs. See: Dagnino & Novaes, Mapeando mudanças em empresas recuperadas; Novaes, Para além da apropriação dos meios de produção?

    Reprinted from http://www.globaljusticecenter.org/

    Translated by Marcelo Vieta.

    Andres Ruggeri is a professor at the University of Buenos Aires and the director of la Facultad Abierta, a program of research and support of the recuperated workplaces.

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    02/01/16
    This paper evaluates the role of self-management in achieving equity and efficiency drawing from the experience of Yugoslavia, an economy at least nominally self-managed on a system-wide scale.

    I. INTRODUCTION

     

    1. Problems with transitions in Eastern Europe have focused attention on alternatives to both central-planning and unregulated markets. Naive enthusiasm for the market has already begun to wane in the face of growing economic chaos and inequality, precipitating a search for more humane and stable forms of organization. Theoretically and in practice, worker self-management is being advocated as a system able to produce efficiently and at the same time distribute goods and power equitably. The purpose of this paper is toevaluate the role of self-management in achieving equity and efficiency from both theoretical models of the self-managed economy and the experience of Yugoslavia, the one economy at least nominally self-managed on a system-wide scale.

    2. Theoretical models derive from many different frameworks, distinguished from each other by assumptions about property rights, the level of competitiveness or openness of the economy and even the objectives of the worker-managers within their firms. At issue fundamentally are the degrees of inefficiency and inequality inherent in self-management. The major sources of theoretical inefficiency are an inability of self-management to secure full employment in the long run, vulnerability to inflation and a tendency toward less than optimal rates of investment due to ambiguous property rights. Inequality arises from the tendency of self-managed organizations to maximize their internal gains, rather than satisfy social goals.

    3. Solutions to the unemployment and inflation problems usually call for either further market reform to establish private property rights or government intervention to promote entry of new firms. Property rights concerns typically have been addressed by reformers with calls for private ownership, based largely on reference to the tragedy of the commons. On the other hand, concerns for preserving social ownership have led to government intervention in the form of taxation of established firms or attempts to harden budget constraints so that firms do not squander social capital.

    4. Each solution, government intervention or private ownership, does violence to some definitions of self-management. For example, with government intervention to maintain employment, conflict arises between the rights of workers in any one firm to control hiring decisions and the right of all workers to have a job. Which right dominates depends upon one's definition of self-management. If self-management is narrowly construed as autonomy of workers within any given firm, the cost of self-management may well be unemployment. Similarly, if worker ownership, not merely worker management, is considered to be a defining characteristic of self-management, the rights of workers who can afford to own their firms dominate the rights of those who cannot.

    5. Other models pose the issue in terms of a different set of defining characteristics of self-management, including enhanced enthusiasm, commitment and therefore productivity of workers who manage their own firms. From this theoretical perspective, the self-managed firm is necessarily more efficient than its capitalist counterpart because of the greater effort exerted by a self-determining workforce.

    6. Whether the individualist or the committed character of the self-managed firm prevails in reality derives to a large extent from the nature of the property and social relations in which the firm is embedded. For example, considerable recent work on the conditions necessary for cooperation focuses on destructive effects of private ownership on the trust and cooperation needed to make both heirarchical and self-managed firms efficient.

    7. The major thesis of the paper, based on an evaluation of Yugoslav experience, is that efficiency and equity cannot be based on self-management at the level of the firm. However appealing the ideal of control by direct producers, intrafirm organization is not the primary determinant of economic and social trajectories. Unemployment, inequality among sectors and regions and inefficient investment are hardly features of a desirable transition. Moreover, autonomous firms in a competitive environment seem to reproduce many of the least appealing features of the capitalist organization of work, among them intra-firm hierarchy. Any new economic system must be construed as a society-wide system of production and distribution, including but not reduced to structure of the firm.

    8. Further, the optimal form of organization for enhancement of self-management rests upon a form of social property that moves beyond a simple dichotomy between private and state ownership. Rather, social ownership and social property are relationships that may incorporate aspects of both private and state ownership where necessary, but both must emphasize the social nature of production and distribution. Concretely, social property can be privately or state owned, but the constraints within which production and distribution decisions be defined to reflect norms of equality and social responsibility.

    9. The first section of the paper briefly reviews the major theoretical literature on efficiency and equity in self-management. In the second section, the performance of Yugoslav self- management is evaluated briefly for two periods of reform, the 1960's in which markets were emphasized and the 1970's, when non-market methods of economic coordination were sought. The third section links failures of self-management to an insufficient development of the theory and practice of social ownership and social property. A final section addresses the role of social property in generating solutions to the failures of self- management revealed by Yugoslav experience.

     

     

    II. THEORETICAL VIEWS OF THE EFFICIENCY OF SELF-MANAGEMENT

     

    10. Beginning with the original Ward (Ward, 1967) and Domar (Domar, 1966) models of the producer cooperative, the focus of self-management theory has been the goal of the worker-managed firm. Although these models assume social ownership of means of production, what is seen to distinguish the self-managed firm is maximization of income per worker rather than profit as the goal. Thus the socialist context of the firm is relegated

    to the background. The self-managed firm is different from the capitalist firm not because private property in capital is abolished but simply because the two firms pursue different goals.

    11. Theoretically, the consequence of reducing the difference between capitalist and socialist firms to management structure is to define efficiency relative to the performance

    of the ideal competitive capitalist firm. Several conclusions about the inefficiency of self-

    management follow from using a capitalist “twin” firm as the standard of reference.

    12. In the simplest one variable input case, the behavior of the self-managed firm compared to its capitalist twin is “perverse”. The supply curve is backward-bending and prices are highly volatile in response to cost or demand changes. Most perverse is the result that if prices rise, the firm produces less, not more as the capitalist firm would do. Therefore, rising prices are associated with contraction of employment and output in self- management.

    13. Many extensions of the basic model have shown that the perversities dwindle with more reasonable approximations to reality, like multiple variable input and substitutability among inputs (Milenkovitch, 1984). Nonetheless, maximization of income-per-worker does have the undesirable effect of rendering marginal productivities of labor unequal across firms. Because hiring decisions are made on the basis of payment to the worker of a share

    of the firm's net revenue, firms will only hire workers if the addition to net revenue is greater than the current share, or the average net revenue.

    14. It follows that the equilibrium level of employment of each firm depends upon its average net revenue structure, and bears no necessary relationship to the marginal productivity of labor in other firms. In general, therefore, each firm operates at a different marginal productivity of labor. As a result, reallocating labor from low- to high- productivity firms would increase the level of output. The conclusion then obtains that self-management is inefficient because when workers maximize per-worker income the society as a whole produces less than is physically possible for a given level of inputs.

    15. Behind this result is the absence of a conventional labor market in self-management. No market wage exists to which the employment levels of all firms adjust and hence no mechanism is available for equilibrating marginal productivities of labor across firms. There is also no wage in the sense of a fixed payment for labor services, because all workers receive equal shares of the net revenue. From these characteristic features of models of self-management arises the possibility of unemployment in long-run equilibrium. Unemployed workers cannot make themselves more attractive by lowering their supply price, because if hired they must receive a proportionate share of the firm's net revenue.

    16. This simple self-managed economy is thus theoretically doomed to inefficiency and inequality. Even without the instability of the simple one variable-input model, self- management produces less than maximum output with less than full employment. Advocates of self-management have countered with two approaches, both of which reject the ideal capitalist firm as the standard of reference and question maximization of income per worker as an accurate description of the goal of the worker-managed firm.

    17. The first approach to salvaging the efficiency of self-management is to posit alternative goals for worker managers, including maximization of worker utility and maximization of profit, each defined in various ways and for various time horizons. Obviously, if short-run profits are maximized, the distinction between the self-managed and the capitalist firm collapses and both are equally efficient.

    18. More interesting are goals which admit non-income sources of satisfaction or utility. Here the common theme is that workers who manage their own firms are more solidaritous with fellow workers and desire to see them employed. Utility then depends upon both income per employed worker and the level of employment. (See, for example, Horvat,

    1972, 1985; Tyson, 1977; Vanek and Miovic, 1977, and the survey of Yugoslav enterprises in Estrin and Bartlett, 1982.) To avoid layoffs, workers self-impose a labor constraint in the form of a minimum level of employment. However, in such models the labor constraint typically applies only to firing existing workers, not to hiring new workers, so the theoretical conclusions about low supply elasticities and resulting unemployment are weakened only slightly.

    19. A second approach to evaluating efficiency of the self-managed firm emphasizes workers' feelings about their jobs as a source of utility. In these models, the key to understanding relative efficiency of capitalist and self-managed firms is variable effort from workers. Workers who manage themselves are argued to be more productive because they are more satisfied, but their improved efficiency is not captured in the Ward and Domar-type producer cooperative models of self-management (Horvat, 1986; Jones and Svejnar, 1982; Vanek, 1970).

    20. The variable effort framework attacks directly the practice of defining the standard of efficiency by the ideal capitalist firm as represented in neo-classical economic theory. In conventional neo-classical theory, the firm operates according to a production function in which output is a function of capital and labor, each labor unit with an assumed constant level of effort. Variable effort faults the standard producer cooperative view of self- management for using the fixed effort, neo-classical production function and thus ignoring the very essence of worker control, increased effort. Limiting efficiency comparisons between self- managed and capitalist firms to criteria derived from neo-

    classical production functions is seen to bias the outcome against self-management.i

    21. To deal with potential unemployment in self-management, long-run theories of the self-managed firm devise mechanisms of entry of new firms while still retaining the goal of maximizing income per worker. The least appealing mechanism is to allow existing workers to hire new workers as wage labor for a fixed wage with no share of the profits. Clearly, this solution reduces unemployment at the immediate expense of self- management, since now only some workers are also managers.

    22. Other mechanisms include allowing unemployed workers to found new firms by permitting them to set their own wages sufficiently low to attract capital. In this case, workers themselves determine their rate of return and are self-exploiting to the extent that they accept less than the normal rate of return. (This is a very common feature of workers' cooperatives in Westerm capitalist countries.) To minimize exploitation, the state can provide capital at subsidized rates, with loans financed by taxes on the employed, whose resistance to expansion is after all the source of the unemployment problem in the first

    place (Vanek, 1970).

    23. Treatment of capital reveals the second major weakness of self-managed economies deduced from the standard producer cooperative models. In the same way that the self- managed economy uses too little labor, it uses too much capital. This behavior also can be traced back to maximizing income-per-worker. Capital (like all non-labor inputs) receives the same payment in both capitalist and self-managed firms, but labor must be paid a share of the profit in self-management. As a result, labor is relatively more expensive in the self-managed firm. This firm thus uses more capital (more of the cheaper input) than the corresponding capitalist firm.

    24. Although self-management is logically distinct from socialism, the Ward and Domar-type producer cooperative models assume socialist property relations with no private ownership of the means of production. The consequences of this assumption, however, are largely unexamined. If instead of producer cooperative models we consider theories of property relations, we find an opposite conclusion about investment.

    25. In non-private ownership, assets are non-vested. Workers have claims only to the income streams generated by their investments and not to the capital itself. Because workers cannot capture the full benefits of investing, they will invest too little. Only in the special case of workers expecting to be associated with their firm in perpetuity will the capitalist and the self-managed firm engage in the same level of investment. Self-

    management is therefore argued to be inefficient, in the specific sense that for the same rate of return and cost of capital, more investment would be desired under different institutional arrangements (Furobotn and Pejovich, 1974). In other words, the rate of investment is sub-optimal because purely capitalist economic considerations would produce a higher rate.

    26. Risk-taking is also seen to be affected by the lack of private property rights. Self- managers in the context of social ownership have a strong incentive to take risks because costs of failure is socialized while benefits of success- accrue to the firm. Excessive risk-taking is associated with persistence of loss-making firms in socialized self- management, because there is no process of adjustment by which losses induce changes in the structure of investment, production and employment.

    27. The central government of course could enforce bankruptcy on firms whose risks have not borne fruit, but this solution simply imposes the will of the state on the workers. This is the crux of the property rights challenge: effective self-management can be achieved only with private property because otherwise the choice is between inefficiency or bureaucratic interference.

    28. The clearest hypothesis generated from the various models of self-management is that unemployment and barriers to entry will be high relative to some capitalist reference point. Subsidiary hypotheses include persistence of wage differentials across sectors, reflecting misallocation of labor, and existence of productivity differentials between capitalist and self-managed firms. Productivity can be worse in either capitalist or self-managed firms according to the kind of model assumed. With a neo-classical model, misallocation of labor explains productivity differences and the self-managed firm is less efficient. With a variable effort model, self-management is more efficient than the typical capitalist firm because workers work harder and smarter.

    29. The same theoretical ambiguity exists concerning capital. Depending upon the precise assumptions, the capital/labor ratio may be expected to be either higher or lower in the self-managed firm compared to its capitalist twin. In either case, however, the criteria for evaluating efficiency are less clear-cut than for employment and productivity, so comparisons are more difficult. 30. Clearly, whatever source of inefficiency is deduced from each of the various models, the macroeconomic environment facing the firm is critical. In the case of entry, if microeconomic intervention like preferential credit to individual enterprises is seen to be distortionary, the only alternative for maintaining full employment is expansionary macro policy. Moreover, to the extent that self-managed firms actually do exhibit low supply elasticities, the degree of expansion must be greater than in the twin capitalist economy. Thus, the burden on the state to conduct successful macro policy is greater in self- management.

    31. A second concern is inequality among enterprises. The low inter-firm labor mobility associated with maximization of income-per- worker, mentioned above, has the obvious implication that rich firms will tend to get richer and poor firms poorer. The first important aspect of this problem is an equity issue: should self-management be introduced even at the cost of equal wages for equal work?

    32. Unfortunately, the basic premise of decentralized self- management, reward according to work, makes government intervention to redress inequality suspect. Self-governing firms should be allowed to keep the fruits of their labor if there is to be true self- management. The dilemma facing the government, then, is to allow increasing income and employment disparities or violate the autonomy of the self-managers.

    33. Compounding this dilemma is the theoretical unclarity of the concept of reward according to work. Determining that returns are the results of worker effort rather than of historical accidents like endowment of superior capital stock or more accessible markets requires imputation criteria procedures that are vague at best. The usual solution proposed is a government agency which calculates, for example, the windfall gains from an autonomous increase in demand. (See, for example, Vanek, 1977, Kardelj, 1981 and Dragicevic, 1967). The government's role then is to tax away these gains to equalize the “conditions of work” to assure that wages are returns to effort alone. The impact of such an agency, with substantial power to impose almost arbitrary taxes, on the independence of firms is ignored.

