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French09/10/15
Lorsqu’une entreprise fait faillite ou est volontairement fermée par ses propriétaires, le chômage n’est pas l’avenir inéluctable auquel sont condamnés ceux qui y travaillent. Une autre issue est parfois possible : la reprise de la production par les salariés eux-mêmes et l’émergence d’une entreprise sans patron.
Une nouvelle démocratie sociale se dessine alors dans laquelle la production n’est plus soumise au profit. Une nouvelle façon de produire et de consommer s’invente. Avec Coopératives contre capitalisme, l’auteur nous propose un tour d’horizon de ces nouvelles coopératives, en France, en Grèce, en Italie et en Espagne. Benoît Borrits démontre, exemples et chiffres à l’appui, que loin d’être un handicap, une entreprise dirigée par ses salariés a plus de change de survie qu’une société de capitaux.
Dès lors, pourquoi ne pas envisager ces reprises sur un mode offensif ? L’auteur interroge la « panne » du modèle post-keynésien et démontre en quoi ces « expériences » peuvent constituer un débouché aux luttes sociales.
Enfin, il développe des propositions économiques concrètes qui faciliteraient les reprises dans une perspective de généralisation et de transformation sociale. Un autre avenir pourrait alors s’inventer dans lequel les coopératives et les Scop seraient les premières marches d’une alternative au capitalisme.
Sommaire
Introduction : il y a une alternative
1. Chroniques des reprises d’entreprises par les salariés
2. Et en plus, ça marche !
3. Improbable compromis entre les classes
4. Oser la transition
5. Incidence sur les débats de la gauche
Conclusion : si la gauche ne le permet pas…Lire la fiche complète
Disponible à partir du 8 octobre 2015
Coopératives contre capitalisme
Auteur : Benoît Borrits
Éditions Syllepse
Pages : 192 / Prix : 10 €
ISBN 978-2-84950-478-8
Diffusion Sofédis
Distribution SodisAuthorsΝαιΝαιCurrent DebateΌχι -
English07/10/15
The global financial crisis has led to a new shop-floor militancy. Radical forms of protest and new workers’ takeovers have sprung up all over the globe. In the US, Republic Windows and Doors started production under worker control in January 2013. Later that year workers in Greece took over and managed a hotel, a hospital, a newspaper, a TV channel and a factory.
The dominant revolutionary left has viewed workers' control as part of a system necessary during a transition to socialism. Yet most socialist and communist parties have neglected to promote workers' control as it challenges the centrality of parties and it is in this spirit that trade unions, operating through the institutional frameworks of government, have held a monopoly over labor history.
Tracing Marx’s writings on the Paris Commune through council communism, anarcho-syndicalism, Italian operaismo, and other 'heretical' left currents, An Alternative Labour History uncovers the practices and intentions of historical and contemporary autonomous workers’ movements that until now have been largely obscured. It shows that by bringing permanence and predictability to their workplaces, workers can stabilize their communities through expressions of participatory democracy. And, as history has repeatedly shown, workers have always had the capacity to run their enterprises on their own.Reviews'Dario Azzellini has emerged as arguably the most important contemporary analyst of worker self-management. Casting a critical eye toward non-revolutionary forms of workers' control, Azzellini and the contributors to this volume enrich our understanding while pressing us ever more toward the radical and transformative experiences in workplace management that have become a resurgent hallmark of our moment.'
George Ciccariello-Maher, Drexel University
'Challenging radical fuzziness and conservative dogma, this book is a resource for comprehending the past and conceptualizing the future.'
Professor Paul Le Blanc, La Roche College, and author of Work and Struggle and A Freedom Budget for All Americans
'An Alternative Labour History is a hugely important contribution to that old socialist question: how can ordinary people exercise self-government in the matters that matter most to their daily lives? The essays here update the vision of workers' councils in response to the ecological crisis and to the prospects raised by popular uprisings. Get this book!'
Paul Buhle, Brown University, and Founder of Radical America
'An Alternative Labour History is a must-read for those seeking fresh ways out of the current global morass. Azzellini and his contributors present a real and possible alternative to the twin corporate traps of monopoly capitalism and state socialism. There are lessons here for all who hold tight to the possibility for a future based on equality and social good.'
Susan Moir, University of Massachusetts BostonTable of ContentsAcknowledgments
Notes on contributors
Introduction
Dario Azzellini
1 Council Democracy, or the End of the Political
Alex Demirovic´
2 Contemporary Crisis and Workers’ Control
Dario Azzellini
3 Workers’ Assemblies: New Formations in the Organization of Labor and the Struggle against Capitalism
Elise Danielle Thorburn
4 The Austrian Revolution of 1918-1919 andWorking Class Autonomy
Peter Haumer
5 Chile: Worker Self-organization and Cordones Industriales under the Allende Government (1970-1973)
Franck Gaudichaud
6 'Production Control' or 'Factory Soviet'? Workers’ Control in Japan
Kimiyasu Irie
7 The Factory Commissions in Brazil and the 1964 Coup d’État
Henrique T. Novaes and Maurício S. de Faria
8 Self-management, Workers’ Control and Resistance against Crisis and Neoliberal Counter-reforms in Mexico
Patrick Cuninghame
9 Collective Self-management and Social Classes: The Case of Enterprises Recovered by Their Workers in Uruguay
Anabel Rieiro
10 Self-managing the Commons in Contemporary Greece
Alexandros Kioupkiolis and Theodoros Karyotis
IndexAbout the Author:Dario Azzellini is assistant professor of sociology at the Johannes Kepler University. His research and writing focuses on social transformation, self-administration, workers’ control, democracy and social movements. Azzellini has published several books, including They Can’t Represent Us (co-authored with Marina Sitrin, 2014), Ours to Master and to Own (co-edited with Immanuel Ness, 2011) and The Business of War (2002). He serves as associate editor for Cuadernos de Marte and is co-founder of workerscontrol.net. He served as associate editor for The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest: 1500 to the Present (2009) and was primary editor for Latin America, the Spanish Caribbean and the new left in Italy. Azzellini is also a documentary filmmaker, co-directing, among other films, Comuna under Construction (2010) and 5 Factories - Workers Control in Venezuela (2007).
www.azzellini.netMediaΝαιΝαιNoΌχι -
Spanish02/10/15
Los trabajadores de la cooperativa Acoplados del Oeste (ex Petinari) consiguieron la aprobación de la media sanción en la Cámara de Diputados bonaerense que declara a la fábrica metalúrgica de utilidad pública y sujeta a expropiación. “Falta un paso”, dicen los obreros, que tras resistir más de seis meses en la ruta, ahora van por la sanción en el Senado.
“¿Entraste alguna vez a la Cámara?”, pregunta Fernanda Lizarraga, la única mujer que tras 18 años de trabajar en la empresa de carrocerías y semirremolques Pedro Petinari e Hijos conforma la cooperativa Acoplados del Oeste, hoy recuperada y autogestionada por sus obreros.
La respuesta es no.
“Yo tampoco”, dice.
Walter Romero -48 años, 12 en la empresa- adhiere: “Nunca entré”.
En una hora saldrá llorando.
Son las 16:18 cuando los 40 trabajadores de Acoplados del Oeste ingresan a los palcos de la Cámara de Diputados de la provincia de Buenos Aires en La Plata. Se sientan y observan hacia abajo, curiosos, el abanico legislativo. En ese momento, según marca un cambiante contador, hay presentes sólo 18 diputados de los 92 en total. En instantes comienza la sesión donde se decidirá si Acoplados del Oeste recibe media sanción que declare a la fábrica de utilidad pública y sujeta a expropiación. Es el paso para que los trabajadores, después de 237 días de conflicto -sueldos impagos, aguinaldos inexistentes, vacaciones fantasmas, despidos, desalojos y seis meses a la vera de la durísima ruta 200, en pleno Merlo, en pleno conurbano bonaerense-, respiren un poco de paz.
El ambiente de la Cámara de Diputados es de bullicio. Sobre el estrado, el presidente Horacio González (FpV) pide un poco de orden y silencio para comenzar la sesión. Son exactamente las 16:30 y el contador aumentó a 31 diputados. “Tenemos público que está esperando”, apura González. Suena una campana. Hay 39 diputados. González pide silencio por segunda vez. Desde los palcos, baja un canto de tribuna: “Ponga huevos huevos Acoplado, ponga huevos huevos sin cesar, esta tarde cueste lo que cueste, esta tenemos que expropiar”. La acústica de la Cámara juega a favor. Los diputados miran, algunos ríen.
González, por tercera vez, pide orden.
“Son peores que los chicos. Dan más vuelta que la mierda”, dice un trabajador, visiblemente nervioso.
A las 16:37, finalmente, se abre la sesión. Hay 51 diputados.