    34. There are few choices of site for evaluating these propositions about self- management. Yugoslavia was the only national economy organized legally on the basis of self- management. Experiences elsewhere have been limited to individual firms or

    sectors, with the exception of Mondragon, which is a region of self-managed firms linked by a central financial and planning authority. The next section examines the Yugoslav experience with self-management in light of theoretical debates about efficiency.

     

     

    III. YUGOSLAV SELF-MANAGEMENT

     

    35. The history of self-management in Yugoslavia began in the early 1950's, when the break with the Soviet Union led Yugoslavia to find a distinct road to socialism. In the almost forty years since, both the theory and the practice of self-management have changed radically.

    36. In the first decade, self-management was conceived of primarily as a society-wide phenomenon. While its core was expanded rights of firms to make decisions, the goal of greater worker power was not firm autonomy per se, but a more committed and productive work force. While the rhetoric of self-management proclaimed unlimited rights for workers, in practice economic rights were limited to such decisions as relative wages within a centrally-determined wage bill and hiring and firing of managers.

    37. The shape of self-management in this period was dictated by two overriding concerns, economic growth and equalization among regions. Therefore, some degree of self- management was desirable because increased productivity would finance growth. However, despite the break with the Soviet Union, the prevailing growth strategy was very orthodox, emphasizing industrial growth and requiring careful husbanding of scarce resources for the expansion of priority sectors.

    38. Such a growth strategy leaves little room for firm autonomy. Most decisions about allocation of capital, output and even labor need to be centrally determined to achieve the limited set of national targets which measure growth. In the Yugoslav case, this degree of centralization was also consistent with the second concern of the period, regional inequality. The central government used its control to reallocate resources to the less developed regions (and poorer areas of developed regions) to create jobs and improve the quality of social infrastructure (Flaherty, 1982).

    39. Self-management in the 1950's, then, allowed workers only limited control over their firms, with the limits established by broader economic and social goals. In the resulting conflict between rights of workers in any one firm and rights of workers as a whole, the whole clearly dominated. Full employment and equalization of conditions of work among regions and sectors were integral parts of the concept of self-management.

     

     

    IV. MARKET REFORM AND SELF-MANAGEMENT

     

    40. By the end of the 1950's, neither the economic performance nor the degree of self- management were satisfactory. After a decade of great success in economic growth and equalization across regions, the strategy of industrialization ran into familiar barriers. Shortages, low output/capital ratios and a stagnant agricultural sector called into question the case for constraining firm autonomy to promote growth. At the same time, workers who had expected their rights to be extended with prosperity now saw a widening gap between the rhetoric of self-management and their near-term prospects for greater independence. The final blow was dissatisfaction of richer regions, who argued that they had paid heavy taxes to advance backward regions whose continued inefficiency was a drain on the entire economy (Flaherty, 1982; Milenkovitch, 1971).

    41. Rising disenchantment with the narrow conception of self-management and with economic performance culminated in the economic reforms of the mid-1960's. The thesis of reform was that efficiency could only be imposed by introducing a neutral arbiter of success, the market. A typical package of liberalizing reforms was enacted, all designed to open up the domestic economy to the discipline of the world market. The carrot to accompany this stick was broader self-management in an economy in which firms were free to make their own decisions about pricing, investment and hiring.

    42. For economic performance, the reforms were a disaster. Inflation, unemployment and balance of payments deficits all soared from 1965 to 1970. A series of stop-go cycles attempted to achieve a compromise between the political commitment to reform and the attendant economic disruptions. In external relations, only the migration of Yugoslav workers to Western Europe and the resulting remittances from abroad kept the trade deficit under control.

    43. The central issue for an evaluation of self-management is the extent to which the self-management component of the reform was implicated in the escalating instability. Both inflation and unemployment appear to some extent to be consequences of greater firm autonomy. In reaction to earlier constraints on wages and to inflationary expectations, workers' councils used their new freedoms to disburse a high percentage of firm net

    revenue as wages. Consumption grew at a rate almost 4 times faster than expected and the internal savings of firms plummeted (Dubey, 1975).

    44. Across the country, but especially in the less-developed regions, open unemployment for the first time became a problem. Rates of unemployment in the poorest regions rose from less than 2 percent to 12 percent between 1965 and 1970 and to almost 18 percent by

    1975. At the same time, labor markets in the developed regions faced labor shortages due to migration of skilled workers to Western Europe (Schrenk, 1979). Yet internal migration of the unemployed to these regions did not occur. Consistent with theoretical expectations, workers in the richer areas were reluctant to expand employment once they had one of the basic freedoms of self-managers, power to allocate their firm's net revenue to wages.

    45. Laying the blame for post-reform economic chaos on self-management is nonetheless complicated by several considerations. First, and most important, the effect of reform on the degree of self-management is questionable. Second, investment, not consumption, was the major contributor to inflationary pressure. Third, excessive investment was due more to competitive pressure and the role of the state than to self- management maximizing behavior. Finally, barriers to entry having nothing to do with self-management inhibited absorption of the unemployed in the more developed areas (Milenkovitch, 1984).

    46. More generally, the crisis cannot be attributed to self-management alone because of the obvious added complications from introducing markets on firms and their environment. As subsidies were withdrawn and foreign competition encouraged, Yugoslav firms found themselves forced to modernize and rationalize to survive. The consequences for worker participation are fairly straightforward and have indeed been found by the few studies available of the behavior of workers' councils. After reform, the role of managers and technical experts in initiating items to be considered by the councils and in determining outcomes have been shown to have increased substantially, while blue-collar influence on firm decision-making declined.

    47. Competitive pressure has also been a major contributor to overinvestment. Ironically, reform was supposed to shift the economy away from the excessive investment of the planned economy, but instead it forced firms to escalate investment to adjust to the new environment. While immediately after reform firms did allocate most net revenue to wages, this did not last for long. Investment on the other hand accelerated in the early 1970's.

    48. The shift from consumption to investment as the primary source of inflationary pressure is explained in part by the role of the state in the early years of reform. Once the consequences of reform for economic stability and equity became clear, the state intervened to control the worst consequences of reform. Wages were at times frozen to keep managers from using wage increases to smooth over discontent at lack of worker participation. At the same time, the government supported over-investment. Faced with a choice between massive bankruptcy and supporting even unwise investment, it chose the latter. This behavior constitutes the notorious soft budget constraint so beloved of critics of socialism, but it also reflects Yugoslav commitment to maintaining levels of employment and equity consistent with a socialist society.

    49. It is impossible to determine with any precision the degree of responsibility for the failures of reform borne by the market v. self-management. Government intervention muddied the waters by restricting the autonomy of the firm as well as by mitigating the influence of market forces. Inside firms, the role of managers and experts replaced the role of party officials in determining what the firm did in fact maximize, but it is unlikely that income per worker was the goal. Neither markets nor self-management existed in anything like pure form.

    50. These caveats notwithstanding, the Yugoslav case does suggest that the market combined with some worker control over wages and employment is a particularly crisis- prone mix. Adding fuel to the fire is the intense regional differentiation in the country. While self-management may be prone to labor immobility, ethnic divisions in themselves are formidable obstacles to the absorption of unemployed workers from the poor regions by the relatively prosperous areas. When reform reversed a decade-long trend toward equalization of regional incomes, the stage was set for the present civil war.

     

     

    V. TOWARD NON-MARKET SELF-MANAGEMENT

     

    51. In reaction to the continuing crisis in the early 1970's, Yugoslavia launched another reform, this time explicitly addressed to the conflict between self-management and centralization. The central premise was that reform had carried centralization too far and that more control over the economy was necessary. The problem then was to design a system of central guidance of the economy consistent with self- management. The solution was based on reduction in the size of autonomous production units to allow more direct participation by workers and on a combination of voluntary and mandatory targets to maintain macroeconomic balance.

    52. Firms were broken down into BOALs (Basic Organs of Associated Labor), in theory the smallest unit producing a marketable output. Relations among BOALs and between BOALs and the central government were regulated by social compacts and social contracts. Among BOALs, the goal was negotiated contracts establishing long-term prices,

    quantities and other terms. In addition to being longterm, the contracts were supposed to take into account the social as well as the firm-level costs and benefits of the prices, etc. The mechanism for incorporating social information into firm decision-making was the community of interest, defined loosely as any segment of society affected by the contract. For example, residents of a neighborhood near a factory would have a say in the process of production and would be able to impose on 'the firm any cost of cleaning up pollution.

    53. Between BOALs and the state, agreements concerned such items as the relation between wage and productivity increases, limits to foreign borrowing, price ceilings and employment quotas. The purpose of the agreements was to maintain consistency between requirements for national economic balance and firm-level decisions without relying on a full-blown central plan. 54. The BOAL system marked a renewed commitment to worker participation, but the concept of self-management upon which it was based proved deficient in several respects. The degree of decentralization resulting from break-up of firms into their constituent units was excessive. Although the expectation was that the smaller units would be forced to cooperate to survive, instead of pooling resources and arranging joint investments the BOALs tended to act individually, each embarking on its own expansion plan. Pressure on investment resources multiplied in line with the proliferation of production units

    empowered to make, investment decisions. The government was then faced with the same choice as in the 1960's reforms, but on a much, larger scale. It could allow widespread bankruptcy of the BOALs or continue to emit credit in destabilizing amounts to control unemployment. Deepening the dilemma in the mid-1970's, recession in Western Europe sent between a third and a half of Yugoslav guestworkers back home. As before, the choice was to support a level of employment consistent with some notion of socialist equity (and, of course, political stability) regardless of inflationary consequences (Milenkovitch, 1984).

    55. Communities of interest and social contracts and compacts also did not work as expected. As mechanisms of coordination they were cumbersome, but the more fundamental problem was the way in which the mechanisms were used. Decentralization did not make the new production units, the BOALs, less subject to decisions favoring their

    own individual interests. In practice, it simply provided an opportunity for fuller expression of the tendencies toward individualism unleashed by the market reforms of the 1960's. The state had ceded both resources and decision-making power to BOALs, further limiting its ability to construct and carry out a coherent national economic program, on the assumption that BOALs would be motivated to promote national stability. When the assumption turned out to be invalid, the government had few levers of control and the crisis escalated.

    56. The BOAL system was introduced as a way to enhance worker participation within a non-market environment of negotiated prices, outputs and investment decisions. Participation may well have improved, but any productivity-enhancing effects at the level of the firm were swamped by the global inefficiency of an economy in which every small production unit was allowed to borrow as much as and invest in whatever activity its individual interest demanded. Reaction to continued crisis focused on the role of the state in supporting inefficient firms. A return to markets, emphasizing bankruptcy, began in the early 1980's, with the usual results of increased inequality, inflation and balance of

    payments problems. (Flaherty, 1988; Flaherty, 1993)

     

     

    VI. CONTRADICTIONS OF SELF-MANAGEMENT

     

    57. Yugoslav experience highlights the contradictory nature of self- management. On the one hand, self-management entails freedom of direct producers to control their firms. On the other hand, decisions made by autonomous, uncoordinated firms can in aggregate actually impede realization of self-management within the firm as well as the survival of the firm itself.

    58. Market reform in the 1960’s defined self-management in terms of the first pole of the contradiction. Firm autonomy was made synonymous with worker control and the market was seen as the only neutral coordinating mechanism consistent with autonomy. The BOAL system of the 1970's in theory repudiated the market as the coordinating mechanism, replacing it with negotiated contracts incorporating social and aggregate economic goals. However, by defining self-management as autonomy of the smallest production unit, the 1970's reforms decentralized to the point that conscious coordination of any sort was rendered virtually impossible.

    59. To link the problems arising from these contradictions to social property, let us first divide problems into two categories, those affecting intra-firm self-management and those raising issues of inter-firm relations, or relations between firms and society as a whole. Into the first category fall issues such as decline of worker participation in decisions, unequal payments to old and new workers and relations among the various BOALs within an individual firm. These issues all stem from related vulnerabilities of self-management

    to both autarchic goals and competitive pressure.

    60. Autarchic or individualistic goals certainly existed prior to reform, and are traceable to several structural features of the Yugoslav economy, most importantly lack of history of self-management, resistance to central determination of returns according to work and ethnic differences. Nonetheless, successive decentralizations of decision-making, ultimately to the level of the BOAL, reinforced an atomistic view of self-management. Each new decentralization pitted ever larger numbers of ever smaller production units against each other, sacrificing inter-unit cooperation for expected improvement in intra- unit equality. Market reforms at the same time had already increased competitive pressure on self-managed firms and BOALS, reducing the expected gains in intra-unit equality as firms turned to experts to save them from failure in the face of chaotic market conditions.

    61. As workers ceded control within the firm to ‘experts’, firms began to implement payment schemes antithetical to self-management, in some cases offering new workers less than proportional shares of the surplus. The BOAL system went further, inducing BOALs to compete to gain access to the most profitable common assets, limiting realization of economies of scale within the firm

    62. At the second level, relations among firms and between firms and society,

    individualism manifested itself in many different ways. Local banks, for example, validated the debt of firms in their area to avoid bankruptcy and unemployment, creating an economy-wide inflationary pressure that eroded potential gains even to these localities. Firms did not report earnings accurately to avoid paying taxes and at the level of regions

    and political resistance to redistributive taxes mounted (and is one of the main causes of the ultimate demise of the republic). Investment fluctuated widely, depending upon the perceived interests of the firm or BOAL. Where investment borrowing was financed by banks, firms tended to over-invest and accumulate large and unpayable debt. Where and when it became clear that debt was unsustainable, firms simply paid out the surplus as wages and left investment and social funds to wither.

    63. In short, problems of realizing self-management at either the level of the firm or the level of society as a whole persisted throughout all the periods of Yugoslav experimentation. In the early, centrally-planned period the contradictions of self- management were manifest mainly within each firm, but with each successive attempt to resolve intra-firm failures of self-management both intra-firm and inter-firm contradictions grew stronger.

    64. The common theme across all these time periods and levels of analysis is the nature and role of cooperation and trust. The initial move to self-management suffered from a fatal blindness concerning property rights, assuming that a system of social ownership of property would guarantee sufficient cooperation and trust to construct self-managment at both the firm and the social levels. For example, the concept of reward according to work, although vague and difficult to operationalize, was not seen to be a locus of conflict, since workers in different firms were all equal as owners of social property and therefore a priori must be cooperative. Workers in richer firms were also citizens of the larger socialist society and as such would trust that their taxes (formally called contributions) to social funds were fair. Workers in all firms in turn would trust government (whose workers were also self-managed) to devise macroeconomic policy to achieve self-management and maintain social ownership.