González avisa que se tratarán dos proyectos “sobre tablas”. El primero es una reforma a la reglamentación sobre la jubilación de excombatientes de Malvinas. El segundo es el proyecto de expropiación que presentó el diputado Miguel Funes (FpV) que, al pedir la palabra, destaca la “lucha” de los trabajadores para resguardar sus fuentes de trabajo. “No creo en el deporte de formar cooperativas”, sostiene, y critica a los empresarios. Luego, valora el aporte del diputado del FIT Guillermo Klein, que acompañó el proyecto. Klein, por su parte, critica a los políticos municipales por “aconsejar abandonar la lucha” (se refiere, entre otros, al candidato a intendente del FpV Gustavo Menéndez) y apunta que el vaciamiento de empresas “no es un caso aislado”.
Y cierra: “Viva Petinari, viva esta expropiación”.
González llama a votar.
Pasó en un segundo: todos los bloques aprobaron la ley.
Los palcos rompen en gritos y abrazos.
Estos hombres metalúrgicos, de manos curtidas y dolores en la espalda, rompen en llantos.
La tierra se mueve
En la previa, el clima era un mar de nervios y expectativa. La cita fue a las 10 de la mañana en la fábrica, que desde afuera ya tiene otra impronta: lo que antes era una bandera hoy es un cartel formal. Y dice: “Acoplados del Oeste. Bateas, volcadoras, semis, carretones, volquetes, repuestos, reparaciones. Nextel: 905 6256 218 7743”. Adentro, las paredes están pintadas y los pisos limpios: no es fácil mantener un predio de 33 mil metros cuadrados. “Todo esto es el esfuerzo de los compañeros”, describió Luis Becerra, 32 años, 9 en la empresa.
“La carpa quedó para la historia”, saludó contento Armando Etcheverría -60 años, 9 en la fábrica, tornería-, sobre el sitio donde los trabajadores resistieron durante seis meses sobreviviendo con lo recaudado de los automovilistas que circulaban por la ruta 200. Es cierto: sólo es una huella del tiempo. Etcheverría se frotaba las manos: “Vamos a ver qué pasa hoy”.
Antes de la partida a La Plata llegó monseñor Fernando Maletti, obispo de Merlo, que bendijo a los trabajadores. Días atrás recibieron una carta del nuncio apostólico Emil Tscherrig en nombre del Papa Francisco. Pasadas las 11 llegó un micro que estacionó en la puerta de la fábrica. De una ventana a otra desplegaron una bandera que cubrió el perfil derecho del ómbibus: “Acoplados del Oeste. Luchando por el trabajo y la dignidad de nuestras familias”. La mayoría de los trabajadores viajaron allí. Otro grupo fue en la camioneta del presidente de la cooperativa, Jorge Gutiérrez -38 años, 11 como obrero-, que cerca del mediodía enfiló por la Ruta 6 hacia La Plata (107 km marcaban los carteles).
Los Redondos y Sumo musicalizaron el viaje.
La voz de Luca Prodan era profética: “Sería bueno que pidieras que la tierra se mueva”.
La canción: Lo quiero ya.
Los trabajadores, al contrario que Luca, sabían lo que querían.
El desalojo que no fue
En La Plata, en diagonal a la legislatura, los obreros fueron operativos. Sacaron una garrafa, armaron una cocina, encendieron las hornallas y colocaron arriba un fuentón. Luis Blasetti -35 años, 7 en la fábrica- desparramó aceite con una servilleta de papel. Cortaron cebollas, morrones, zanahoria, y pusieron todo a cocinarse con chorizos y carne. Taparon la fuente con cartón.
Cuentan los obreros que en la semana tuvieron una nueva amenaza de desalojo. Fueron rumores que circularon fuerte en la fábrica y que intentaron instalar la idea de la llegada intepestiva del fiscal con una orden firmada por el juez. “Nos querían asustar”, dice Eber Moreno -21 años en la empresa, encargado de viga- con una sonrisa desde La Plata esperando la media sanción. Los rumores, de todos modos, no eran infundados: el fiscal de la Unidad Funcional de Instrucción (UFI) N°5 de Morón, Claudio Oviedo, intentó realizar el “lanzamiento” de los trabajadores (así de literal y de romántica es la jerga jurídica para hablar de “desalojo”) por “usurpación”, pero el juzgado de Garantías N°2 del doctor Ricardo Fraga no hizo lugar. “Le dejó en claro que el conflicto ya no es de corte penal y se declaró incompetente”, explica Claudo Caponera, uno de los abogados de los obreros. Además, el juez le reciminó al fiscal la solicitud de la medida por basarse únicamente en la denuncia del personal de seguridad de la propia fábrica, sin tener en cuenta la postura de los trabajadores que desde enero no cobran un peso. “Prácticamente, el juez le dice al fiscal que no cumplió con las garantías del debido proceso”, expresa Caponera.
Eran las 15:52 cuando sonó un Nextel. “En media hora, masomenos, entramos”, avisó el trabajador que atendió. “Bueno, comamos rápido”, apuraron todos. Uno gritó: “¡Hagan fila!”. Se obedeció por unanimidad. “¿Chori o carne?”, era la pregunta. Se comió rápido.
A las 16:08 comenzó la entrada al Congreso.
Una hora despúes los trabajadores salieron con media expropiación en el bolsillo.
Definición sin penales
“No…”, atina a decir Fernanda Lizarraga.
Pregunta: ¿No qué?
“No reacciono”
Toma un respiro: “Es muy raro, todo fue muy rápido. Todos a nuestro favor. No me di cuenta cuando se votó: me di cuenta con el llanto de mis compañeros”. Lizarraga era una de las administrativas de la fábrica que no estaba de acuerdo con el reclamo de los trabajadores al comienzo del conflicto: será la secretaria administrativa de la cooperativa. “Anoche pensaba en eso. Gracias a mis compañeros aprendí que hay otras maneras de pelear y que nada es imposible”.
Hernán Noir -31 años, 10 como trabajador- también recordó imágenes, diálogos. “Pensaba cuando, hablando entre nosotros, decíamos: ´¿Te imaginás si llegamos a formar una cooperativa? Soñar no cuesta nada´. Me fui acordando de eso en todo el viaje. Es una revancha, por todo, pero no termina siendo venganza porque esto es nuestro laburo. No es que estamos haciendo una maldad. Ellos no nos dieron nada y nosotros les dimos todo. Uno entraba en Petinari y no sabía si al día siguiente te iban echar a la mierda. Y este día a día nos llevó a no relajarnos: empezamos a ir a todos lados. Cuando nos dimos cuenta teníamos la media sanción. Podemos respirar un poco”.
Los trabajadores saben cómo moverse, y no pierden de vista que aún falta la otra media sanción del Senado. Ni bien concluyó la sesión en Diputados, con lágrimas aún húmedas y en medio de fervorosos abrazos, la planificación era qué pasos seguir para mantener el tema en agenda y que Acoplados del Oeste sea cien por cien obrera. “Se viene otra etapa”, apunta Luis Becerra. “La resistencia contra Petinari va dando sus frutos. Ahora empieza la lucha de sacar esto adelante. Peor de lo que estuvimos no vamos a estar. Fue mucha la incertidumbre: fue un camino que nunca transitamos y nunca sabíamos dónde íbamos a terminar. Pero confirmamos que es posible”.
A Jorge Gutiérrez también le cuestan las palabras: “Se me vino a la cabeza todo: mis hijos, mi señora, mi familia y las caras de felicidad de mis compañeros. Por ellos es la lucha. Estábamos todos con el corazón en la boca. Ojalá ahora se sumen más compañeros. La empresa nos decía locos, que la cooperativa no se iba a hacer. Bueno: acá tienen la respuesta. Falta un paso”.
Falta un paso, sí, pero la media sanción es como ir ganando 1 a 0.
Gutiérrez la clava en el ángulo: “Ya está: estamos seguros que penales no va a haber”.
Publicado en www.lavaca.org
01 Octubre 2015
TopicΝαιΝαιNoΌχι -
English26/09/15Opponents of workers democracy argues that democracy cannot be extended to the “enemies of socialism”. However, we must distinguish acts (or crimes) from opinions and ideological tendencies.
Roger Garaudy, one of the leading intellectuals of the reactionary Communist party of France, visited Belgium November 5, 1968 to give a lecture on “May 1968 in France,” at the request of the Communist Student Union of Brussels University. It was not surprising that radical students considered a lecture on this topic by a representative of the French CP as a provocation.
In any case, when the meeting started, a few dozen Maoists carrying portraits of Chairman Mao and anarchists carrying a black flag persistently tried — for the most part successfully — to prevent Garaudy from addressing the audience.
A confused debate followed in which the question of whether Garaudy should be allowed to speak was mixed with the question of whether or not a revolutionary situation had existed in France in May. Finally, the Maoists and anarchists ended the debate by pushing Garaudy out of the meeting hall.
This incident raised serious questions about the norms of democratic debate and behavior in the working class and socialist movement. In answer to some of the questions raised, Ernest Mandel, the well-known Marxist economist and editor of the Belgian socialist weekly La Gauche, wrote an article on the subject of workers democracy which appeared in two parts in the November 16 and November 23 issues of La Gauche. Because of the timeliness of the topic, we are reproducing the article below. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.
* * *
The lamentable incidents which occurred at the ULB (Universitaire libre de Bruxelles— Free University of Brussels] when Garaudy came to speak there have induced me to explain once again why we adhere to the principles of workers democracy.
Workers democracy has always been a basic tenet of the proletarian movement. It was a tradition in the socialist and communist movement to firmly support this principle in the time of Marx and Engels as well as Lenin and Trotsky. It took the Stalinist dictatorship in the USSR to shake this tradition. The temporary victory of fascism in West and Central Europe also helped to undermine it. However, the origins of this challenge to workers democracy are deeper and older; they lie in the bureaucratization of the large workers organizations.
The Social Democratic and trade union bureaucrats were the first to begin to undermine the principles of workers democracy. They started calling general membership meetings at infrequent intervals. Then they began to rig them, or often to do away with them altogether. They began likewise to restrict or abolish freedom of discussion and criticism within their organizations. They did not hesitate even to appeal to the police(including the secret police) for help in fighting revolutionary minorities. At the time of the first world war, the German Social Democracy set a dismal example of collusion with the state repressive forces. In subsequent years, the Social Democrats everywhere followed this example.
The Soviet bureaucracy first and then the bureaucrats in the Stalinist Communist parties (or in trade unions under Stalinist leadership) simply followed the pattern established by the Social Democrats, extending it further and further. They abolished freedom of discussion and of tendencies. Slander and lies replaced argument and debate with opponent tendencies. They made massive use of physical force to prevent their opponents from “causing any harm.” Thus, the entire Bolshevik old guard which led the October Revolution and the majority of the members of Lenin's Central Committee were exterminated by Stalin during the dark years of the Great Purge (1935-38).
The young generation of anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist militants now developing a revolutionary consciousness are spontaneously returning to the traditions of workers democracy. This was apparent in France in May and June when freedom of speech for all tendencies was jealously safeguarded in the assemblies of students and revolutionary workers and students. But this new generation is not always conscious of all the principled and practical reasons for workers democracy.
This is why the youth can be vulnerable to a kind of Stalinist-derived demagogy being spread by certain pro-Chinese sects, which seek to make people believe that workers democracy is contrary to “the interests of the revolution.” Therefore, it is necessary to reaffirm these reasons strongly. The workers movement lights for the emancipation of the proletariat. hut this emancipation requires the abolition of all forms of exploitation to which the workers are subjected. Rejecting workers democracy means quite simply that you want to maintain a situation like the one today in which the masses of workers are unable to make their opinions heard. The Marxist critique of bourgeois democracy starts from the idea that this democracy is formal because the workers do not have the material means to exercise the rights which the bourgeois constitutions formally grant all citizens. Freedom of the press is just a formality when only the capitalists and their agents are able to get together the millions of dollars needed to establish a daily newspaper.
But the conclusion that follows from this critique of bourgeois democracy, obviously, is that means must be created enabling all the workers to have access to the media for disseminating ideas (printing presses, meeting halls, radio and television, posters, etc.). If, on the contrary, you conclude from this that only a self-proclaimed "leading party of the proletariat” — or even a little sect which declares that it alone is “genuinely revolutionary — has the right to speak, to use the press, or to propagate its ideas, then you risk increasing the political oppression of the workers rather than abolishing it.
The Stalinists often reply that abolition of the capitalist system equals emancipation of the workers. We agree that abolition of private ownership of the means of production, of the profit economy, and of the bourgeois state are essential conditions for the emancipation of the workers. But saying that these are “essential” conditions does not mean that they are “sufficient.” Because as soon as the capitalist system is abolished, the question arises of who is going to run the factories, the economy, the municipalities, the state, the schools and universities.
If a single party claims the right to administer the state and the society; if it imposes a monopoly of power by terror; if it does not permit the mass of workers to express their opinions, their criticisms, their worries, and their demands; if it excludes the workers from administration— then it is inevitable that a widening gulf will develop between this omnipotent bureaucracy and the mass of workers. Then, emancipation of the workers is only a deception. And without real workers democracy in all areas, including freedom of organization and press, real emancipation of the workers is impossible.
These principled reasons are rein- forced by practical ones. Like all social classes in history, the working class is not homogeneous. It has common class interests, both immediate interests and historical interests. But this community of interests is interwoven with differences which have various origins — immediate special interests (professional, group, regional, craft interests, etc.) and different levels of consciousness. Many strata of the working class have not yet become conscious of their historical interests. Others have been influenced by bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideologies. Still others are weighed down by the burden of past defeats and failures, of skepticism, or of the degradation caused by capitalist society, etc.
However, the capitalist system cannot be overthrown unless the entire working class is mobilized in action against it. And this unity in action can only be obtained if these various special interests and levels of consciousness can be expressed in, and little by little neutralized through, de bate and persuasion. Denying this diversity can only result in a breakdown of unity in action and in driving successive groups of workers into passivity or into the camp of the enemy.
Anyone with experience in strikes has been able to see in practice that the most successful actions are pre pared and conducted through numerous assemblies, First of the unionized workers and later of all the workers concerned. In these assemblies, all the reasons in favor of the strike can be developed, all opinions can be expressed, and all the class enemy's arguments can be exposed. If a strike is launched without the benefit of such democracy, there is much more risk that many workers will observe it halfheartedly, if at all.
If this is true for an isolated strike, it holds all the more for a general strike or for a revolution. All the great revolutionary mobilizations of the workers from the Russian revolution to the revolutionary upsurge of May and June 1968 in France and including the German and Spanish revolutions, to cite only these examples — have been characterized by veritable explosions of workers democracy. In these instances, many working-class tendencies coexisted, expressed themselves freely in speeches and in the press, and debated before the entire class.
The word “soviet'— council of workers delegates —presses this unity of opposites — the unity of the workers in the diversity of their tendencies. In the Second Congress of Russian Soviets, which took power in the October Revolution, there were a dozen different tendencies and parties. Every attempt to repress this workers democracy — by the Social Democracy in Germany, by the Stalinists in Spain— has presaged, if not expressed, a setback or defeat for the revolution.
The absence of workers democracy not only hampers unity in action, it also obstructs working out a correct political line.
It is true that the workers movement has an excellent theoretical instrument to guide it in the often extremely complicated twists and turns of economic, social, and political struggles — revolutionary Marxism. But this tool must still be used correctly. And no one person has a monopoly on its correct application.
Without any doubt, Marx and Lenin were geniuses. But life and history ceaselessly pose new problems which cannot be solved simply by turning to the scriptures. Stalin, who was considered by many honest Communists before his death to be “infallible,” ill reality committed many errors, to say nothing of crimes, some of which --as in agricultural policy— have had pernicious consequences for three decades for the entire Soviet people. Mao Zedong whom other naive souls also consider “infallible,” endorsed the policy of Aidit, the leader of the Indonesian CP, up until the eve of the military coup d'état. his policy was at least partially responsible for the deaths of 500,000 Indonesian Communists and workers. As for the myth that the Central Committee of a party is “always right,” or that the majority of this committee is “always right,” Mao himself rejected it in the famous resolution passed by the CC of the CCP (Chinese Communist party] on the “cultural revolution” in April 1967. But if no person or group has a monopoly on truth and wisdom, then discussion is indispensable to deter- mine a correct political line. Rejection of discussion under any pretext (and the pretext that a political opponent is “counterrevolutionary' or an “end my agent” is as old as bureaucracy), or substituting epithets or physical violence for debate, means condemning oneself to remain the victim of false ideas, inadequate analyses, and errors with debilitating if not catastrophic consequences.
Marxism is a guide to action, they often say. That is true. But Marxism is distinguished from utopian socialism by its appeal to scientific analysis. It does not focus on action per se. It focuses on action which can influence historical reality, which can change it in a given direction — in the direction of socialist revolution, toward the emancipation of the workers and of all humanity.
Out of the clash of ideas and tendencies, the truth emerges which can serve as a guide to action. Action inspired by “monolithic,” bookish, and infantile thought— which is not subjected to the uninhibited criticism possible only in a climate of workers democracy — is condemned to certain failure. It can only result, in the case of small groups, in the disillusionment and demoralization of individuals; in the case of unions or larger parties, in defeats for the class; and where the mass of the workers is concerned, in defeats with a long train of humiliations, privations, and impoverishment, if not casualties.
Often these arguments in favor of the principles and practice of workers democracy are countered in Stalinist circles by the assertion that workers democracy cannot be extended to the “enemies of socialism” inside the workers movement. Curiously, certain groups which claim to be anti-bureaucratic and very left take a similar line to justify booing and hissing or resorting to physical violence as a substitute for debate with their political opponents.
Both the Stalinists and the ultra- leftists cry: “You don't argue with revisionists, capitalist forces, and the representatives of the enemy.” In practice, the Stalinists try to replace debate by repression, if not murder and the use of tanks against the workers (from the Moscow Trials to the intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia). The ultra-leftists limit them- selves more modestly to preventing Garaudy from speaking, doubtless until the dreamed-of day when they can use more “effective” means modeled on the Stalinist ones.