    65. These assumptions were not necessarily purely utopian. Yugoslavia’s war experience was a powerful source of solidarity and cooperation. In the early post-war period, the very motivation for self-management, repudiation of Soviet-style planning, was itself reflective of a common social goal. Nonetheless, the burden of continuation of cooperation and trust was placed on a concept of social ownership and social that was underdeveloped both theoretically and in practice. In the early period firms did have workers’ councils, but as the preceding analysis describes, the definition of social ownership allowed firms only to use the assets and to not sell or alienate them. Indeed, even the income from use was narrowly constrained by centrally-determined limits on wages and choice of investments. Accepting this practical definition of social then required individual firms to believe in self-management at the level of the entire society, which was difficult to achieve when the political and economic decisions were concentrated within a ruling elite. The rhetoric of social property and rule of self-managed workers was confronted with a centralized state apparatus that left little role for real participation in decision making atany level.

    66. The obvious gap between the ideal and the reality of social ownership explains part of the push to reform. For example, the state had promised to use social property to deliver increasing levels of consumer goods, but by the end of the 1950’s were still not forthcoming. Citizens as well as firms saw little difference after all between Soviet planning and self-management and the concepts of social ownership and social property remained elusive.

    67. In the reform periods, the concepts were refined in ways which reflected these dissatisfactions of the 1950’s. By decentralizing economic decision making and control, Yugoslav theorists of self-management hoped to realize social property by ceding economic resources to individual firms, communities and regions. Much has been said already above about the tensions and problems produced by reform. With specific reference to social property, the tendency of all the reforms was in fact to de-socialize property by putting it under the control of firms or groups who faced increasing pressure to in effect

    loot social property to maintain their economic and social existence. With the simultaneous introduction of markets both domestic and international, the concept of social property was thoroughly undermined again, this time at the level of the economy as a whole. Firms and communities, who might in fact have wanted to be cooperative, were forced into beggar- thy-neighbor strategies by the nature of the economy into which they were now thrust unprepared.

    68. As a result, the core proposition of social property heretofore, that users of the property cannot destroy or alienate it, came into conflict with stark realities of a crumbling economy. While still legally proscribed from selling off assets, firms could and eventually did devalue social capital, either by borrowing money they could not repay or by actual running-down of machinery without putting aside required depreciation funds. This tendency was simply accelerated by the BOAL system, which took the path of further individualizing social ownership and property.

     

     

    VII. CONDITIONS AND MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL PROPERTY

     

    69. The problems experienced by Yugoslav self-management are inherent in the structure of participatory institutions and the failures contribute to our identification and understanding of the core requirements and pitfalls in such a system. Two of the central components of Yugoslav self-management, reward according to work and redistribution to achieve equal conditions of work, are fundamental to a society that is both efficient and just. At the same time, however, unless these principles are applied within proper social institutions, they are bound to fail. This section explores what might be the defining elements of such institutions, focusing on social property as the central concern.

    70. Reward according to work is a principle that addresses what has come to be seen as a major impediment to efficiency even in market economies, rent and rent-seeking behavior. Rent in the classical sense of a return to the ownership of a scarce resource can also be defined as ‘...payment to the owner of a resource independent of the effort or past savings put in by the owner’. (Sorensen, 1996, p. 1338) Viewed in this light, any higher earnings of self-managed firms that derive from historical accidents of market access or inherited higher-quality capital are not be rewards to effort but rents. Conversely, the vagaries of the world market can reduce the incomes of firms independent of their efforts, yielding negative rents.

    71. In this framework, rent is clearly a basis for exploitation. For example, John Roemer argues that the owners of rich land may be said to exploit the owners of poorer land. (Roemer, 1982) This is one case of the more general concept of exploitation in Roemer: exploitation exists whenever there is inequality in ownership of resources and any group could be better off by withdrawing with its share of the resources. (Roemer, 1988) This latter point underscores, however, the knife-edge property of rent. Rent must be taken away to avoid exploitation, but excessive transfer of surplus above the amount not attributable to a firm’s effort is also exploitative. The choice of mechanism for calculating rent is therefore critical.

    72. Unfortunately, the difficulty in determining rent for this purpose (known as differential rent) is well-known. In socialist societies, the calculation problem may be particularly acute because there is no benchmark of competitive market prices of inputs and outputs to use as reference points for calculating rents. (Kornai, 1992; Sorensen, 1996, p.1323; Dragicevic, 1967, pp. 73-77)ii Moreover, socialist societies tend as deliberate policy to foster productive structures that generate monopoly rent. Monopolies in production are

    created to take advantage of increasing returns to scale; monopolies and rent-seeking behavior are widespread in shortages, which most centrally-planned economies have experienced chronically at least with respect to consumer goods.

    73. Yugoslav theorists of self-management debated the solutions to these problems of rent for several years before concluding that the best response was to move toward market reform as the mechanism best suited to further development of self-management.iii For example, Ervard Kardelj, in analyzing the reasons for the failure of differential rent to achieve rewards according to work, concluded

    74. I think that our failure to ensure equal conditions of economic activity and income- earing was due to a considerable extent to lack of respect of objective market laws. So we had to resort to taxation. (Kardelj, 1964, p.26)

    75. In this conclusion, Kardelj anticipates and largely agrees with discussions of property rights as the major explanation of the failure of self-management. Furobotn, Pejovich, Kornai and others in the property rights school argue that the lack of private property produce artificial incentives, while market relations grounded in full ownership rights create automatic and ‘spontaneous’ incentives. (Furobotn and Pejovich, 1974; Kornai,

    1992) Still, Kardelj and the major Yugoslav contributors to the debate were aware of the inherent tensions involved in relying upon market indicators to achieve self-management:

    76. For self-management presupposes equality based on the objective laws of material or economic development, on the one hand, and on a conscious adjustment and guidance of that development, particularly of economic and social relations among working people, on the other. Consequently, economic activities governed by the laws of the market, social planning and economic and social solidarity among working people are three inseparable components of our socialist system of self-management. ...True enough, these components are in a contradictory relationship. (Kardelj, 1964, p. 27)

    77. We are left, then, in a dilemma. In Kardelj’s terminology, there is a contradiction between markets and economic and social solidarity among working people. Although he sees market relations as necessary for achieving a core principle of self-management, reward according to work, market outcomes are not necessarily consistent with the second principle, equalization of conditions of work.

    78. This same dilemma has received considerable attention in current work on cooperation, trust and social norms. Working within a game theoretic framework, this literature offers a forward from the contradictions of self-management discussed above. Several analyses of trust and cooperation have concluded that market relations are inimical to trust and cooperation. (For example, Seabright, 1993; Bardhan, 1993; Ostrom, 1994 and 1999; Coleman, 1988)iv Private property and markets fail because contracts are incomplete or

    unenforcable. Contracts need to be supplemented with informal norms and agreements but private property and marke relations can damage these mechanisms. Moreover, even the

    ‘tragedyof the commons is coming to be seen as less a tragedy than an oppportunity for exploiting the advantages of collective action. As Seabright concludes,

    79. To summarize, it should be clear that private property rights not only may fail to solve the problems of externalities that bedevil common property resources. When contractual relations remain in important respects incomplete, private property may also weaken the mechanisms of cooperation that previously existed, either by shifting the bargaining power of the parties so that they no longer share enough interdependence to make cooperation credible, or by weakening the credibility of long-term contracts. (Seabright, 1993, p. 129)

    80. Common results found in these explorations of efficient institutions point to several necessary characteristics for trust and cooperation. First, people must develop knowledge that long-term interests can be harmed by acting to maximize short-term interest. In a game theoretic framework, this typically is seen to require repeated interaction, so that the individuals deciding upon collective action have information about the past and therefore expected future behavior of the various actors. Without such information and expectations, cooperation can fall victim to high discount rates for future gains, leading to the kind of looting of social assets seen in Yugoslavia.

    81. In addition, there must be costs to defection from collective action, and these costs must be sufficient to offset benefits from being the first to defect (or simply an early defector). Costs can be monetary, as when loss of reputation leads to loss of credit, or social, as when defecting leads to expulsion from the group. Finally, and critically, trust and cooperation may not result from either of these two conditions without broadly common perceptions of the norms of fairness. Thus, in the Yugoslav case, although monetary and social costs could be imposed relatively easily, at least in the era of more central control, disagreement among regions on norms of fairness still made defection worthwhile. Under these circumstances, the costs would have to rise to such a degree to counteract differing norms that fairness would be increasingly difficult to establish.

    82. Supplementing theories of collective action, research on the nature and role of social capital yields insights about the necessary conditions for trust and cooperation. Ostrom provides the most useful definition of social capital: it is the ability to construct commonly understood and practiced, self-enforcing rules of behavior. (From Sobel, 2002, p. 147) The existence of social capital clearly affects incentives to participate in groups and work within networks. In societies with high levels of social capital, people are more willing to trust, or as Sobel defines trust, ‘...to permit the decisions of others to influence...[their]...welfare. (Sobel 2002, p. 147) With respect to Yugoslavia, a higher level of social capital presumably would have led self-managed firms and BOALs to choose less autarchic paths, to permit decisions of other firms and of the state to influence their welfare.

    83. Requirements for high social capital vary across cultures and times, but the literature on social capital identifies several general characteristics applicable to all societies. The number of decision-makers and the frequency of their interactions are important (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994), sincedense networks facilitate both commonality of norms and information flows identifying obedience to norms and imposition of sanctions for disobedience. (Coleman, 1988) Work on management of the commons suggests in addition that informal mechanisms of decision-making, monitoring and sanctioning also support high social capital. However, a key condition of informal mechanisms is local participation. Social networks can lead to efficient and equitable outcomes to a large degree according to the extent that the institutional arrangements are locally-determined. (Ostrom, Gardner

    and Walker, 1994)

    84. These results of the recent research on norms, collective action and social capital put the Yugoslav experiment in self-management in a more positive light. The crisis-driven and erratic shifts in Yugoslav policy did still incorporate critical features identified in analyses of trust and cooperation. Social ownership as the environment in which to embed self-management was originally designed exactly to develop cooperation and trust by reducing inequality and competition. Decentralization and later the BOAL system both explicitly aimed at enhancing local participation, hence creating dense networks, and also at preserving and using local and informal mechanisms of decision-making. 85. However, the research on norms, trust and cooperation also highlights the same problems faced in Yugoslavia, namely the inability of purely local arrangements and decisions to satisfy broader social norms and goals. One caution is that perfectly efficient local arrangements may make people outside the local group worse off v, as happened in Yugoslavia. Ownership poses a second and related difficulty. Formal or legal ownership is not sufficient to achieve any of the goals purportedly associated with specific forms of

    ownership. For example, as noted above, private property can produce inefficiency when it ignores or conflicts with established informal practices of decision-making and control and state ownership is not necessarily either efficient or equitable. The heart of the problem is that property relations, like market transactions, involve incomplete contracts that work

    in practice due to informal (and most likely local) arrangements and networks.

    86. The core of the institution of owership is a matter of unquestioned and largely unconscious social and economic practices that must be rooted in nonlegal developments….When obedience breaks down on a large enough scale, no authority is strong enough to police everyone. (Rapaczynski, 1966, p. 88)

    87. When the formal institutions are either insufficient to achieve desired goals or in

    conflict with goals, informal institutions develop that can undermine the formal. This is true not just of Yugoslavia, but of the Soviet Union, where the notorious tolkachi are a clear example of the use of social capital to make institutions work, and of market economies, where open and tacit collusion undermine competition.

     

     

    VIII. TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF SOCIAL PROPERTY

     

    88. To achieve efficiency and equity, then, we need institutions that support common perceptions of fairness and enhance trust so that the informal practices reinforce and do not impede or repudiate social goals and norms. The arguments concerning collective action and social capital, combined with Yugoslav experience, provide some guideposts for redefining social property to strengthen trust and cooperation.

    89. First, with respect to the economy-wide requirements for social property, we need to consider the type of transactions, the social goals toward which the economy is headed, the policies needed to reach those goals and the consistency of policy with existing norms of fairness. It is clear that market relations, the form of transaction favored by Yugoslavia to realize self-management, are fundamentally at odds with trust and cooperation. Therefore, the first characteristic of social property is that it must constrain market criteria for either production or distribution decisions.

    90. Note that this does not necesarily mean state ownership or the amorphous social ownership of Yugoslav socialism. Property can be owned by individual production units or by individuals, as long as the uses to which the property is put are in conformity with social goals. This kind of group or individual ownership can in fact be made contingent upon such conformity, so that property rights, while decentralized, are not absolute. This approach has historical precedent in both the Soviet Union and in developing capitalist countries. For example, land reform legislation in the Soviet Union in the 1920’s called for distribution of land to small producers as long as they continued production. Many tribal forms of land distribution, for example in South Africa, also allow individual ownership contingent upon productive use. 91. Moving from ownership to the form of transactions, we can begin to specify the constraints that should operate on property to make it social. In general, transactions must be guided toward fulfillment of social goals. If we assume for now that economic goals are embodied in the overall growth strategy of the society, market relations must be shaped toward achievement of the growth strategy. This is perhaps obvious, given that this was the main point of central planning. However, in an environment of social property the nature of these goals and the links between goals and limits on markets must be made transparent.

    For example, if the development of a domestic capital-goods sector requires high levels of imports, and the country is foreign-exchange constrained, imports of consumer goods will decrease, either by government decree or de facto by rises in prices of these goods. If the latter is allowed, rent-seeking behavior will drain productive resources to activities which increase the supply of consumer imports, legally or illegally. A more constructive

    alternative in this case would be a rationing scheme, allowing for a rational and equitable distribution of goods. These kinds of decisions are made constantly, hence the tendency to streamline mechanisms for decision-making, in order to respond to changing condisions.

    92. Nonetheless, such decisions must not be made by a central planning board, but from a broader base of participation in economic decision-making. In this respect, the Yugoslav communities of interest are an instructive model. Criticisms of the participatory decision making structures of the 1974 constitutional reform center on the inefficiency of both processes and outcomes. Focusing for now on issues of process, the research on norms and collective action show that this criticism seriously undervalues the role of perceived fairness in the efficiency of outcomes. Contrary to neo-classical fascination with costs of participation, if we look instead at costs incurred from lack of cooperation, we come to a more favorable conclusion about institutions like communities of interest.

    93. It is also important to consider the economic environment in which the communities of interest were embedded, namely a highly chaotic and vulnerable open market. If the role of market criteria is constrained, both the uncertainty surrounding the impact of decisions and the necessity to make quick decisions (at the macro level) will be reduced. The first requirement of social capital is to embed the participatory decision-making structures in an economy not subject to the wide fluctuations characteristic of a small and open economy. With this requirement met, participatory mechanisms are likely to work more smoothly, at least with regard to process.