Of course, the working-class bureaucracies objectively act in the interests of capital, primarily by channeling the workers' periodic revolutionary explosions toward reformist outlets and thereby blocking opportunities to overthrow capitalism. They play the same role by influencing the workers on a day-to-day basis in favor of class collaboration, undermining their class consciousness with ideas taken from the bourgeois world.
But the objective function and role of these bureaucracies is not confined to maintaining class peace. In pursuing their routine reformist activities, they come in conflict with the everyday interests of capitalism. The wage increases and social welfare laws won by the reformists — in exchange for their pledge to keep the workers' demands within limits that do not threaten the bases of the system — reduce the capitalists' profits somewhat. The trade union organizations which they lead inject the collective power of labor into the daily relationships between the bosses and the workers. And as a result, these conflicts have an altogether different outcome from the past century, when the strength of the trade unions was slight or nonexistent.
When the capitalist economy is flourishing, the bourgeoisie is willing to pay the price represented by these concessions in return for “social peace.” But when the capitalist economy is in a bad way, these same concessions rapidly become unacceptable to the bourgeoisie. Then, it is in the capitalists' interest to eliminate these organizations completely, even the most moderate and reformist ones. The very existence of the unions be comes incompatible with the survival of the system.
This shows the real nature of the reformist bureaucracy in the workers movement. This bureaucracy is not composed of owners of capital who buy labor power in order to appropriate surplus value. It is composed of salaried employees (of the workers organizations or the state) who vacillate and waver between the camp of capital and of the Proletariat, some times leaning toward one, sometimes toward the other, depending on their particular interests and the pressures to which they are subjected. And, in facing the class enemy, the vanguard workers have every reason to do their utmost to force these bureaucrats to return to their camp. Otherwise, the common defense would be greatly weakened.
Overlooking these elementary truths leads to the worst catastrophes. The workers movement learned this to its cost during the rise of fascism. At that time, the “genius” Stalin invented the theory of “Social Fascism.” According to this theory there was no difference between the “revisionist' Social Democrats and fascists. It was even proclaimed that the Social Democracy had to be defeated before the struggle against the Nazis could be won.
While the Social Democratic and Communist workers were happily bashing each other's heads in — the reformist leaders shared the responsibility this time equally with their Stalinist counterparts — neither came to power, massacred thousands of worker militants, and dissolved all the workers organizations. Thus, he made possible a temporary, if some what embittered, reconciliation be between the Social Democrats and the Communists in the concentration camps. Would it not have been better, while not making any concessions in the ideological struggle against revisionism, to fight together against the Nazis and prevent them from taking power?
On an infinitely smaller and less tragic scale, the situation in the university can lead to a dilemma of the same type overnight. All the left tendencies are fighting to gain recognition of their right to carry on “political activism” on the campus. But it is quite possible that the administration will take the incidents surrounding Garaudy's visit as a pretext for banning any more political lectures. What other course, then, is there but to fight together to win minimum political freedom in the university? Would it not be preferable to respect the rules of workers democracy from now on, since they conform to the common interests of the workers movement and the student confrontation movement? If subjective criteria (“Anybody who doesn't support every one of my tactical turns is a capitalist and a counterrevolutionary, even if he served as president of the People's Republic of China and vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist party for twenty years!”) are substituted for these objective criteria, then you fall into complete arbitrariness. You end, of course, by wiping out the distinction between “contradictions among the people” and “conflicts with the class enemy, treating the former more and more like the latter.
Of course, it is impossible to make an absolute and total separation between the two. Marginal cases are possible. We advocate frank debate in meetings of strikers. We do not think that we need restrict ourselves to polite discussion with strike breakers.
In every marginal case, however, we must distinguish acts (or crimes) from opinions and ideological tendencies. Acts must be proved and judged according to clearly established, well-defined criteria of the workers' interest (or after the overthrow of capitalism, of socialist legality) so as to prevent arbitrariness. Failure to distinguish between acts and opinions can only result in extinguishing workers democracy, lowering the level of consciousness and mobilization of the workers, and progressively robbing the revolutionists themselves of their ability to orient themselves politically.
Published by the Young Socialist Alliance in 1968Reprinted from the Trotskyist Youth Archives.
1960-2000 – Εργατικός 'Ελεγχος ενάντια στην Καπιταλιστική Αναδιάρθρωση, Ernest Mandel, Βιομηχανική Δημοκρατία, Εργατικός Έλεγχος, Ernest MandelTopicΝαιΝαιNoΌχι -
English26/09/15Robert Vitak
The discussion about workers' control or the general extension of industrial democracy raises for most socialists some fundamental problems of power in society; but not, it should be noted, for some of the more recent advocates of the idea. When Anthony Wedgwood Benn, for example, came forward last year with his contribution he was quite explicit in his view that "real workers' control" would fit comfortably within the existing relations of power :
Certainly there is no reason why industrial power at plant or office level should be exclusively linked to ownership of shares, than that political power should have been exclusively linked to the ownership of land and other property as it was in Britain until the "voters control" movement won its battle.1
When European managements, increasingly challenged by their trade union movements, insist that "Involvement is the key to industrial relation" and when Robert Cam talks about the men and women in industry wanting "greater involvement in the decisions which affect their everyday working lives, we do not, of course, expect them to question ownership rights. Commenting, however, on what he terms Mr. Benn's "fairly full-blooded form of workers' control" a Times leader writer puts his finger on the dilemma of power :
Mr. Benn does not pause to consider the implication of that for the provision of capital, innovation, and restructuring of industry.4
When we turn to the debates among socialists, although the realities of power in capitalist society are at least explicitly recognized, there is often some confusion about the objectives of workers' control demands. The starting point for all, and the end for some, is the assumption that "once we have socialism all will be different". As Bill Jones wrote in a discussion published in Marxism Today:
It is only when the workers win political power that we will see an end to our profit society and its replacement by a service society in which the skill, knowledge and ability of our working class is used to the full. Only in such a society will the talents of our people be fully used: only in a new society will we be able to control our environment and obtain the full fruits to which our labour, skill and knowledge entitles us. That, for me, is the meaning of workers' control.5
These are certainly aims with which we can all agree, but merely to state them fails to advance the argument about how to achieve them or to clarify the concept of workers' political and economic power. A noteworthy feature in the debate is that those who display the greatest caution about using the slogan of workers' control in contemporary society tend to be equally sceptical about implementing it in a socialist economy. Bert Ramelson, a leading spokesman on the subject for the Communist Party, argued in the Marxism Today symposium already referred to that industrial democracy was a relative and not an absolute concept :
Only in the sense that the workers as citizens have a political say in determining the economic and social policies of the state, in determining the main lines and indicators of the overall plan and in contributing towards the plant plan, can it be argued that workers' control becomes feasible under socialism.6
The assumption here is, of course, that once the powers of ownership are in the hands of a socialist state, direct control, or "self-management" by the workers at the point of production, might conflict with the national interest. Admitting that at this stage of socialism differences between management and workers cannot be expected to disappear, the article sees in the present-day countries of Eastern Europe "a tremendous expansion of industrial democracy" thanks to the powers of the trade unions.
Unfortunately, events in some of the countries Ramelson had in mind hardly confirm this view; witness the accumulated problems, economic and political, that Czechoslovakia was trying to solve under Dubcek's leadership in 1968, and more recently, and more alarmingly, the unhappy events of December 1970 in Poland.
And in Czechoslovakia especially we have seen over the past two years not an expansion but an erosion of the industrial democracy which began to take shape through what has been known as the Prague Spring. The workers councils set up at that time have now been abolished and supremacy of state power in the economy has been reaffirmed.
The Socialist industrial manager, Rude Pravo wrote on 29 October 1970,
is empowered by the socialist state to direct and organize production in his enterprise in a qualified manner in accordance with the society-wide aims and in the interests of all members of the community. He performs his management functions within the socialist production relations which have abolished the contradiction between management and labour.
The job of the socialist manager, the article continues, is more demanding than that of his capitalist counterpart, for
whenever he makes an important decision he must consider not only the interests of the collective he leads, but also those of the entire national economy . . . Creating a continual harmony between society-wide interests and the interests of the enterprise collective is the feature of the decision making process of a socialist manager.
We have here an emphasis on decision-making at the top by a manager who has to "master the art of leading and motivating people correctly and providing the preconditions for developing their working initiative". It was this system of "one-man management" under centralized state control-instituted under very different circumstances in the Soviet Union-that had already proved an unwieldy, undemocratic instrument long before 1968; and while the reference to the interests of the collective is perhaps a concession to criticism of rigid centralization, it is still the managerial and not the democratic voice that will decide. Therefore the dilemma of power still exists, and the whole experience of Czechoslovakia provides an interesting commentary on the realities behind the concept of "workers' power".