    94. This point is relevant to outcomes as well as processes of participatory decisions. As discussed in previous sections, the competitive pressure faced by BOALs and communities of interest led them to take increasingly autarchic decisions, which did lead to inefficient outcomes when viewed from an economy-wide perspective. The autarchic outcome suggests further requirements for social property. Property must be used in ways that are consistent with the overall goals of society and yet are also not in conflict with more local goals. This is the crux of the difficulty of defining social property. Even if the society can agree on an overall growth strategy, for example, individual firms or areas may be negatively affected by the strategy. Societies must find some social glue that allows groups to both express their individual preferences and yet adhere to a set of social preferences perhaps at odd with theirs.

    95. Networks are clearly one form of social glue, and to develop and sustain networks is a requirement of social property. To facilitate positive interaction between group and society-wide preference, though, networks must cross group boundaries. Democratic political structures like separation of powers and bi-cameral legislative branckes are one mechanism designed to transcend boundaries and allow for majority rule, but these structures are both themselves subject to erosion of representativeness and not easy to insert into societies with no traditions of such institutions. The most important lesson learned

    from Yugoslav experience and the research on networks and norms is that structures and norms with which a society is not yet familiar wont work, even if they are intrinsically desirable.

    96. Fortunately, every society has in place both local networks and networks that transcend local interests. The trick for defining social property is to find and build upon these broader networks. At the local level, as we have seen above, networks function best when they are dense, when people and groups are relatively small and have frequent communication. These conditions cannot hold when we are talking about transmitting norms and information across groups throughout the whole society. At this level, social capital must

    facilite communication among groups, which requires what has come to be called ‘bridging social capital’ in contrast to dense networks, which are ‘bonding’ social capital. (Putnam,

    2000) Burt (1992) views this problem as one of holes in networks, which he calls structural holes. Typically these holes are filled by individuals who earn rents for their activities (this is similar to the Soviet tolkachi phenomenon).

    97. The role of social property here is to construct alternatives to filling holes by wasteful rent-earning and rent-seeking behavior. I will outline here only a skeleton of a structure for social property that can expand bridging social capital through society-wide networks. The first requirement is that basic systems of incentives and rewards be designed and implemented to balance competing needs and interests. Mechanisms for doing this based upon communities of interest are for example industry-wide groups of firms, economy- wide groups of consumers (such as consumer cooperatives) and society-wide groups concerned with specific issues such as education or health care. Social capital requires fora for expression of the norms of each of these groups and inter-group discussion of ways to reconcile competing interests. However, in the end, resolution of competing interests must be assigned to a body of policy-makers in which is vested authority for ‘bridging social capital’. This body should not earn rents for its activity, but would have the final decision- making power. Thus, what puts the social back in social property is the ability of a governing body to impose limits on individual and group behavior consistent with the

    social goals (as embodied for example in a growth strategy).

    98. Any such governing body of course must refer to the preferences of competing groups and provide as widely as possible for expression of difference of opinion. The second requirement for social capital is that this body is accountable to the groups whose opinions it is soliciting. Typically in capitalist countries electoral recall is the mechanism of accountability, but this is not a necessary feature of a viable system of social capital. Sanctions short of removal, such as have been used to provide incentives to managers to fulfil central targets, are one alternative. Criteria for determining success or failure can be performance-based and/or based on the degree to which social cohesion is maintained in the face of policies with clear winners and losers. The overriding necessity is that criteria are clear and consistent, and, unlike the targets of central planning, defined through broad consultation with interested parties. 99. In both requirements, balancing of competing needs and interests and accountability,

    the specific nature of the bridging social capital’ must come out of existing institutions and norms. In Yugoslavia, there was no tradition of self-management or even of economic

    and social cooperation across regional and ethnic boundaries. The pre-conditions did not exist for self-management to bear the heavy burden of bridging local networks by creating a new pan-Yugoslav and socialist consciousness. At the same time, central planning that tried to impose a growth strategy clearly unfavorable to richer regions did not take

    sufficient account of entrenched local norms of fairness. More suited to the existing conditions would have been a looser economic federation that balanced competing norms and needs through ceding ownership to groups and individuals but closely controlling the use of that capital and the distribution of the surplus. Building on the post-war solidarity noted above, a looser federation could have avoided fetishizing of self-management and rather focused more clearly on both bonding and bridging networks. Instead, the uni- dimensional concept of self-managemend undermined central control of economic policy and led to elevation of the market as the only economic coordinating mechanism consistent with self-management. To be sure, a looser federation would have initially redistributed less to poor regions, but it would more likely have produced greater longer-run satisfaction of the broader social goals of economic growth and alleviation of poverty. In other developing countries, existing producers and consumer cooperatives might provide the strongest social glue for bridging across networks, while in more developed countries federations of trade unions would be valuable in bridging.

     

     

    IX. CONCLUSION

     

    100. Unhappily, the Yugoslav experience suggests that the conditions under which self- management can be achieved simultaneously with social goals are elusive and fragile. This conclusion does not engender optimism that self-management is a cure for the ills experienced in transition economies.

    101. The underlying problem, however, may be more with the narrowness of standard conceptions of self-management than with self-management itself. The first producer cooperative models of self-management explicitly assumed social ownership of production bu the implications of this assumption were not examined. Indeed, the socialist content of self-management was either merely an article of faith, as in Ward and Domar's producer cooperative approach or seen to be irrelevant, as in Vanek's work. In either case, the fact that the firm is embedded in and affected by its broader economic and social environment is not central to most theories of self-management. Yugoslav problems with self-management, however, point to the necessity of connecting self-management to strong central institutions and networks, since the individual firm, whatever its internal organization, is not strong enough to absorb unscathed the impact of volatile markets or misguided planning.

    102. Self-management must be embedded in a social context in which good economy- wide decisions are made and at the same time local norms of fairness respected. Conventional criticisms of self-management from the property-rights school and from neo-classical economists who call for market reform may be largely misleading. The point is still valid however that the optimal nature of social property remains difficult to specify precisely. We know that trust and cooperation are essential to resolving conflicts between local autonomy and social goals, but we don’t have much concete to say about how trust is nurtured in different societies.

    103. Clearly, we know that simple changes in form of ownership of assets are not sufficient. Yugoslavia’s many false starts arise exactly from missing this point. In the early years, transferring assets to the state was seen to be sufficient to establish norms of self- management. In later reforms, decentralizing assets to the regions, firms and communes was seen to be sufficient to achieve participation and cooperation. The cost of ignoring the real effects of papering over tensions between individual firms and society was we now know was a revival of ethnic hatred and ultimate disolution of both the country and the experiment in self-management.

    104. We also know that the requirements of social capital (and self-management), namely cooperation and trust, are embedded in the broader history of each country. The task facing Yugoslavia in constructing a unique and less alienated society than existing models was new and uncharted. Moreover, the norms that give rise to trust and coooperation are embodied in informal and local institutions and arrangements. By their very nature, they are difficult to identify and to formalize. Therefore, forging relations of trust and cooperation across networks must be a careful and gradual process. Large-scale change in property relations or social relations in order to impose any ideal, free market or ‘socialist man’, is doomed to failure. Only a slow iterative movement, through free discussion of competing interests within a managed and stable economy, can reveal and strengthen both the dense networks and the bridges between networks necessary for as fragile as system as self- management. 

    X. BIBLIOGRAPHY 

     

    105. Burt, Ronald (1992) Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition (Cambridge: Harvard

    University Press)

    106. Domar, Evsey (1966) On Collective Farms and Producer Cooperatives American Economic Review

    Vol.56:No.4, pp. 734-57

    107. Dragicevic, Adolf (1967) Income Distribution According to Work Performed Socialist Thought and

    Practice Vol. 18:No. 26, pp. 70-87

    108. Dubey, Vinod (1975) Yugoslavia: Development with Decentralization (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins

    Press)

    109. Estrin, Saul and William Bartlett (1982) The Effects of Enterprise Self-management in Yugoslavia: An Empirical Survey”, in Jones, Derek and Jan Svenjar Participatory and Self-Managed Firms (Lexington: Lexington Books)

    110. Flaherty, Diane (1982) Economic Reform and Foreign Trade in Yugoslavia Cambridge Journal of

    Economics Vol.6:No.2, pp. 105-142

    111. Flaherty, Diane (1988) Plan, Market and Unequal Regional Development in Yugoslavia Soviet Studies

    Vol.XL:No.1, pp. 100-124

    112. Flaherty, Diane (1993) Socialism and Nationalism: Ethnicity, Class and Civil War in Yugoslavia” Rethinking Marxism Vol.6:No.2

    113. Furobotn, Erik and Svetozar Pejovich (1974) The Economics of Property Rights (Cambridge: Ballinger)

    114. Kornai, Janos (1992) The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton: The

    Princeton Uniersity Press)

    115. Horvat, Branko (1972) Critical Notes on the Theory of the Labor-Managed Firm and Some

    Macroeconomic Implications Ekonomska Analiza Vol.6, pp. 291-294

    116. Horvat, Branko (1975) On the Theory of the Labor-Managed Firm, in Horvat, et al., eds. Self- Governing Socialism: A Reader (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press)

    117. Horvat, Branko (1982) The Political Economy of Socialism (Oxford: Martin Robertson)

    118. Jones, Derek and Jan Svejnar (1982) Participatory and Self-Managed Firms (Lexington: Lexington

    Books)

    119. Kardelj, Edvard (1981) Contradictions of Social Property in a Socialist Society (Belgrade: Socialist

    Thought and Practice)

    120. Milenkovitch, Deborah (1971) Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought (New Haven: Yale

    University Press)

    121. Milenkovitch, Deborah (1984) Self-Management and Thirty Years of Yugoslav Self

    122. Management” ACES Bulletin Vol.XXV:No..3, pp. 1-26

    123. Putnam, Robert (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster)

    124. Rapaczynski, Andrzej (1996)The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property RightsJournal of Economic Perspectives Vol.10:No.3, pp. 87-103

    125. Schrenk, Martin, C. Ardalan and N. el Tatawy (1979) Yugoslavia: Self-management Socialism and the

    Challenge of Development (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press)

    126. Sorensen, Aage (1996)The Structural Basis of Social Inequality American Journal of Sociology

    Vol.101:No.5, pp. 1333-65

    127. Tyson, Laura (1977) The Impact of External Economic Disturbances on Yugoslavia: Theoretical and

    Empirical Explorations Journal of Comparative Economics Vol.3:No.4, pp. 346-75

    128. Vanek, Jaroslav (1970) The General Theory of Labor-Managed Market Economies  (Ithaca: Cornell

    University Press)

    129. Vanek, Jaroslav and Peter Miovic (1977) Explorations into 'Realistic' Behavior of the Yugoslav Firm”, in Jaroslav Vanek, ed. The Labor-Managed Economy: Essays (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)

    130. Ward, Benjamin (1967) The Socialist Economy: A Study of Organizational Alternatives (New York: Random House)  

     

     

     

     

     

    Notes

     

     

    i An empirical case for variable effort is made in efforts to measure different kinds of efficiency loss. Most studies that find allocational inefficiency due to violation of-neo-classical static marginality criteria amounts to only about 1% of GNP while losses of productive efficiency may be 10, 20 or more times greater”. (Horvat, 1986, p. 14)

     

    ii Dragicevic (1967) presents one of the clearest discussions of the link seen by Yugoslav reformers between reward according to work and competitive markets. He argues that complaints about injustices in distribution arise from a misunderstanding of the role of fluctuations in market prices. In fact, variations in earnings due to market are necessary: The differences in income earned by the same kind of work organizations, the losses of one and the extra incomes of others,...,is the price” paid for the general economic development of society’. He then goes on to argue that the price paid will be higher the more the domestic economy is protected from foreign competition. Dragicevic,

    1967, p. 76-77)

     

    iii Property rights theory generally supported this link between self-management and market reform. Staellerts (1995) provides a usefule summary of the main themes in the property rights approach to understanding Yugoslav experience.

     

    iv This does not mean that state ownership is viewed as a better alternative. Bardhan, for example, argues that Although privatization has its equity and efficiency problems, nationalization of the local common property resource and its management by a distant bureaucracy is rarely any better, and in some cases actually much worse.’ (Bardhan, 1993, p. 89)

     

    v As Sobel puts it The ability to use network relationships to obtain beneficial outcomes need not be good for cosiety or even for the network. In many circumstances, these benefits come at a cost to individuals outside the group. Society may lose when group members exploit social capital.’ (Sobel, 1992, 146)

    Diane Flaherty is a Professor in the Economics Department of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

    Reprinted from http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar

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  • English
    02/01/16
    An essay that sketches out the most common microeconomic and organizational challenges that Argentina's recuperated workplaces face and maps out the “social innovations” being spearheaded by them.

    Argentina’s  worker-recuperated enterprises emerged out of the unraveling of the country’s neoliberal experiment circa 1997. With traditional union tactics proving incapable of addressing workers’ immediate needs, some workers took matters into their own hands by occupying and reopening their bankrupted or failing firms as workers’ cooperatives under the auspices of autogestión (self-management).
    Argentinaempresas  recuperadas  por  sus  trabajadores  (worker-recuperated enterprises [ERTs]) emerged out of the first signs of the unraveling of the countrys neoliberal experiment circa 1997 to 1998 (Fajn 2003; Rebón 2004; Ruggeri 2006). As the countrys neoliberal model reached a breaking point at the turn of the millennium, small and medium-sized business bankruptcies swelled to historically unprecedented levels while more and more workers fell into the ranks of the structurally unemployed.With traditional union tactics proving incapable of addressing workers’ immediate needs, and with an impotent state on the defensive as social, economic, and political crises rendered it incapable of responding to soaring immiseration and business failure, some workers took matters into their own hands by occupying and reopening their bankrupted or failing firms as workers’ cooperatives under the auspices of autogestión (self-management).In the ensuing years, ERTs have offered new hope for workers in hard times. In particular, they have crafted promising—and workable—alternatives for Argentinas workers to self-control their labor and their means of production while forging promising economies of solidarity that both contest and begin to move beyond capitalist market logics. 

    To date, the ERT phenomenon in Argentina involves roughly 180 mostly small and medium-sized enterprises estimated to include between 8,000 and 10,000 workers (Ruggeri, Martínez, and Trinchero 2005).While ERTs constitute only a small fraction of the countrys approximately 14.3 million officially active participants in its urban-based economy (Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo, y Seguridad Social de la República Argentina 2005), labor expert Hector Palomino (2003:72) pointed out that the political and economic impacts of Argentinas ERT phenomenon are more “related to its symbolic dimension” than to the strength of its size. Despite their small numbers, ERTs have inspired “new expectations for social change” in Argentina, since they especially show innovative and viable alternatives to chronic unemployment and underemployment (p. 72) and the “institutionalized system of labour relations” (p. 88). Indeed, ERTs not only show Argentine workers’ innovative capacities for saving jobs and avoiding the fate of precarious welfare plans or structural unemployment, they also illustrate workers’ capacity for adeptly managing their own working lives. As such, I extend Palominos analysis here and argue in this article that Argentinas ERTs more fundamentally show innovative alternatives for reorganizing productive life itself, especially during hard, crises-riddled economic times. These alternatives, I implicitly argue, prefigure other possibilities for economic and productive life that, at the same time, emerge from within, resist, and move beyond the dross of a neoliberal system in crisis. The team of activist anthropologists at the University of Buenos Aires working with a number of Argentinas ERTs calls these alternatives their social innovations (Ruggeri 2006; Ruggeri et al. 2005). These social innovations are undergirded by the notion of autogestión, the driving concept that guides the directly democratic values and practices contouring ERTs’ cooperativized organizational and labor processes. As I address throughout this article, ERTs’ cooperatively reorganized and self-managed workplaces and their engagement with solidarity economies point to the viability of worker-led paths to socioeconomic transformation despite chronic production, financial, and other challenges these firms continue to face. 

    I begin by pointing out the macroeconomic and macropolitical conjunctural factors that most directly contributed to the rise of worker-recuperated enterprises in Argentina. Second, I link the concept of autogestión and the organizational framework of workers’ cooperativism to ERTs’ cooperativized production practices. Third, I map out several of the most salient challenges faced by ERTs’ day-to-day practices of autogestión within Argentinas current conjuncture of intensive marketcompetition in a recovering national economy. And last, I explore ERTs four overarching social innovations that arise immanently out of, yet also begin to move beyond, their microand macroeconomic challenges. These four social innovations are (1) ERT protagonists creative responses to intensive market competition and financial and production challenges; (2) their commitment to democratize and cooperativize labor processes and divisions of labor; (3) their reclamation of social production within solidarity economies that recuperate workers surpluses and potentially contest notions of surplus value and surplus labor; and (4) their rediscovery of notions of social wealth, opening up workplaces to the community and strengthening the social value of these worker self-managed workspaces. In the concluding passages of the article, I propose that ERTs should provide much inspiration for workers facing growing job losses and business bankruptcies in our current moment of global financial crisis (Andrews 2009; Feintzeig 2008; Steinhauer 2008).2


    Five Conjunctural Realities Underpinning Argentinas ERTs

    • Conjuncture of Economic Precariousness

    Beginning around 1995 and coming to a head in the crisis years of 2001 to 2003, thousands of small and medium-sized businesses in Argentina began to lose market share while amassing unwieldy debt loads due to the drying up of local and export markets during the countrys economic liberalizations of the 1990s. In the name of curbing hyperinflation and reducing a surging national debt that, paradoxically, continued to rise throughout the 1990s, Argentinas International Monetary Fund– sanctioned liberalizations included the “dollarization” of the peso (Economic Minister Domingo Cavallos “Convertability law”), the privatization of over 150 once nationalized or public sector firms, the erosion of decades-old labor protections, and the foreign capitalization of large portions of Argentinas industrial and agricultural base (Petras and Veltmeyer 2004). By the mid-1990s, it was clear that these neoliberal policies were negatively affecting the competitive advantage of Argentine products in foreign and national markets (Damill 2005). Specifically, the large wave of privatization schemes, company downsizings, outsourcing, and deregulation of labor markets and other antilabor practices were underpinned by a mass outflow of capital to foreign economic interests, compromising the competitiveness of thousands of firms throughout the country (Boron and Thwaites Ray 2004; Patroni 2004). Producing severe microeconomic crises at the point of production that cut across all urban economic sectors (Palomino 2003, 2005; Rebón 2004), this macroeconomic situation eventually caused a growing number of firms to declare bankruptcy at historically unprecedented rates starting around 1995.3 By the apogee of the neoliberal collapse in late 2001 and early 2002, with Argentinas default on its national debt, the national month-to-month business bankruptcy ratehad reached its highest point in Argentinas modern history; during the Carlos Menem and Fernando de la Rúa presidencies (1989 to 2001), bankruptcies soared from an average of 772 per month in 1991 to over 2,600 per month by late 2001 (Magnani 2003:37). 

    Risking entering the ranks of the structurally unemployed that by the first quarter of 2002 affected well over 20 percent of Argentinas active, urban-based workers (Levy Yeyati and Valenzuela 2007),4  the response by some of Argentinas workers was to occupy and attempt to subsequently self-manage their failing or failed firms under the legal rubric of a workers’ cooperative. Rather than being impelled by a revolutionary cause, traditional union demands, or the leadership of mainstream political parties, in actuality, these responses were, at first, highly risky and localized tactics carried out by desperate workers willing to face violent repression by the state and returning owners to save their jobs, continue to feed their families, and safeguard their dignity. Initially, then, ERT protagonists took on the challenges of selfmanagement out of necessity heightened by the lack of alternative employment within a morally bankrupted political and economic system that looked the other way while countless business owners engaged in nefarious schemes to save their dying firms at the expense of the well-being of employees.5 That is, workers’ initial actions involving the seizure of deteriorating or bankrupted companies, the occupation of them for weeks or months, and their reopening as workers’ co-ops tend to initially arise most directly out of fear and anger. As such, ERTs were first impelled by pragmatic and phenomenologically immanent responses to worker-protagonists’ deep worries of becoming structurally unemployed, a life situation that Argentine workers have since termed “death in life” (Vieta and Ruggeri 2009:202). 

     

    • Conjuncture of Deep Class Divisions

    Everywhere in Argentina, conspicuous consumption has, since at least the mid- 

    1990s, intermingled with historically high levels of poverty and indigence even despite the relative recomposition of the countrys national economy (a recovery due in part to tight fiscal and monetary policy and favorable world commodity markets during Néstor Kirchners presidency) (Levy Yeyati and Valenzuela 2007). Over the past fifteen years or so, deeply structurated economic and social divisions have visibly etched everyday life in Argentina as continued social tensions between the haves and have-nots fuel a culture of combativeness among the countrys marginalized groups (Almeyra 2004). 

    Moreover, and at the expense of the well-being of its rank and file, Confederación General del Trabajo de la República Argentina (the General Confederation of Labor of Argentina [CGT], the countrys largest union central) helped foster the antilabor climate of 1990s as it bought into President Carlos Menems neoliberal reinvention of the countrys economy and his complementary redesign of the Peronist party, the CGTs traditional political ally (Palomino 2005). It is not surprising, then, that ERTs have received little support from traditional unions. With the exception of fewsupportive union locals, such as the Quilmes branch of the steelworkers union and Asociación Nacional de Trabajadores Autogestionados (the National Association of Self-Managed Workers [ANTA]), the incipient union for self-managed workers formed in 2005,6  the Argentine labor movement has been only tentatively supportive, indifferent, or outright hostile to the plight of ERT protagonists. Ensconced within the neoliberal consensus that permeated even Argentinas official representatives of its working class, and with widespread bafflement among traditional union leaders as to how to deal with workers who no longer reported to bosses, most unions have chosen instead to focus their efforts on employees who continue to work under bosses (Vales 2005). As a result, and with the exception of the important support they received from smaller political parties of the Left, neighbors, and sympathetic social activists, academics, and social movement organizations, ERT protagonists were mostly left to fend for their own destinies in a sea of neoliberal values and practices that effectively denied them much-needed union advocacy. 

    • Conjuncture of Horizontalism and Resistive Subjectivities

    With a dearth of options left for working people on the brink of structural unemployment, between 1995 and 2005—and especially between 2001 and 2003—class divisions crystallized into the strident radicalization of marginalized groups. A contagion of bottom-up popular resistance and horizontalism7 spread across Argentinas marginal sectors throughout this period, witnessed in the widespread direct action tactics of property occupations and squatting, the piqueteros’ now famous road blockages, spontaneous community mobilization, and directly democratic organizing structures (Palomino 2003; Sitrin 2006). What spilled over from these grassroots mobilizations onto all forms of popular struggle was a renewed sense of collective purpose against a callous, exploitative, and socially alienating system; a growing ethos of self-organization and direct participatory democracy “from below” (Colectivo Situaciones 2004, para. 3); and a massive “reactivation” of “communitarian social experience” (Svampa and Pereyra 2004:233). Antonio Negri (2003) observed that the responses of groups such as the piqueteros to the radical liberalization of the national economy bore witness to a new “energy of universal conviction and of egalitarian social recomposition” (p. 2) that emerged from the urban barrios and industrialized towns of the country at the time. This contagion intermingled with a long history of working-class militancy and workers’ collective imaginary of Argentinas Peronist-led “golden years,” which included a strong labor movement, a prosperous working class, and a mostly nationalized and self-sustaining economy. By the early years of the new millennium, there was much cross-pollination between grassroots social justice groups, highly visible in the diverse composition of those engaging in the daily protests that took place across the countrys urban centers (Almeyra 2004). As such, up until 2005 and the relative recomposition of Argentinas economy (which, it should be said, included the governments co-optation of some of these grassroots groups via strategies of assistentialism and clientelism), much ofthe routines of daily life in urban Argentina were peppered by constant protests, the occupation of land by the dispossessed, workplace takeovers, and road stoppages by myriad marginalized groups demanding better living conditions and social change (Vieta 2005). 

    These are the most direct roots of Argentinas wave of workspace recuperations that merged with ERT protagonistsmemories of past workersstruggles. As such, ERT protagoniststactics of workspace occupations, while distantly rooted in cultural memory of past labor struggles, were, on one hand, most directly modeled after the new social transformations that were taking shape around them at the time. On the other hand, and simultaneously, the practices of workspace occupations and recuperations were themselves influencing other social and cultural expressions of selfdetermination. Moreover, Argentinas “communitarian social experiences were also encouraged by the contagion of directly democratic and popular forms of resistance across Latin America that were surging at the same time (e.g., Bolivias water wars, Brazils landless peasants movements, Mexicos Zapatistas). For many workers in Argentina, participation in direct action to recuperate and recompose their workspaces, both modeled after and also influencing the new social movements strategies and tactics that were taking shape around them, seemed to be the only viable alternative left in the face of a retreating and ineffectual state committed to its neoliberal project.

    • Conjuncture of Tight Community Bonds

    Geographically and ideologically, ERTs are situated deep within the community in which each enterprise finds itself. There is both a spatial dimension and a community imaginary that intermingles with the emergence of autogestión in Argentina. For example, and as I describe in the last section of this article, economies and networks of solidarity between a recuperated enterprise and its neighborhood and other local ERTs have in some cases emerged into community links of mutual aid. This is driven in part by the fact that most workers live in or near the neighborhoods where the enterprises are located. Moreover, neighbors were often supportive of and at times active players in the recuperation of workplaces. Consequently, neighborhood cultural centers and other community services tend to organically emerge within many recuperated enterprises as a way of giving back to the neighborhoods that supported them, as a way of further valorizing the ERT within the community, and also as a strategy for protecting the ERT from ongoing repression and threats of closure via the bonds of solidarity that form within these interlaced communities of mutual assistance. 

    • Conjuncture of Cooperativism

    Cooperativism has a long tradition in Argentina extending as far back as the early waves of European immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.Many of these immigrants brought to their new country the anarchist, socialist, and cooperativist ideals of their homelands, ideals that guided the early Argentine labor movement in the first years of the twentieth century (Munck, Falcon, and Galitelli 

    1987). Subsequently practiced in myriad economic sectors and entrenched in national business legislation, the countrys ERTs have adopted the framework of cooperativism as an important legal organizational model in light of the paucity of other legal frameworks for these former owner-managed, now worker-recuperated enterprises. I explore the implications of this broad adoption of cooperative values, structures, and practices in more detail in the last half of this article.

     

    Micropolitical and Microeconomic Factors Impelling ERTs

    Emerging out of these five broad conjunctural realities, ERT protagonists consistently mention five often overlapping microeconomic and micropolitical experiences that most directly motivate their tactics of workplace takeovers and their subsequent desire for autogestión (Ruggeri et al. 2005:66): (1) owners’ illegal “emptying” of factories of their assets and inventories just before or shortly after bankruptcy is declared, often in collusion with corrupt local officials and court trustees (called vaciamiento); (2) employees’ perceived imminence of the bankruptcy or closure of plants; (3) employees’ not getting paid salaries, wages, and benefits for weeks or months; (4) actual layoffs and firings; and (5) lockout and other mistreatment. Synthesizing these micropolitical and microeconomic motivators, Palomino (2003) identified three stages in the emergence of an ERT in Argentina: (1) ERT protagonists’ recognition and intensification of conflict with former bosses and/or state institutions, (2) the transformation of workers’ perceptions of their capacity to change their situation and shift the terrain of conflict from their workplaces into the streets and the corridors of power, and (3) the struggle to regulate and normalize their work as self-managed workers’ co-ops. Movimiento Nacional de Empresas Recuperadas (the National Movement of Recuperated Enterprises), the first and most influential ERT lobby group, evocatively captures this three-staged struggle toward autogestión in the following slogan, borrowed from Brazils landless peasant movements: “Ocupar, resistir, producer” (“Occupy, resist, produce”). 

    The strategies and tactics of occupation, resistance, and subsequent self-managed production under the legal framework of a workers’ co-op are, especially during the first precarious days of an ERT, important defensive maneuvers for its protagonists, maneuvers that, at first, directly respond to the dire conjunctural crises and microeconomic and micropolitical situations that place in innumerable ways the very lives of its workers at risk. Eventually, and for reasons I explore in the remaining pages, over the course of reopening a firm as a workers’ cooperative, these defensive maneuvers borne out of necessity transform into long-term visions and desires forautogestión. In other words, initial tactics to defend jobs and increase life security eventually can become, ERT protagonists discover, viable strategies for reorganizing workplaces and productive life cooperatively. As many ERT workers and activists have told me in countless conversations since 2005, initially their rage and fear at the possibility of being without work nearly always fomented their actions. But gradually, throughout their struggle for autogestión, workers eventually come to discover that it is indeed possible to change their own circumstances for the first time in their lives. This in spite of and, indeed, because of a political system that remains unresponsive to their quotidian needs. And, as I explore in the last two sections of this article, these multidimensional, macroand microlevel experiences ultimately shape an ERTs cooperativized labor processes and divisions of labor while inspiring the solidarity economies it forges.