* * *
In the years between 1945 and 1948, when the Czechoslovak Communist Party was a member of a multi-party coalition and accepting a "special road to socialism" the organized working class movement turned as a matter of course to ideas and policies of workers' control in industry. A study of the economy in the immediate post-war years, which was published in 1968, summed up the situation in these terms :
Nationalization as it was carried out in Czechoslovakia in 1945 .; was implemented by a people's democracy in which power rested with the popular masses . . . the working class had a big say in the management of national enterprises, primarily through works councils and the revolutionary trade unions.7
That these works councils were seen as an integral part of the change to public ownership is demonstrated by the fact that they were given official standing by a Presidential decree issued simultaneously with the decrees introducing nationalization in various sectors of the economy; they were set up by the trade unions and operated in many firms that were still in private hands. The trade union movement, through its Central Council, had a voice in appointing the directors of nationalized enterprises. And apart from the works councils the shop floor was represented on the managing boards that administered what came to be known as "national enterprises"; one third of the members of these boards were elected by employees, two thirds were nominated by government authorities in consultation with the Central Trade Union Council. "In the light of these circumstances," the author of this study tell us. "factories, mines and other nationalized enterprises can be regarded as having been in socialist ownership from October 1945."
In those early years the works councils also played a revolutionary role in pressing for progress in nationalization. The miners of the North Bohemian coalfield, for instance, sent a delegation from their works councils to Prague in July 1945 with the message that they would not support a government that left the mines to private capital. The Ostrava miners called a strike on the issue, while employees of power stations, banks and other concerns also demanded nationalization.
When, by February 1948, the Cold War tensions projected on to the domestic scene had plunged the democratic coalition into crisis, it was a national convention of works councils that voiced the working u class demand for radical socialization of the economy. Yet these works councils which played such a powerful part in helping the Communist Party to emerge victorious from the crisis were not encouraged to go forward from their role of workers' control to socialist industrial democracy; in 1949 they were disbanded and the principle of one-man management, so emphatically reiterated in 1970, was rigidly applied, while the trade unions were gradually incorporated into the power machine.
Speaking in 1968, when the country was trying to bring power down from the abstract heights of "ownership in the name of the working class", Professor Sik described the consequences of that early departure from democracy :
The first ventures in progressive management were abandoned. Czechoslovakia went over to an administrative, centralized type of planning and management evolved in a different environment, under different conditions. . . Enterprises increasingly lost sight of their own wants and those of others, submitting meekly to the arbitrary directives, advice and orders from the top. The authorities at the centre literally confiscated all financial resources in the factories, doling them out as they thought best to investment, raw material supplies and wages. With their monopoly of wisdom they were the ones to decide what should or should not be left to the enterprises down below. And so, in time, the unhealthy principles that could at best be justified in time of war grew into a set and indisputable routine. Orders were passed down from the top about the size of the labour force, the level of gross output, the industrial branches to be given priority. The outcome was that the working people, who were supposed by law to be co-owners of socialist property, in fact lost this sense of ownership.9
The image of socialism as a matter of growth rates, construction of heavy industry and of Five Year Plans heroically fulfilled by mobilizing the economy as one gigantic enterprise, and subjecting the economic processes to the indomitable will of the leaders, was born of the special conditions of the Russian revolution. "Industrialization," as the Czech Marxist Radovan Richta pointed out, "is one of the preconditions and starting points, rather than the goal of socialist progress."1° And in their study, which provided part of the theoretical basis for the 1968 Action Programme, Richta and his team showed how the industrial system with its separation of man and the machine, operative labour and management, perpetuated the gulf between the leaders and the led in both the economic and the political fields. The tragedy of Czechoslovakia was that although in 1949 she already possessed many of the preconditions for bridging the gulf, she was forced by the external circumstances of the Cold War and by Cominform pressure dictated by Stalin to take a step back. In the words of political economist Radoslav Selucky:
Paradoxical as it may seem, Czechoslovakia-one of the world's ten most highly industrialized countries--underwent in this period 1949-63 a second phase of industrialization very similar in structure and methods to that of the Soviet Union in the 30s.11
What came to be known as the iron and steel concept of the economy put a stop to the promising ventures in flexible planning and workers' control belonging to the "special road".
The Czechoslovak working class movement, however, embarked in good faith on the new course. The enthusiasm of the rapid and successful post-war reconstruction period was, for a time, injected into what seemed the surest road to the socialist goal. For this the workers were willing to put their faith in the advantages of centralized management, the mobilization of resources and manpower, and the planning by decree. They could not know what even the economists began to understand only when the operation failed to yield the promised fruits-that is, that this type of extensive growth (building more factories, recruiting more manpower) could not, in a relatively advanced economy, achieve what was required; as soon as the industrial potential had been created, only intensive use of capacities, technological progress and free play for "the skill, knowledge and ability of the working class" could be effective. Nor could the Czechs and Slovaks know that, in addition to economic stagnation (which despite partial reforms in the late fifties was to be obvious to all by the winter of 1962-3), the course adopted, far from liberating the working class, would subject them to a political system matching one-man management in industry with one-man rule of the whole country, with both managers and the labour force figuring as cogs in the political and economic machine.
With the abolition of democratic control at the point of production one of the main ways of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat was seen to be the promotion of workers from the shop floor to positions in the economy and administration. One-year training courses were organized, but the majority received much shorter training for their new jobs, or none; it is estimated that during the early 1950s some 100,000 workers went into managerial, administrative and technical occupations.12 The subsequent decade was to show that despite this seemingly admirable and democratic move, the "promotion" of individuals did not add up to workers' power-a discovery not surprising, perhaps, to British workers who have too often seen what can happen to trade unionists when, cut off from democratic control by their members, they are elevated to positions of power in industry and the administration. Although there were, of course, worker managers who did an excellent job, in many cases the efficiency which was supposed to be the reason for rigid one-man management was lost, for as economic difficulties continued lack of managerial skills proved a serious drawback; in 1953 some 60 per cent of enterprise directors had had no special training for their jobs and less than five years’ experience in them, while by 1962 only 29.1 per cent of enterprise and works managers matched up to the standards of qualification which had, by then, been prescribed as desirable. And this ill-conceived "working-class policy'' deprived the country of one of its great initial advantages-a strong body of economists and technical intelligentsia willing to work for a socialist government (before February 1948, 35 per cent of the directors of industrial concerns had been members of the Communist Party)--men whose skills and experience were often wasted.
Bureaucracy flourished under this system, while the rank-and-file workers, despite the social prestige, job security and other undoubted advantages they enjoyed, were-as the most numerous section of the population-also the worst sufferers when the economic and other defects of the system made themselves felt; and both at work and as citizens they were excluded from the vital processes of decision-making.
A report of 1969 shows that when the population was classified according to selected indices of social status, "participation in management" (at work and through leisure-time political involvement) was confined almost exclusively to the two top strata (comprising respectively 2.3 per cent and 8 per cent of men of productive age) and these consisted of intellectual occupations with a strong emphasis on the middle-aged. (The top political and governmental office-holders were excluded from the survey).14
As another indication of the state of affairs in the late sixties we may quote the findings of a poll carried out among leading Party and Government officials and directors of big enterprises in a district of southern Bohemia in April 1968 (that is, before the Dubcek reforms had got under way, but when people could speak freely). To the question whether power in the country rested with the working class only 54.4 per cent answered, yes; and 50.8 per cent agreed with the proposition that power was limited to the few, the working class worked but did not govern.16
As an epitaph on the era of "socialist industrialization" the words of a worker speaking in 1968 are revealing; he was referring to proposals sent from his plant to the Communist Party's Twelfth Congress in 1962 : "When we steel workers pointed out that we were turning out steel for the scrap heap, they nearly put us in jail because, they said, we were throwing mud at our socialist industry . . . When we protested again about the 'steel concept' and showed it could only lead to bankruptcy, the people in Prague jumped down our throats -'Aren't you ashamed,' they said 'you're steel workers and you criticize the steel concept. You're reactionaries.' Only I don't have to be dumb just because I'm a steel worker. What's the use of a thriving steel industry if the whole Republic is going to rack and ruin?"16 That, of course, was the voice of a politically conscious man, and although there were many such in all spheres of life, indifference to what "they" were doing in the seats of power was for many years an all too common reaction.
* * *
Tempting as it is to present the workers council movement of 1968-9 as a political revolt against Stalinist bureaucracy, the reality is more prosaic. The primary concern was to make the economy work and the self-management idea was, in fact, a logical extension of the economic reforms first mooted in the early sixties.