    The Praxis of Autogestión and Argentinas ERTs

    Currently in Argentina, autogestión means to self-organize and self-direct working life cooperatively as an alternative to owner-managed work organization, while minimizing the intrusive mediation of free markets, traditional bureaucracies, hierarchical organization, or the state.Autogestionar is the verb that drives how more and more groups throughout Argentina are democratically and ethically reconstituting productive life. 

    Autogestión has also made those practicing it in Argentina increasingly aware that, on one hand, any stark separation between work life and the rest of life is a fantasysociability, needs, and desires overflow artificial divisions between private life and public work. On the other hand, there is also an increasing awareness that the neoliberal drive to increasingly merge capitalist production with the reproduction of life itself is a move by contemporary forms of capital to more totally capture for its projects of accumulation and incessant pursuits of profit the moments that Marx (1967) called “the intervals between the buying and the selling (p. 155)—the spaces of life that, for capital, are about “unproductive consumption(p. 573) and “unproductive labour (Marx 1976:1038-44). The crisis of the neoliberal model in Argentina made many workers who were standing on the precipice of permanent structural unemployment realize that neoliberalisms absolutist promises of abundance and well-being “for allwithin free markets, unencumbered competition, and perpetual growth were false ones. In actuality, they now realize, these “promiseswere not about increasing workers well-being but rather ideologically driven moves by contemporary capital to further secure workers dependence on the system, consolidate the power base of an elite minority (the entrepreneurial class), maximize productivity via the intensification of labor processes that served to minimize labor costs, and ensure the creation of surplus value and profits even in hard economic times. 

    The worker cooperative model is the most effective form of organizing the desire for autogestión for ERT protagonists because it specifically addresses other values,such as caring for one another, horizontality, self-reliance, and equity, values that gradually and imminently grew in the imaginary of ERT workers during the process of fighting for the control of workplaces, securing jobs, and ensuring dignified and humane working conditions. Moreover, the worker cooperative model serves to place a workable organizational framework around ERT protagonists’ desires to selfmanage their work. It also serves to symbolically and practically counter the abusive and exploitative relations ERT workers suffered under former bosses (Fajn 2003; Vieta and Ruggeri 2009). The worker cooperative model, for instance, encourages each worker-member to have an equal say in the running of the recuperated shop. This is most readily visible in the regular workers’ assemblies and elected workers’ councils that administer ERTs. As well, and in part because of the political lobbying and direct action pressure tactics of ERT protagonists’ and ERT-based organizations such as the National Movement of Recuperated Enterprises, workers’ cooperativism has become one of the only recognized legal models in Argentina for former employees to begin to self-manage bankrupted enterprises (Vieta and Ruggeri 2009). Furthermore, the potential for workers’ liberation from alienation and exploitation implicit in workers’ cooperativism emerges out of the different productive world that it reveals to workers because of its focus on self-reliant labor processes grounded in the principles of “labour hir[ing] capital” (rather than the other way around) (Smith, Chivers, and Goodfellow 1988:25), “work” as the common contribution of each member (Instituto Nacional de Asociativismo y Economía Social 2007), and “control . . . linked to work” (Oakeshott 1990:27).

     

    The Challenges to Autogestión in Argentinas ERTs

    Despite the possibilities that autogestión opens up for workers, there are two major challenges that tempt ERTs in Argentina to return to the business practices they had originally contested: chronic underproduction compared with original production levels under owner management and a continued overreliance on competitive markets.

    On average, ERTs currently produce at between 20 percent to 60 percent of their original output capacity compared with production runs under owner management (Ruggeri et al. 2005:52). Most critically for ERT workers, these diminished production levels cut into precious revenues needed to pay salaries and sustain the firms on a month-to-month basis. One reason for underproduction is linked to financing issues: because ERTs are considered poor “subjects of credit” by lending institutions, there is a dearth of access to loans for production inputs or for sustaining cash flow in lean months. Financing issues are also intimately linked to the challenges of adequately addressing depreciating machinery. In many instances, ERT protagonists have had no choice but to attempt production in workplaces with machines that had been in disrepair well before workers took over the firms or that fell into disrepair during the long periods of inactivity between the firms’ closure and their reopeningas worker-run firms. With irregular or inadequate sources of funding adding to already existing capitalization issues and reduced revenues, problems with underproduction issues compound as inadequate or broken machines cannot be readily replaced and thus must be operated at suboptimum levels or must be shut down temporarily as workers themselves attempt to repair them. This often means that precious production time is replaced by extended periods of unproductive or suboptimum work activity. Lack of financing and underproduction issues are yet further complicated by the fact that there is still no national government policy for assisting ERTs, as the Argentine state is caught between recognizing ERTs as viable models for saving jobs and its commitments to capitalist business models and private property rights (each ERT is treated by the state on a case-by-case basis, if considered at all; Vieta and Ruggeri 2009). In addition, and as I discuss shortly, while innovative nonconventional and irregular sources of funding linked to NGOs or community fund-raising drives have helped sustain many ERTs, such erratic funding sources delinked from revenues add to an ERTs tenuous existence and the instability of its workers. While these nontraditional funding sources perhaps point to promising noncapitalist financing practices, having to compete in capitalist markets with firms that can adequately meet their own capitalization needs necessarily means that an ERT is disadvantaged in meeting market demands when its workforce must dedicate time that would otherwise be spent on production on non-production-related activities such as fund-raising or fixing machines.

    Yet another factor that places ERTs at a competitive disadvantage and that adds to chronic microeconomic instability and underproduction is related to the political effort that ERT workers must expend during periods when their worker-members are lobbying local legislatures to renegotiate their status as expropriated firms, during other political struggles for legal recognition, or when renegotiating the debts they have inherited from the old firms in local courts. These struggles usually occur in the first days, weeks, and months of an ERT. Even once their enterprises are fully recuperated or legally recognized as workers’ co-ops, ERT protagonists’ early days of self-management often unfold under the shadow of having to deal with the former bosss outstanding debt or having to renegotiate outstanding accounts payable or unpaid services (such as electricity, gas, and telephone lines), engage with local courts and their trustees with the paperwork required to deal with the bankruptcy of the previous firm, lobby regional legislatures and their local political representatives to vote in favor of expropriating these workplaces on behalf of its workers, or face head on the imminent risk of state repression, eviction, or threats by former owners and their hired thugs seeking to reclaim control over their lost assets. All this is in addition to having to struggle to regain lost market share or convince a dwindling customer base to continue to buy from a once failed and now worker-run firm. Furthermore, the promise of formally expropriating these firms on behalf of their worker-protagonists, technically possible under Argentine legislation, in practice has thus far secured for most ERTs a temporary expropriation of between two and fiveyears subject to renewal at the end of that period (Vieta and Ruggeri 2009). The continuing struggle for the permanent expropriation of these firms, a struggle that continues to this day, has meant that ERT protagonists have had to resort to tactics of protesting in front of or actually even occupying regional legislatures for days at times as a means of lobbying local politicians to vote in favor of granting expropriation. Again, the need to engage in these political actions rather than focus on production has real consequences for ERTs’ bottom lines, especially in their precarious early months of existence; during these political moments, some of the ERTs workers, and at times all of them, need to be mobilized for political and legal activities not directly related to the firms’ core business.

    Moreover, ERT workers, unlike their capitalist competitors’ workforces, must engage in an extended period of learning new administrative skills as they attempt to recompose failing firms. During these periods, the strain and pressure on ERT protagonists to learn the ins and outs of self-management and workers’ cooperativism as quickly as possible further compromises their competitive advantage, leading to further periods of underproduction.

    A related challenge that adds an additional long-term worry for an ERTs incumbent members is related to hiring new members in moments of expansion or, usually, as more and more of its members near retirement age. During these crucial periods, there tend to be two major questions on the minds of incumbent ERT members: If the number of “newassociates supersedes the number of “foundingmembers of the ERT, could the cooperative be voted out of existence one day and become, once again, a capitalist firm? Could capitalist business models be perceived by newer members to be much more “efficientfor securing jobs and tackling competitive markets? Because of the risks and uncertainties these two questions pose for the longterm survival of ERTs, many ERTs have decide to incorporate new workers as temporary contract “hireswithout making them members of the cooperatives right away. At times, these contracts are renewed far beyond the maximum six-month probationary period defined by Argentine cooperative legislation for deciding whether a co-op can make recent hires new members. Ironically, these situations tend to reproduce the very exploitative and alienating capitalist practices that led to the labor instability ERT protagonists were contesting in the first place. In some ERTs, however, there is a marked preoccupation with balancing the equitable treatment of all their workers with the ERTs horizontalized organizational and production processes and the long-term viability of the co-ops. In some cases, the balance seems to be maintained by strategies that could be interpreted as nepotism: hiring family members, ex-workers of the cooperatives (including returning retired workers working partor full-time), or workers recommended to them by other ERTs or friends.

    Finally, not all ERT members desire to learn new skills, and some resist the extra commitment required of them by the firmsnew cooperative values. Having been content with working for fixed wages, following orders from bosses, and restricting their work to attending to their tasks as defined by the old division of labor when thefirms were under owner management, not all workers in ERTs are happy with the extra responsibility of having to learn new skills, attend regular assemblies, or be present at social movement or political rallies and activities in solidarity with other social groups or ERTs. As some of these recalcitrant workers have told me, these extra activities and responsibilities detract from the time that should be spent on production. While perhaps stating the obvious, it is important to remember that the transformation of these workers subjectivities from employees to self-managed, cooperative workers is not a uniform process; far from it. Rather, it is multifaceted and singularly experienced by each individual. Some workers seem to have more invested in the process of self-management than others, even within the same ERT. It must be remembered that the degree of personal commitment to the project of self-managing these cooperative firms is socially variegated. As one ERT worker poignantly put it, “Its easier to put the factory into production once again than to change the heads of some of our compañeros (quoted in Fernández, Imaz, and Callaway 2006).

    As Gabriel Fajn and Julián Rebón (2005) underlined, chronic financial precariousness, diminished productive capacity, and organizational uncertainty means that ERT protagonists tend to work with the constant awareness that sufficient revenues might not be generated to pay salaries. This material insecurity illustrates the main contradiction implicit in self-management within a greater capitalist system: ERTs risk losing sight of the collective spirit and democratic ideals that drove them to become workers’ cooperatives in the first place when staying afloat becomes the primary focus of their workers to meet the socially necessary labor times demanded by market competition (also see McNally 1993). As Fajn and Rebón observed, the resulting pressures that come with the desperation of staying afloat and the pursuit of sufficient returns to pay wages and reinvest back into the firm serve to refocus the attention of an ERT from its cooperativist possibilities back into the very capitalist logic that it contested in the first place. For Fajn and Rebón, the effects of these challenges have meant that some ERTs have returned to business and management styles more in tune with capitalist norms, such as the reinstitution of fragmented and repetitious work tasks, the privileging of technical and marketing skills above other skills, increased job intensification, pressures to work overtime without adequate compensation “for the good of the team,” situations in which the control once exercised by the shop floor supervisor is returned in the form of the “collective foreman,” and at times the formation of a new “boss” in the figure of the ERTs elected president or a new class of managers in those workers who belong to the workers’ council. In these situations, ERTs risk becoming “cooperativist capitalists” that privilege, once again, the maximization of revenues (and even profits) above all else. As the authors point out, echoing Marxs (1978a, 1978b, 1981) critique of cooperatives (also see Jossa 2005), when workers become overwhelmed by the daunting demands of self-management within continued market competition, practices that emulate capitalist priorities risk pushing an ERT to a mode of production ensconced in “self-exploitation and [self]-bureaucratization” (Fajn and Rebón 2005:7).

     

    ERTs’ Social Innovations

    The tensions between the desire for autogestión and the challenges brought on by financial precariousness, underproduction, obstinately competitive markets, and an unsympathetic state get played out in each ERT on a daily basis, shaping the cooperative labor processes ERTs adopt. In this last section, I describe four of the most salient “social innovations” being spearheaded by ERTs, innovations that mitigate the challenges to autogestión I discussed in the previous section. Moreover, these social innovations emerge creatively from out of and as direct responses to the tensions of self-managing firms within Argentinas current conjuncture.

    • Creative Responses to Production and Financial Challenges

    How much of a problem underproduction ends up being for an ERT tends to vary from sector to sector. ERTs that depend on smaller machines with single operators, such as those in some metal shops or in the printing, textiles, food processing, and service sectors, tend to produce at higher capacity rates than those in heavier industries such as shipbuilding, pulp and paper, gas, and electricity, which depend on much larger machinery and more complex production processes (Ruggeri, et al.

    2005). Because the latter, more capital intensive sectors require higher levels of automation using more sophisticated machinery and more multifaceted production cycles, ongoing operational necessities such as machine repairs and technological renewal become hard to come by without access to regular and reliable funds for reinvestment back into the cooperative. In the former, less capital intensive sectors, the tendency is for worker-operators themselves to repair their own machines and to mediate structural barriers to production by engaging in small-batch production practices (Vieta and Ruggeri 2009).

    As a result of production and financial challenges, and illustrative of the adaptability and innovative capacities of the ERT movements self-managed workers, most ERTs have had to resort to the individual and collective ingenuity and determination of their workers for ensuring the ongoing operation of the firms. Examples of how ERTs mediate structural barriers to production include just-in-time or day-to-day production practices, requesting that customers pay for raw materials when placing orders, or working a façón (a practice that sees ERTs producing under contract for third-party contractors or as subcontracted parts of other firms’ production runs). ERT workers have also had to learn and share accounting and marketing skills and tasks. These were the principal skill sets to be lost in most ERTs that emerged during the crisis years of 1997 to 2003, primarily because the white-collar workers who possessed these more transferable skills also happened to be on average younger compared with shop floor and line workers. Because these administrative, marketing, and technical workers tended to have an easier time finding work elsewhere, many would chose this route in part to avoid the insecurities of making a go of itwith an ERT. While the loss of these skilled workers adds further challenges to meeting production runs, revenue goals, and staying afloat (especially during an ERTs early days), the flip side of these challenges is that many ERT workers have had the opportunity to develop new skills and capacities that remained untapped in the stricter divisions of labor when the firms were under owner control. The initiatives of learning new administrative and marketing skills show that, as Marx was fond of pointing out, workers’ skills and capacities extend far beyond their specific work roles and that, despite capitalist rhetoric, workers do indeed possess the ability to effectively self-actualize and motivate themselves without the need of coercion. Indeed, ERT workers are proving that the capacity to innovate and practice entrepreneurialism is not the monopoly of business owners and managers.