By 1962 it had become painfully clear that extensive industrial growth and the rigidly centralized system of planning and management associated with it had led the country to a dead end. Economists set to work on proposals for radical change, involving a switch to intensive operation; the spokesman for the proposed reforms was Professor Ota Sik, then a member of the Communist Party Central Committee. Subsequently, some well-meaning critics on the Left had suggested that the measures involved "a return to the market"; we should note in passing that nothing could be further from the truth. To bring dynamism into the system, the economists argued, it was necessary to allow enterprises17 to operate as genuine undertakings in a market economy controlled by overall planning. In place of commands from the top the state would make extensive use of indirect pressures designed to create an atmosphere in which the interests of enterprises would tend to coincide with the national interest. This concept was at the very heart of the endeavour not merely to revitalize the stagnant economy but, more fundamentally, to advance from the simple negation of capitalism, represented by state ownership of the means of production, towards ownership in the hand of the "associated producers", to use the words of the Communist Manifesto. Perhaps only those who have lived in the system can fully appreciate what it means when "there is no link between producer and consumer to transmit a positive or negative verdict on the expenditure of effort by millions of people".18 As long as commodity production persists, that link is provided by the market as an instrument of the plan; without the existence of the socialist market as a democratic regulator, no amount of workers councils or decentralized planning can bridge the gulf between the producers, consumers and the power structure.
The concept of enterprise operation in a socialist market economy -which, of course, is not comparable to the Soviet NEP because it applies to a fully socialized economy- goes back, in a sense, to the point in Czechoslovakia's history before workers' control was abolished and before decision-making was elevated to higher spheres. It presupposes a democratic political system which precludes bureaucratic dictation of the overall plan.
Although the political implications were not spelled out in the proposals advanced by the economists, it took no great theoretical knowledge for the Party leadership of the day to appreciate the danger to the monolithic structure on which their personal power rested.
Forced, however, to take some steps to salvage the economy, they ultimately accepted a watered down version of the original proposals, to be introduced without undue haste. Full implementation was supposed to date from January 1967, but features of the old system were still retained.
The result was, not surprisingly, disappointing and did much to discredit the whole idea. Although the more forward-looking and politically active among the industrial workers and technical intelligentsia were determined, nonetheless, to try and make a success of the venture, for many workers this seemed to be just one more reorganization from above and there was quite natural concern about possible redundancies, stricter demands on skills and so on. Insofar as this compromise reform did delegate responsibility to the enterprises, it was managements and not the workers who had to make the decisions.
However, all through the preceding discussions the feature of the proposals that had been universally popular had been the demand for improvement in management skills, replacing the politically reliable amateurs by trained men.
Progress already made during the sixties in improving the level of management had been generally welcomed, although many people grumbled when new brooms in the shape of the technical intelligentsia presumed to disturb the even tenor of their inefficiently organized labours. And the situation was complicated by the efforts of the regime to sow discord between the workers and the intellectuals the working class being commonly identified with manual workers only, with "origin" by birth holding pride of place. It is a tribute to the political maturity of the Czechoslovak workers that when it came to the point-in 1968-they not only joined forces with intellectuals, but also refused to be baffled by the allegedly knotty problem of technocracy versus democracy, a matter we discuss below in describing the development of the workers councils.
To understand both the limitations of the working class attitudes in those years of chronic crisis, and also the soil from which the experiment in self-management ultimately sprung, it should be realized that the dissatisfaction in the workshops was due not solely to a decline in the standard of living and the irritations of an ineffective economy; there was also a sense of frustration peculiar to a system that was socialist at least in name. Workers under capitalism faced with such a situation would have fought back against the bosses. But for the workers of Czechoslovakia there was no easily identifiable enemy who could be held responsible. The fact of socialization and the constant assurances that they were indeed the owners of the nation's wealth had kept alive some sense of involvement in the conduct of affairs and so, when things went wrong, many felt, over and above a natural concern about their own lives and jobs, a frustrated desire to help put matters right. The "participation" through trade union committees, production conferences and so on, especially in the early years, had given thousands of devoted volunteers some insight into the problems of their everyday working lives-although as one who has experienced all this at shop floor level this author can confidently venture the opinion that shop stewards in capitalist Britain exert a greater influence on working conditions than Czechoslovak trade unionists did under the "directive administrative" system of what purported to be socialism.
While these attitudes help to explain the widespread faith in skilled management as the cure for economic disorders, they were also a potential source of more direct action. It is interesting to note that when the first steps were being taken in applying the new economic measures some groping attempts were made by employees to take matters into their own hands at plant level. Thus in 1966, in a big Prague engineering works, the trade unions and Party committees were forced by pressure from below to go beyond the customary limits of formal participation to intervene in management, even setting up temporary bodies of a self-managing type to cope with a crisis threatening their enterprise.19
In the political atmosphere of the day, however, these were isolated ventures; at that time, as again after the fall of Dubcek,2O anything which smacked of self-management was officially regarded as an attack on state power. The people of Czechoslovakia were learning to their cost that the reforms for which the economy was crying out were cramped and confined by the political interests entrenched in the seats of power, while it was equally clear that the most perfect democratic system would be doomed if it failed to cure the economic ills.
The opportunity to escape from the dilemma was offered in January I 968. Throughout the preceding year the political and economic pressures had been building up to crisis point and the target of criticism was the man who personified the "one-man management" of society-Antonin Novotny, who since 1957 had combined the posts of President and First Secretary of the Communist Party. It was the decision taken by the Party Central Committee in January 1968 to replace Novotny in the post of Secretary by Alexander Dubcek that released the pent up opposition and precipitated the events now known as the Prague Spring.
Discussions that had been going on more or less quietly and discreetly were now conducted openly at meetings and through the mass media. While democracy in the political sense was the chief topic during the first exciting months, the economic reform was not ignored. Ideas about industrial democracy which the economists had seen theoretically as a necessary component if their schemes were to advance socialism, as they hoped, and some of the thinking that had been going on in the higher echelons of the trade unions could at last be confronted with the opinions current in the factories. At a pragmatic level the views coincided : if enterprises were to have powers of decision, the people who would feel the consequences in their pay packets should be able to take a hand in that decision-making. In these simple terms the point was made in the Communist Party's Action Programme of April 1968 :
The economic reform will increasingly place the working communities of socialist enterprises in the position of bearing the direct consequences of good or bad management. The Party therefore considers it essential that those who bear the consequences should exert an influence. There is a need for democratic bodies in the enterprises with well-defined powers in relation to management. The directors and top executives should be responsible to these bodies for overall performance and would be appointed by them.
The debates before and after publication of the Action Programme touched on more fundamental issues as well, most important, that of ownership. Previously it had been the state, ostensibly in the name of the people, that had appeared in the role of owner of all nationalized enterprises (others, including co-operatives, had been so hemmed in by regulations that there had been little scope for "group ownership" to assert itself). The directors of these establishments had been in effect civil servants answerable to the state. But the economists assumed that under the new system the state, which would exercise control, would have to be separated from the enterprise sphere. To whom, then, would the directors be responsible? Now a socialist enterprise, it was argued, like any other firm, consists of three parts employees, management and owner (the owner being whoever bears financial responsibility and the risk of the undertaking). Insofar as the state relinquished the role of direct and exclusive owner its place could be taken in a nationalized concern either by management (the technocratic or managerial concept) or by a workers council (the democratic concept). Whereas before 1968 the reform could not go beyond the technocratic measure of giving more power to managements, the Action Programme came out in favour of the democratic alternative, which was what Professor Sik and the other authors of the reform had had in mind.
If, however, the enterprises were to operate as self-governing units would this mean breaking up state ownership into group ownership? Would, in fact, the enterprises be handed over to enterprise ownership? This, in the opinion of many people, would mean relinquishing one of the advantages of socialism, that is, the concentration of the entire production process in public hands. Though finding much of interest in the Yugoslav system, Czechoslovak economists never set out to copy their model. In general, with differences of emphasis, the argument on this subject ran as follows : Social ownership is never, even under the most rigid centralism, an undifferentiated whole, it can only be expressed through its parts. The reform would encourage elements of group ownership that would help to overcome the situation where property belonged "to everyone and to no one", but the economy should not be split into separate units of enterprise ownership. Overall social ownership would operate through the groups to the benefit of the group and of society as a whole. Brought down to the realm of practical operation these considerations led to various proposals about the composition of the self-governing bodies. Some urged caution-and this was the official view-suggesting that it would be wise to have some outside members of enterprise councils (specialists, representatives of local and consumer interests, banks, the firm's suppliers) as guardians of the wider interests. There was disagreement between those who thought these members should be democratically elected by the enterprise personnel and those who favoured nomination by management or even governmental authorities.
The issue of democracy and expert management was hotly debated. The less democratically-minded suggested giving the managerial side a strong foothold in the workers councils to prevent the untutored masses from riding roughshod over the province of the experts. Others, including many trade unionists, saw the solution in a careful definition of managerial and council competency. When ultimately the movement came into being, however, the prepared schemes were often swept aside.
For the trade unions the economic reform had meant something of an upheaval even before the events of 1968. As long as orders came from the top they had carried out their job of transmission levers in orthodox Stalinist style, with defence of their members' interests taking second place. Even the partial measures of reform, however, made this position more and more untenable. The unions found themselves under crossfire-on the one hand they were not serving their members (the question, "What does one get out of it?" had long been heard among the rank and file), on the other hand they were accused of blocking progress by trying to protect established practices and inefficient concerns. It took political change and the infusion of new blood in the trade union leadership to bring clarity to the discussion.