    Other innovative initiatives that respond to unmet revenue goals and capitalization challenges include

     

    1.   practices of recycling leftover materials from production processes for economic and ecological purposes;

    2.  approaching lenders as “less risky” collective coalitions of ERTs that, in effect, creatively addresses the banking systems risk assessment benchmarks;

    3.  accessing government funding sources and business development programs in partnership with university research teams, foreign NGOs, or other research initiatives working in conjunction with ERTs;

    4.   organizing neighborhood “solidarity” fund drives;

    5.   the establishment of networks of experts facilitated by supportive university programs and technical institutes to aid in administrative tasks and technological repair and upgrading; and

    6.   the emergence of “economies of solidarity” among ERTs.

     

    The involvement of ERTs in economies of solidarity is perhaps the most promising  aspect  of  their  creative  responses  to  production  and  financial  challenges.9

    Indeed, I argue it is prefigurative of what a noncapitalist, worker-run economy might begin to look like. In these nascent economies of solidarity, competitive markets are beginning to be replaced by practices that see ERTs in similar or related sectors sharing orders and customers and even collaborating with or bartering technical expertise, the use of machinery, labor processes, raw materials, marketing and administrative tasks, legal assistance, inventory, or other production inputs.

    ERTs working in the graphics and printing sector, for example, have since late

    200formalized  a  solidaritnetworocooperativethroughouthgreater Buenos Aires area to pool resources, approach markets collectively, share customer orders and production input costs, and more effectively tackle the various challenges they face in a highly concentrated and competitive printing and publishing market. Holding regular monthly strategy meetings in different member co-ops each time, one of the explicit goals of the network is to forge links between ERT graphics co-ops and non-ERT cooperatives working in the sector (i.e., co-ops thatwere not once owner-managed firms). Another example of an inter-ERT economy of solidarity was formalized in mid-2006 as Federación Argentina de Cooperativas de Trabajadores Autogestionados (Argentine Federation of Self-Managed WorkersCooperatives [FACTA]). It was formed by several Buenos Aires–based ERTs with aspirations to create a coalition whereby ERT members could collectively lobby and coordinate funds from the state and forge alliances with universities and NGOs. Their hope is that these alliances will support member ERTs in technical upgrading and administrative assistance, help create or reinstitute lost retirement benefits, and secure medical and health coverage for ERT workers. FACTAs major goal concerning production as a coalition is to increase ERT members revenue potential and market share by collaboratively approaching markets and attending to purchase or service orders as a collective of ERTs, while articulating tighter links with ERTs from the interior and other cooperatives (Castiglioni 2006; EnRedAndo 2006).

    Pragmatically grounded and theoretically rich with the possibilities for another mode of economic life, the practices of solidarity economies, though still nascent, not only assist participating ERTs in competing with strictly capitalist firms and reducing their reliance on irregular sources of financing but, more promisingly, begin to work out other, less competitive and more collaborative models for the production and distribution of wealth. Collaborative economic practices between ERTs also serve to, once again, place into question the privileging of competitive and profit-maximizing business values as they essentially encompass the sixth principle of cooperativism: cooperation between cooperatives. In the analysis of the next three social innovations, I describe in more detail other specifics of the new solidarity economies emerging between ERTs and within an ERTs worker collective.

    • Horizontal Work Structures and Equitable Distribution of Revenues

    Ninety-four percent of ERTs reorganize production under the legal rubric of a workers’ cooperative (Fajn 2003; Ruggeri et al. 2005). Why is this the case? While it is true that an ERTs adoption of cooperativism initially has do with the fact that it is one of the only readily available legal frameworks from which to reconstitute a workspace controlled by a collective of workers in Argentina, ERT protagonists soon discover that, conceptually and practically, workers’ cooperativism is indeed a viable, already tested, and sound model for self-organizing and self-managing production. Second, as the first ERTs emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s, ERT workers’ collectives, the movements first leaders and legal advisors, and sympathetic academic activists and individuals from other social movements eventually came to the conclusion after much debate that, in a politically and economically volatile environment, being legally recognized as cooperatives was important for ERTs’ stability and longevity and for the protection of their workers against repression by police and returning owners. Third, as ERT workers have told me, many ofthem come to the realization that becoming a workers’ cooperative actually offers them a much more egalitarian foundation from which to counteract the effects and memories of the exploitative structures and practices of the capitalist firm they had once been a part of. In other words, the legal framework of a workers’ co-op facilitates addressing workers’ communal needs and desires that arise in the processes of taking over and self-managing the plant. In practice, these communal desires manifest themselves in the democratic forms of one-worker, one-vote decision making most ERTs adopt and the equitable redistribution of revenues many of them seek. Indeed, regular workers’ assemblies and other directly democratic decision-making processes are integral to the day-to-day and month-to-month running of the vast majority of ERTs (Fajn 2003; Ruggeri et al. 2005). Fourth, workers’ cooperativism is a viable business model that goes a long way toward showing the state and potential customers that the workers’ collective is serious about its commitment to running its own affairs. And last, because of Argentine cooperative law, becoming a workers’ cooperative rather than another form of entity protects the worker-members from the seizure of their personal property should the co-op fail, while ensuring that the ERT does not have to pay taxes on revenues (Fajn 2003).

    The past dozen years or so of ERT self-management practices have also shown that once the cooperative model takes hold in the imaginary of an ERTs workforce, most of its members become committed to reorganizing workplaces in egalitarian ways (Fajn 2003; Ruggeri et al. 2005). One clear example of this is the preponderance of pay equity schemes no matter how senior a worker is or what skill sets he or she possesses; between 56 percent (Ruggeri et al. 2005:76) and 71 percent (Fajn

    2003:161) of ERTs practice complete or nearly complete pay equity. This is another promising innovation that serves to reconceptualize work within a productive entity as it transforms and flattens organizational hierarchies on the basis of particular work skills while revalorizing the contributions of all workers in a productive entity. The practice of equitable pay, incidentally, is not necessarily common in traditional workers’ co-ops in Argentina or in other conjunctures and is one immediately noticeable innovation that differentiates ERTs from other forms of workers’ cooperatives (Vieta and Ruggeri 2009).

    Interestingly, egalitarian pay schemes are related to the age of an ERT, the political turmoil the collective of workers had to traverse during the firms most turbulent early years, and its size. Older ERTs that had to traverse more intensive struggles of occupation and resistance between 1997 and 2003, the politically and economically volatile years that saw the collapse of the neoliberal model of the 1990s, are more likely to practice egalitarian pay schemes compared with newer ERTs that formed after 2003, when the Argentine economy started to recompose itself. For example,

    70 percent of ERTs recuperated during or before 2001 practice complete pay equity, while 39 percent of those recuperated during 2003 and 2004 do so. In addition, the size of a firm tends to also be linked to pay equity: 64 percent of firms with twenty or fewer workers practice pay equity, compared with 47 percent of firms havingbetween twenty and fifty workers and 54 percent of firms with more than fifty workers. (Ruggeri et al. 2005:80-81).

    There are two major explanations for the differences in equitable remuneration depending on the age, size, and history of an ERT. With regard to the size of an ERT, the collectives of workers belonging to smaller ERTs tend to forge stronger social ties and thus tend to sympathize with one anothers plight more than between workers in larger ERTs; colleagues in smaller firms tend to spend more time interacting with one another on a daily basis and also have more intimate knowledge of one anothers jobs, personal lives, and concerns. This means, as I have observed firsthand, that smaller ERTs also tend to experience less factionalism, individualism, and shop floor competition compared with larger ERTs with more dispersed work teams. With respect to older ERTs that emerged in the most conflictive years of social, political, and economic crisis, the social bonds in these firms were solidified during moments of intense political and economic struggle. Especially heightened for those workerscollectives that formed their ERTs in the most harried days of the socioeconomic crisis at the turn of the millennium, these shared struggles included long periods of occupying or squatting in the workplace; collectively experiencing intense moments of political conflict such as staving off police repression, dealing with returning recalcitrant former owners, or countering unfavorable legal decisions; and sharing the challenges that come with the lengthy periods needed to reestablish production.

    • The Reclamation of Surplus: Paths to Social Production

    One outcome of cooperativizing labor processes within emergent economies of solidarity are ERTs’ experiments with forms of social production that redistribute social wealth more equitably while minimizing capitalist forms of surplus value and wealth accumulation.10 For example, although not always possible, ERTs tend to ensure that revenues are first distributed between workers’ salaries, the material needs of workers that periodically arise, and pensions for retired members of the cooperative before allocating remaining revenues to the production needs of the firm. That is, the preference in ERTs tends to be to redirect any remaining revenues into the needs of production and the maintenance of the firm only after meeting individual workers’ needs. Some ERTs, such as the Zanón/FaSinPat ceramics ERT in the province of Nequén or the Unión Solidaria de Trabajadores (UST) waste recycling and parks maintenance ERT in the city of Avellaneda, for example, practice divvying revenues between capitalization needs, salaries, and community service. Restructured under the values of cooperativism, equal compensation, and community service rather than profit maximization, these alternative forms of revenue allocation are possible because, being workers’ co-ops, labor hires capital, not vice versa; it is the workers’ assembly that decides how revenues are to be distributed rather than a boss or the incessant pursuit of profit.The reclamation of social production via the cooperative principle of “labor hiring capital” also rearticulates ERTs’ labor processes and decision-making structures in the following ways:

     

    1.   horizontal organizational structures framed within elected workers’ councils and regular workers assemblies that tend toward infinitely more transparent administrative and self-managerial methods than when ERT firms operated under owner management;

    2.   the prevalence of flexible ad hoc work committees and labor processes that change with the needs of a particular order or production run and that are integrated into actual decision-making processes within the shop floor itself;

    3.   looser and more horizontal communication structures on shop floors fostering continuously flexible and open dialogue between workers; and

    4.  worker-members’ eating and playing together regularly (e.g., daily communal lunches and weekly soccer games or barbeques) and taking many breaks throughout the day (regular mate tea breaks, for instance), helping ease the tensions and stresses that come with working life.

     

    • Opening Up Workspaces to the Community: Reclaiming More Than Surplus

    It is clear by now that jobs are not the only things recuperated by ERTs. The ERT phenomenons new forms of social production and the sharing of social wealth also include opening up workspaces to other uses besides producing the immediate products or delivering the specific services that preoccupy a firm during business hours. Many ERTs, for instance, also double as cultural and community centers, free community health clinics, popular education schools, alternative media spaces, and even community dining rooms run by workers, neighbors, or volunteers.

    The print shop Artes Gráficas Chilavert in the Nueva Pompeya neighborhood of Buenos Aires, for example, has a vibrant community center on its mezzanine level called Chilavert Recupera (Chilavert Recovers), hosting plays, music concerts, and community events often linked to Argentinas social justice movements every Saturday night. Chilavert also converts its main shop floor into an art workshop on weekends. During one of my weekend visits to the print shop in 2005, volunteers from the community were giving a class on the dying porteño signage art called fileto, while workers and visitors from the community were playing table tennis in the cultural center. On another occasion in July 2007, I witnessed a community play about the ERT movement whereby Chilavert itself became a living theater as the play was performed in the midst of stacks of papers and printing machinery. IMPA, the large metallurgic cooperative, located in the central Buenos Aires neighborhood of Caballito, is also known as La Fábrica Cultural (The Cultural Factory), dedicating a large portion of its space to an art school, silk screen shop, and community theater. Artes Gráficas Patricios, located in the economically depressed southern BuenosAires neighborhood of Barracas, houses a primary school, a community radio station, and a medical clinic that is run by local community volunteers. In August 2007, I attended a community fund-raising concert on the blocked-off streets outside of Patricios, where several thousand spectators listened to numerous bands playing on a temporary stage improvised from the print shops flatbed truck as local musicians donated their time and equipment to the occasion. And UST, the aforementioned waste recycling ERT, redirects a third of its revenues to community development projects such as an affordable housing initiative for its workers and the surrounding community. This initiative has already built 100 attractive townhomes to replace the precarious homes of some of its workers and local residents, with several dozen more homes to follow. In addition, UST built and supports a youth sports complex in the neighborhood and an alternative media workshop and radio program, and heads a unique plastics recycling initiative for the large low-income housing project located near its plant.

    Hosting such cultural and community spaces and involving themselves intimately with the needs of the local community is not just a way of giving back to the neighborhood out of self-interest or corporate “goodwill.” Instead, the worker-recuperated plants are seen by ERT protagonists as continuations of the neighborhood. These ERTs are always open to the neighborhood, and the neighbors use them often. During my time in Argentina, I quickly learned that with many ERTs, their workspace walls do not demarcate enclosures that protect the work inside from the community outside. Rather, as many ERT protagonists told me, recuperated workspaces are recognized by them as being deeply rooted in the needs and desires of the local community and, as such, their participation in and collaboration with the communities that surround them makes up a vital part of their raison d’être.

    Pragmatically, engraining themselves into the surrounding neighborhoods and opening up the recuperated workspaces to the community adds to ERTs’ social value within the community in immeasurable ways. One direct result of this increased social value is that ERTs are further protected from the threat of closure by the state or returning former owners. If the state, for example, were to consider closing an ERT or returning it to private hands once more (as has happened in some cases), elected officials and the courts have to contend not only with the wrath of the ERTs workers but also with the potential anger and mobilization of the surrounding communities. Thus, the social capital of ERTs exponentially grows with the opening up of the co-ops to the community, especially compared with a capitalist businesss limited and instrumentalized connections with the world beyond its walls as a seller in the marketplace or as a purchaser of raw materials and labor power. One can say that the self-valorization of ERTs within the communities that surround them increases their social value in ways not accounted for by capitalists’ focused pursuit of surplus value and profits or in self-interested “goodwill” community programs. As such, with the opening up of an ERT, more than a factory or print shop or medical clinic or hotel or metal shop is recuperated. ERTs’ practice of autogestión alsorecuperates values of mutual aid and noncommodified social production, moving far beyond a capitalist firms primary interests.


    Concluding Thoughts, Potential Openings

    Under the auspices of autogestión and within the legal and organizational rubrics of workers’ cooperativism, Argentinas ERTs are beginning to exemplify innovative ways of reorganizing work that directly address the inevitable instability wrought by an overreliance on the global neoliberal market system. They also offer viable community-based alternatives to welfare plans, government make-work projects, assistentialism, clientelism, unemployment, and underemployment. Moreover, I understand ERTs as articulating new ways of critically thinking about the power of employers to determine the working conditions of employees. The ERT movement is also modeling for Argentinas still brittle and debt-beholden economy alternative forms of economic relations, which include the practices of interand intra-ERT solidarity economies and networks—the sharing of customers, orders, prime materials, technological know-how, administrative duties, legal assistance, and even machinery and labor processes between workplaces that practice infinitely more horizontalized and egalitarian labor processes compared with capitalist firms. Most important, these alternative economic models are pointing to possible paths beyond recurring and, what is clear in our current world economic conjuncture, systemic macroeconomic crisis. Rooted deeply in the neighborhoods and communities that surround them, ERTs rely more on the principle of subsidiarity—intimately engaging in production practices that privilege the local—rather than in a global system of capital irresponsive to local needs.