Previously, while not turning down the idea of some kind of employee involvement in management, the official union view had been, as it is in Britain, that this would be the prerogative of the unions themselves. The new standpoint that emerged from the rethinking of the spring of 1968 was that the trade union branches and the workers councils should each perform a different job. The argument for this is interesting because it ties in with the discussion on ownership mentioned above.
People working in a socialist enterprise, it was said, have a dual status-on the one hand they are employees, on the other they share in social ownership (whether in the group or the wider sense). The two sides cannot be satisfactorily represented by a single body. Therefore, the employee status should be the concern of the trade unions, while the workers councils would fulfil the ownership function. Implicit in this approach is the realization that what we call the workers' side in Britain could not withdraw from decision-making, should a conflict arise, to assume its defensive role in confrontation with management or employers. But the benefits of the trade union role in industrial democracy were not discarded; the unions did a great deal to prepare the ground for setting up workers councils-indeed, some two-thirds of the preparatory committees for councils were formed on their initiative.21
In the spring months of 1968, then, people in industrial and other enterprises began to explore the idea of setting up democratic bodies to take a hand in management; the move was seen as a necessary part of the economic reform which, it was hoped, could now be operated without the compromises imposed in the Novotny era. Apart from the statement in the Action Programme, there was no firmly organized lead from the top, so that it was a matter of local initiative whether anything was done or not. Where interest existed preparatory committees were set up to sound out opinion in the workshops, examine the practical aspects and, if things seemed favourable, to arrange for workers councils to be formed by due process of democratic election. Figures based on inquiries in- 93 enterprises where preparatory committees had been formed during 1968 show that the trade unions were the initiators in about 65 per cent, Communist Party branches 17 per cent, managements 14 per cent, groups of technicians 2 to 3 per cent and groups of workers around I per cent of cases.
In view of the conflicting attitudes on the role of the projected councils, official quarters tended to slow down these developments. Nevertheless, reports from government departments during the summer showed some 350 enterprises expected to be operating with workers councils by January 1969. Interestingly enough, while the formation of preparatory committees had reached a peak in June and July and then showed a downward trend, the number of actual councils set up by these committees soared in the month following the invasion by the Warsaw Pact countries to a high point that was only exceeded by a new peak in December; many reports show that the feeling in the factories was that in the face of such a crisis it was even more important to assert their democratic rights. A decline in the graph of council formation after September is accounted for by a Government pronouncement in October calling a halt until legislation had been passed (with the fall of Dubcek in April 1969 this was shelved). The opponents of industrial democracy, especially among top-ranking bureaucrats, began to take courage and succeeded in scotching plans in some places or even in disbanding some existing councils. All the more remarkable, then, is the new rise in December, evidently due to the determination at trade union branch level, encouraged by a still progressive leadership. The net result was that at a conservative estimate (from trade union sources) 120 workers councils were in existence by the beginning of 1969 and they represented some 800,ooo employees, or about one-sixth of the labour force in the productive industries. At a delegate meeting held in January, with notable lack of publicity or official support, there were IOI councils and 64 preparatory committees represented. A publicity black-out then prevented further figures being published, but repeated calls from Party and Government for a halt until legislation had been passed suggests that in the first half of 1969, at least, the movement had not been stifled. Finally, the article in Rude Pravo on 22 July 1970, ringing the death knell of the councils, mentions the figure of 300 still operating in June 1969.
There was of course little time for the success of the venture to be judged in the field of performance. But surveys and statistical information on the election, membership and powers of the councils did appear in the first half of 1969. In reading the reports one is struck by the varied picture given, suggesting that this was a voluntary movement refreshingly free from regimentation, while also reflecting the divergent attitudes and the pressures at work. Most of our information is based on data from 95 workers councils, 69 in the manufacturing industries, 26 in other sectors. The bulk of the membership consisted of people elected from the shop or office floor, their share ranging from two-thirds to four-fifths of all council members. With many variations, the balance was made up of ex oficio members from management and other departments within the enterprises, of people nominated by directors and, exceptionally, by government departments. Outsiders, specialists and others, were very much in a minority; in some cases they were nominated, but more often they were co-opted by the elected councils, and their voting rights on purely domestic matters were usually restricted. In brief, the evidence indicates that while considerations of expert know-how and of safeguarding the wider interests were not ignored, the emphasis was on the democratic element.
A review of the conduct of the elections shows a degree of freedom remarkable to anyone acquainted with how such matters were handled in the past. Nominations came in from all organizations within the enterprises-the trade unions, Communist Party branches, youth organizations-and directly from working groups on the shop floor, in departments, offices and so on. The latter and the unions each accounted for one quarter of the nominations, only 8 per cent coming from managements and 10 per cent from Party branches. No outside bodies were allowed to put forward candidates. From a total of 3,622 candidates in the 95 cases investigated, 1,421 were elected. Eighty-three per cent of the people eligible cast their votes.
Before looking at information on the membership of the councils it will be useful to see what powers they possessed. A survey of their constitutions, made in 1969, shows that in all cases they were responsible for appointing the enterprise director and top management staff; this in its very procedure was a more revolutionary step than appears at first sight because, in many cases, posts were advertised, candidates were interviewed and the selection made on merit-something unheard of in the days of "cadre policy" dictated from the top. As an example we may cite the Skoda Works. When the wind of change was blowing in the summer of 1968 the General Director resigned and his place was taken by a member of the management staff. In September a workers council was established. In Rude Pravo of 18 December 1q68 we read : "The Workers Council of Skoda, in accordance with its constitution approved by the Ministry of Heavy Industry, decided at a meeting on 31 October to advertise the post of General Director." Ten applications were received-one from a Deputy Minister. The candidates submitted references and statements about how they envisaged doing the job, they were given psychological tests and interviewed by a special committee of council members. A short list of five having been drawn up, the candidates came before a full council meeting where they spoke and answered questions. The meeting then voted by secret ballot; by 22 out of 29 votes the man who had been holding the post since August was elected and engaged on a six-year contract.
The councils also fixed the director's salary and the share of enterprise earnings that he and the executive staff should draw; they had powers of decision on such matters as mergers with other enterprises, dividing into smaller units or liquidating a concern. In general it was their business to decide the overall lines of development and the principles of operation (usually in the light of proposals put forward by the enterprise director), and to keep control of financial policy, including the distribution of profits after paying the prescribed charges to the state (an important attribute of ownership, entirely lacking under the old system when the bulk of enterprise funds were appropriated by the government). Some constitutions gave the workers councils full powers of decision on these matters, others allowed for consultative powers on proposals put forward by management, in which case, however, they did have a right to veto projects that might conflict with the workers' interests. In short, the survey revealed two main trends in the constitutions, the one subordinating management to the democratic body on overall matters of policy, the other giving greater rein to management decision. The day-to-day direction of production was, however, always left to the qualified staff appointed by the councils. In general, we find here, too, a predominance of the democratic over the technocratic or managerial concept.
Moreover -and this is the most striking fact to emerge from an analysis of the elected membership of the 95 councils- the vexed question of whether interference by laymen might not run counter to efficient management was resolved in a remarkable way : 70.3 per cent of the council members turned out to be technicians, 24.3 per cent were manual workers and 5.4 per cent administrative staff. Since at least two-thirds of the voters were manual workers, many must have cast their votes for candidates who were technicians. Czechoslovak commentators said that this was a unique feature, not found in Poland or in Yugoslavia, and surprising in a country where, as we have noted, antagonism between workers by hand and brain had been diligently fostered by the Novotny regime; it was seen as a protest against the amateurism of the old system. Figures for skill and education follow the same pattern : of the worker members, 68 per cent were recorded as highly skilled (in the metal-working trades 85 per cent), while 55 per cent of the technicians were highly qualified; 26 per cent of council members were university trained, 26 per cent had higher secondary education.
There might be reason to fear an undemocratic or technocratic element in this and obviously one would want to see what the workers electorate felt after, say, a year's operation. But in a country where the economic base for class distinctions between manual worker and technician had long since disappeared, where higher education was not the prerogative of a privileged class, and all were equally in the position of wage earners (with, moreover, surprisingly small wage differentials), it looks as if the voters knew what they were doing. In any case, most important was probably the democratic climate of opinion; in elections to trade union committees at plant level there had never been this emphasis on skill and education, yet in an authoritarian set-up they were only too often bureaucratic. And people on the spot, evidently aware of the possibility that the workers councils might, in their turn, become a new, self-managing bureaucracy, were already suggesting ways to ensure they should not become alienated from their constituents : by making certain, for instance, that there was a steady turn-over of membership.
The election results also showed that people voted for candidates they knew well and who knew the enterprise concerned and its problems. By length of employment in the given enterprise the members were divided as follows : 72 per cent with 10 and more years employment, over 50 per cent with 15 and more years in the firm and only 4 per cent less than 5 years. But age was not equated with wisdom and experience-7 I per cent of the successful candidates were between the ages of 35 and 49 years.