    On the whole, then, ERT protagonists’ socially innovative experiments with autogestión as a long-term solution to dire macroand microeconomic situations, even with the myriad challenges they continue to face, are providing suggestive alternatives to traditional capital-labor relations in Argentina and beyond, especially during hard times. Emerging in an industrialized national economy in decline and with its neoliberal system in tatters, the reopening and self-management of struggling or failed capitalist firms as workers’ co-ops by its former employees perhaps prefigure the types of bottom-up solutions available to workers in the most recent crisis of the neoliberal system that hit with force in 2008. With the global Norths working classs fate tightly entangled in the dropping fortunes of global financial capital through their debt-financed consumerism and home ownership (an indebtedness connected to the relative drop in real wages over the past forty years) and the privatization of their pensions (fueled by the neoliberal mantra of less state intervention and more market mediation) (Gindin 1998), the case of ERTs should be of particular interest to workers in our current conjuncture. This is especially so considering sharply rising unemployment rates (Andrews 2009; Steinhauer 2008) and a coming wave of small and medium-sized business bankruptcies that were already climbing in theUnited States, for example, by the last trimester of 2008 (Feintzeig 2008). Indeed, the idea of employees’ occupying workplaces in trouble is not unheard of in developed capitalist economies. Take, for example, the case of workplace sit-ins during the Great Depression in the United States, the worker takeover of the Tower Colliery coal mine in Wales in 1994 and 1995 (Waddington, Parry, and Critcher 1998), or the more recent Maple Leaf workers occupation of their meatpacking plant during a labor dispute in Edmonton, Canada, in 2005 (United Food and Commercial Workers International Union 2005), Alcan workers’ restarting production of their closed aluminum smelter under self-management in Quebec in 2004 (La Nuit 2004), the Republic Windows and Doors employee sit-in in Chicago in late 2008 (Lichtenstein and Phelps 2008), and the recent workplace occupations of failing firms in Ireland and England (Grevatt 2009; Socialist Appeal 2009). Even though the possibilities of worker-managed firms emerging in the global North en masse as workers’ microeconomic responses to the current financial crisis would have to be looked at in light of each conjunctural particularity, taking over failing or failed businesses by employees and reopening them as workers’ co-ops in developed industrial economies such as Canada, the United States, and Europe is not as far-fetched as neoliberal ideologues or skeptics might have one believe. Specific surges in workers’ cooperatives as bottom-up solutions to growing rates of unemployment occurred, for example, with the noticeable expansion in labor coops in Finland in the 1990s in the wake of the economic disruption of that countrys white-collar and service sectors caused in part by the breakup of the Soviet Union (Birchall 2003). Workers’ co-ops also saw rapid growth in the Industrial Common Ownership Movement in the United Kingdom during its deep economic recessions of the 1970s and early 1980s (Melnyk 1985; Oakeshott 1990). And in Canada, the province of Quebec has a long tradition of workers’ cooperativism that has promisingly weathered many economic storms, most notably in its forestry and health services sectors (Quarter 1992).

    By experimenting with the practices of autogestión and putting into play the possibilities it opens up for both confronting microand macroeconomic crises and reinventing productive life along more cooperative and directly democratic values, ERTs are pointing to viable ways workers can seek to take control of their own skills, means of production, labor power, surpluses, and time. Their everyday practices of autogestión and their promising social innovations are, while emergent and always in tension with capitalist values, living testimonies of a commitment to another mode of productive life. Most inspirational to me were the many personal testimonies I had the privilege of hearing in myriad conversations I engaged in with ERT workers since 2005: most ERT protagonists I spoke with told me they would not go back to the exploitative and alienating work conditions they previously experienced under managers and business owners, despite the long struggles needed to achieve autogestión in Argentina. This is the case, most insisted, even if their salaries or wages were to increase with an employer and, most surprising to me, despite the many challenges to material security that worker self-management experiments face in Argentinas recent socioeconomic conjuncture.

     


    Notes 

     

    1. Besides Argentina, in Latin America, ERTs can be found in large numbers in Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Collectively, Latin Americas ERTs involve roughly 30,000 former employees of failed or failing firms that have recomposed them into self-managed workplaces (Trigona 2006). As in Argentina, they can be considered “grassroots [responses by] workers facing structural unemployment and the dismantling of national economies by speculative global capital and neo-liberal market policies” (Vieta and Ruggeri 2009:205). The case of Argentina, however, stands out for several reasons. The fact that it is the largest amalgamation of ERTs in the region and that the movement has lasted as long as it has in the country is particularly surprising considering the lack of government and traditional union support for ERTs, the dearth of access to credit and other financial support mechanisms, and its various other challenges, as I analyze in the last half of this article. ERTs in Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela, on the other hand, are smaller in number and have enjoyed abundant national and local government support and tight links to unions or national union centrals, and have easier access to more regular sources of funding and support from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or cooperative movement associations. 

    2. A few words on methodology: Much of the analysis I offer here is based on my direct observations, ethnographic notes, and interviews with over thirty-five key protagonists and workers of the ERT movement over several visits I have made to Argentina since 2005. Some of the qualitative and most of the quantitative analysis in this article is based on the multidimensional in situ ethnographic interviews, observations, and questionnaire work at over seventy ERTs across Argentina conducted by an extensive team of activist researchers out of the Open University Program, Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, at the University of Buenos Aires. A summary and analysis of the teams findings can be read in their books The Recuperated Enterprises in Argentina (Ruggeri et al. 2005) and The Recuperated Enterprises: SelfManagement and Work in Argentina and Latin America (Ruggeri 2009). I have been working extensively with this team since late 2006, and this article highlights some of my contributions to the project. I must also clarify here that, while my analysis in this article is intended to be a broad, general summary of the ERT phenomenon, I endeavor throughout not to overgeneralize it by offering up, where possible, examples of unique practices and nuances that illustrate the multidimensionality of the forms of autogestión practiced within each ERT. Nevertheless, the practices of recuperating workplaces in Argentina since the ravages of the neoliberal model of the 1990s do contain common tendencies and shared experiences. It is my hope that I have succeeded in this article in balancing an account of these trends while respecting and recognizing the particularity of each ERT and its worker-protagonists.

    3. Consequently, ERTs can be found operating in the following sectors: metallurgy, shipbuilding, chemical and oil refining, mining, meatpacking, printing and publishing, education, tourism, textile and clothing manufacturing, construction, food production, home and food retailing, transport, water treatment, and health delivery. Moreover, although a large number of ERTs are based in and around the city of Buenos Aires, they are found across the national territory (Fajn 2003; Ruggeri et al. 2005).

    4. By “structurally unemployed,” I refer specifically to those full-time workers who were directly unemployed as a result of the neoliberal structural adjustments of the Argentine economy throughout the

    1990s. Neoclassical economists consider “structural unemployment” the gap between the population of workers not working but actively seeking full-time work and those workers still employed, specifically when this gap is a result of labors not being able to “adjust” to the structural changes in a national or regional economys work conditions due either to economic growth or contraction or to changing demands in skills related to technological change in the modes and regimes of production. Structural unemployment is to be differentiated, according to these economists, from “frictional unemployment,” which is considered the “normal” turnover rate of labor in an economy in relative “equilibrium” (Ragan and Lipsey 2004). As Patroni (2004:104) pointed out, for the first time in Argentinas modern history, the initial spurt of economic growth of the early 1990s brought with it structural unemployment rather than more employment. As the decade wore on, the continued deindustrialization and multinationalization of much of Argentinas economy caused the demand for labor to decrease even further, especially related to the widespread business practice of replacing workers with labor-saving machinery from abroad, which became cheaper and more accessible for businesses during these years as a result of the dollarized peso. Additionally, as dismissed former public and industrial sector workers found it harder and harder to find similar work elsewhere, growing structural unemployment was paralleled by the growing rate of underemployment and unregulated part-time work, contract work, and other precarious forms of employment devoid of social security guarantees. As such, the neoliberal model in Argentina was also effectively about the cheapening and flexibilization of labor costs and, in practice, the fragmentation of organized labor (Patroni 2004).

    5. The period that saw the greatest surge in ERTs (2001 to 2003) was also a period of intensive labor turmoil in Argentina, witnessed in the escalation of strikes, lockouts, public protests, and road blockages (Vieta and Ruggeri 2009). Much of this grassroots-driven labor strife was in direct response to the unresponsiveness of the state and traditional unions to the plight of workers that faced abusive practices from owners and managers, which included the denial of adequate remuneration; the outright withholding of pay, benefits, pension contributions, and overtime compensation; rampant downsizing and outsourcing; illegally transferring assets and machinery to other locales when facing bankruptcy; and the closure of businesses without notifying employees. It is no coincidence, therefore, that during these three years, Argentina saw the greatest number of, as well as the most conflictive, workplace occupations. It is also not coincidental that these years of heightened labor strife also happened to be the years with the highest rates of unemployment and bankruptcies in modern Argentine history (Rebón 2004; Ruggeri 2006).

    6. ANTA is situated within Argentina’ smaller and younger union central, the progressive Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina (Argentine Workers’ Central). Formed in late 2005 by sympathetic union activists who also had experience with various forms of self-management, ANTA emerged as a response to the states’ and traditional unions’ general indifference or outright hostility to the plight of the nonunion-affiliated, the self-managed, the underemployed, and the unemployed. Since its inception, ANTA has treated the state as the boss, lobbying it to recognize the labor rights of self-managed workers in their struggle to secure pensions, stabilize sectorwide wages, create a national health and workers’ compensation plan, and access favorable and just loans.

    7. Popularized in particular by the daily organizational practices of grassroots activist and neighborhood groups that formed in Argentina during and since the economic crisis of 2001 to 2002, horizontalism espouses an egalitarian (re)distribution of economic and political power. More specifically, it is both a theory and a practice, mapping out, immanently rather than in a predetermined way, how the ongoing participation of all individuals in the decision making of a particular collective and between collectives can be facilitated. Moreover, horizontality points to the conscious attempt by individuals of a collective to lessen the coercive force of obligation by rallying around a more inclusive force of mutual commitments and consensus (Sitrin 2006).

    8. Autogestión has a Greek and Latin etymology (Farmer 1979). Auto comes from the Greek autós (self, same) (p. 59). Gestión comes from the Latin gestio (managing), which in turn comes from gerere (to bear, carry, manage) (p. 59). More evocatively, one can conceptualize autogestión as “self-gestation”— self-creation, self-control, self-provisioning, and, ultimately, self-production. Tellingly, the English words gestate and gestation evolved from the word gestión. Indeed, autogestión alludes to an organic and processual movement of self-conception having sociopolitical relevance in its implicit notion of becoming and potentiality. Together, the words auto and gestión yield the perhaps inadequate English term self-management. With a praxical genealogy rooted in utopian socialism, classical anarchism, Western Marxisms, and more utopian strands of critical theory, to practice economic autogestión means to be cooperatively selfreliant in constituting ones productive capacities.

    9. In Argentina, a distinction has emerged over the past decade between the “social economy” and “economies of solidarity” (Elgue 2006; Ruggeri 2009). Before the countrys neoliberal experiment began to take off in the in mid-1970s, the voice of the Argentine working and marginalized classes, mediated by strong labor and cooperative movements, helped forge a version of the Keynesian welfare state that served to guarantee the redistribution of substantial portions of the nations wealth to its working class. During the 1980s and early 1990s with the return of democracy, the discourse of an equitable redistribution of wealth grounding this traditional class compromise gave way to the discourse of possessive individualism and the downloading of the states role in securing a social safety net to the “social economy.” By the 1990s, the social economy became an eclectic and loose fabric of NGOs (some foreign), union-controlled benefits programs, ad hoc community organizations (soup kitchens, community centers, free medical clinics, etc.), and precarious microenterprises (bakeries, food dispensaries, service-oriented entities, etc.). This uncoordinated mix of entities essentially served to replace the former state-funded social safety net. The neoliberal discourse of the times positioned this new, “autonomous” social economy as a more “efficient” means of service delivery in comparison with the “cumbersome” apparatus of state welfare provisioning. In actuality, the 1990s versions of the Argentine “third sector” became an “economy of the poor” as clientilistic and work-for-welfare schemes tied to service delivery rendered certain community groups more “worthy” of assistance than others (Ruggeri 2009).

    Rather than a top-down, assistentialist, or underserviced and underfunded social economy, “economies of solidarity” are rooted in locally focused, community-led, and self-managed economic activity. At core, an economy of solidarity differentiates itself from the neoliberal system of setting up poor aid schemes to offer handouts to structurally marginalized communities by grounding itself in self-reliance, self-direction, self-control, and directly democratic decision making structures and peoples assemblies made up of individuals from those communities directly affected by and engaged in the actual production of their own goods and services. Economies of solidarity practice equitable redistribution of surpluses among individuals and groups directly affected by the productive activities that provision for social needs. As such, they include explicitly noncapitalist and antineoliberal economic practices such as bartering, sharing in the responsibility of production, horizontal organization, direct and democratic involvement in decision making, solidarity, mutual aid, and cooperativism. Moreover, they are saturated by values that desire viable, sustainable, and community-based exodus from conditions of perpetual marginality and social exclusion. Economies of solidarity do this by creating and engaging in economic practices that are parallel to the state-capitalist system, that emerge despite and in many ways apart from the continued presence of capitalist markets, and that prefigure other modes of noncommodified and community-based economic and productive life (Day 2005).

    10. By “social production” I mean here the productive capacities of “freely associated” and cooperativized labor with the capacity to be productive free from the internal coercions of management and capitalist work organization and the external coercions of the market and the state. For David McNally (1993), in a close reading of Marx (1978a, 1978b, 1981), the “social production” suggested by workers’ cooperatives prefigures a new economic model under principles that “are antithetical to the imperatives of capitalism” (e.g., production and economic planning with “social foresight,” “associated” rather than waged labor; McNally 1993:186). Associated social production, unlike socially necessary labor working under the confines of the wage-contract and capital-labor relations, is driven by and “necessitates [directly] democratic control” by the direct producers (p. 187). Moreover, it requires “the involvement of the [direct] producers in determining how their labour will contribute to the satisfaction of freely determined social needs” (p. 187).

     

     

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    Reprinted from the author´s page at www.academia.edu

    Marcelo Vieta is a social science researcher and teacher with a doctorate from the Program in Social and Political Thought at York University in Toronto, Canada.

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