It is worth recording that the political composition of the councils also produced a surprise. There had been some idea that popular revulsion against the bureaucratic methods employed by the ruling party in the past might lead to a majority of non-Communists being elected. In fact, all 83 councils where the political structure was recorded included Communists, in 44 they were a majority, in 6 the balance was even, and in 33 non-Communists predominated. In all, 52 per cent of members were Communist Party members, and only in the building trades (49 per cent) and agriculture (37 per cent) were the figures below the average, interestingly enough both sectors where a higher than average proportion of manual workers and a lower of the highly educated were elected.
Among the dramatic events of 1968 and 1969 the workers council movement was not, of course, in the forefront of public interest and not everyone was informed about its purpose. Nevertheless, we have some pointers to the state of public opinion, including two polls conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research,22 one in July 1968 (nation-wide sample of 1,610 people questioned), the other in May 1969 (sample 1,603). To the question, "Do you consider the establishment of workers councils in the bigger enterprises would or would not be useful?" the affirmative answers were 53.3 per cent in the first and 59.1 per cent in the second poll; opinion against the councils was 9.9 per cent in the first and 3 per cent in the second, while the don't knows were 33.1 and 35.1 per cent respectively, the balance being made up of miscellaneous other views. We have given these results in some detail to bring out the interesting point that the swing between July 1968 and March 1969 in favour of the self-management idea was at the expense of the opposition which, as more detailed figures show, consisted in July 1968 in part of technocratically inclined people; many of the latter, after the shock of the August invasion, were to change their minds about industrial democracy. Support was strongest in Czechoslovakia's Black Country in northern Bohemia (70 per cent in 1969), followed by Prague (67), itself an important industrial centre.
It should be pointed out that the workers councils established or in course of formation were in enterprises often comprising several factories or plants, some of them the biggest concerns in the country. For instance, the Skoda Works in Pilsen, a stronghold of the movement, elected from I 13 candidates a 29-member council; this worked out at one member to 1,500-2,000 employees, and some had to travel from the firm's branches in faraway Slovakia to attend meetings. An analysis of the press reports, however, showed that it was clear that 262 THE SOCIALIST R'EGISTER 197 I the pattern varied considerably according to the size and nature of the undertakings. The first council in transport (Czechoslovak Road Transport, Usti nad Labem) had 24 members elected by I I depots with a total of 6,200 employees.
Rude Pravo of 3 October 1968 published an interview with the chairman of the newly-formed workers council, the enterprise director and the Party chairman at Slovnaft, the big chemical combine in Bratislava, Slovakia. Here they had taken time in preparing the ground-responding in April, to the idea put forward in the Party's Action Programme, they finally held the elections to their council at the end of September, after the August invasion. All employees at work that day-4,285 of them cast their votes, electing 15 council members from different departments (5 manual workers, 10 technicians); five co-opted members from outside the firm included the director of the other big chemical works in Bratislava; five members were to be appointed by government authorities-making a total of 25. In its make-up, then, this council tended towards the official concept of limited or managerial democracy, and its chairman, too, spoke in the interview of partnership with management; there was to be joint decision-making on investment policy, technological development and so on. The first meeting had discussed and approved proposals from the directors of chemical enterprises in Slovakia for the development of the industry in the region. The feeling was that there would now be scope for new ideas and expansion that had been stultified under the old system.
There was a danger, of course --especially in the big enterprises or where the managerial concept predominated- that council activities would be rather remote from the shop floor. In late 1968 and early 1969, when self-management could still be openly discussed, the argument was being voiced that the next step would be to have councils at plant level, too, and although this was not the government view, the movement would probably have advanced in that way. For short-lived as it was, this was a genuine movement, enjoying, as we have seen, considerable public support. Of all the features of the "Prague Spring", this essentially working class undertaking, though perhaps slow to develop, was among the longest to survive. Today we can only surmise what potentialities it possessed; but in the summer of 1968, when the prospects for both economic and political democracy seemed fair, Professor Sik, for instance, ventured the suggestion that the workers councils might one day prove to be the nucleus for a new self-governing system in the political as well as the economic field -producer groups might be associated in a chamber of Parliament, thereby exercising more fully the power deriving from ownership.
Of course, as things are this is speculation. Nor, it should be noted, did the Czechoslovak experiment ever presume to offer a model for other countries. The workers council movement emerged in the special circumstances of a country where the relations of production were entirely non-capitalist, but where owing to the bureaucratic barriers that were holding". back an advance to fully socialist relations there was a tragic wastage of human potential. In examining the implications of workers' control both as an instrument of attack on capitalism and as a means for enabling the skill and talents of the working class in the broadest sense to be fully used in a future socialist society, socialists in other countries can learn much from the post-war history of Czechoslovakia. It should be borne in mind, however, that the course taken by Czechoslovakia cannot be attributed solely to Cold War pressures. It has been pointed out by Czechoslovak historians that whereas in 1945-8 there were ideas about a special road to socialism, no theoretical or programmatic statement was ever made suggesting that any model was envisaged at the end of the road other than that evolved in the very special circumstances of the Soviet Union. True, Yugoslavia did choose a different model, but it should not be forgotten that up to 1950 she was following the Soviet example far more rigidly than Czechoslovakia; it was the upheaval of the Cominform excommunication that led her to question the dogmas and begin dismantling her Stalinist structure. The special circumstances of a backward economy and a multinational state have made Yugoslavia's path exceptionally difficult. The strategy of socialist revolution aiming from the outset to overcome the tensions and contradictions inherent in industrial society and to place power truly in the hands of the workers by hand and brain has yet to be worked out.
Originally published in Socialist Register 1971
Εργατικός Έλεγχος υπό τον Κρατικό Σοσιαλισμό, Robert Vitak, Εργατική Αυτοδιαχείριση, Πρώην Τσεχοσλοβακία, ΕυρώπηTopicΝαιΝαιNoΌχι -
English26/09/15The worship of prices in Jugoslavia has lead to distortions associated with the "fetishism" of commodities
"When we mention the law of value we have so far always used alternatives : either the law of value or plan. I maintain that there is no 'either-or'; the law of value is not put against the plan, but the plan is an element of the law of value, the biggest, most important and most significant one at that."
(Dr. V. Bakaric, leading Jugoslav planner and Secretary of the League of Communists of Croatia in his Current Problems of Constructing our Economic System. Zagreb, 1963, p. 52).
SOCIALISTS all over the world have shown increasing interest in the workings of the Jugoslav economy in recent years. The discrediting of Stalinism and a growing appreciation of the economic and political problems of the bureaucratic State have focused attention on the techniques of decentralization that the Jugoslavs have been practising since the break with the Soviet Union in 1948. Today the Jugoslav "model" arouses envy in may parts of Eastern Europe as well as alarm in China. Not all economists in the Socialist countries are impressed, however. A current joke among economists in Poland runs : "What is Jugoslavia? It is the place where the last Stalinist died". The "Stalinism" of Jugoslavia, according to these Poles, is the semi-religious role played by the price mechanism ("law of value") in all Jugoslav discussions and policy-decisions. It is certainly true that most of the enthusiasts for workers control, non-bureaucratic planning and self-management have failed to question the assumption of Jugoslav political and economic writers that "real" prices are determined by a largely free competitive set of market forces. In the same way as the system of prices in a capitalist economy is arbitrary and often unconnected with the assumed efficiency of market forces, so a close examination of the Jugoslav economy would reveal the presence of a high degree of monopoly in price structures which are real only in the sense that they are arbitrary.
---I---
Much of the writing about Jugoslav economics has been misleading. In large part, this has been the result of establishing an idealized model of the economy rather than an analysis of its historical evolution since the liberation of the country from the Nazis. Socialist Jugoslavia has passed through three distinct phases since 1945: the first period, 1945 to 1950, were the years of reconstruction, highly centralized planning, a very heavy rate of investment (about 29 per cent of the gross social product), and from the time of the break with Russia, a period of dislocation resulting from the economic blockade imposed by Eastern Eur0pe.l The second period, 1950 to 1960, was a decade of rapid economic growth as the investment of the previous years came into full production, and as the new system of "market Socialism" and workers' control of enterprise began to increase incentives and improve efficiency. The third period, 1960 to the present day, has been characterized by a marked trend towards autonomy and even anarchy in economic affairs, and there developed an extreme liberalism in economic policy and a revulsion against anything but the mildest forms of indicative planning. At the same time and as part of these general trends there has occurred a rapid development of self-management in economic and political life. The first two periods have been widely discussed but it is this last period which in many respects represents an important break with previous policies and previously held ideas and which has been least understood, both inside as well as outside Jugoslavia.
It is argued below that the worship of prices and "profitability" in Jugoslavia in recent years has been leading to some of the distortions which Marx associated with the "fetishism" of commodities, that is, relations between social groups taking second place in importance to relations between goods and to the needs of the market.
The issue is one of great importance since many socialists in both East and West cannot conceive of a truly decentralized economy, aneconomy guided by self-managed enterprises, without attaching the market system to it as a kind of economic-political motor in order to make the whole thing work. There are also those who wrongly imagine that the market system provides an automatic in-built protection against bureaucracy, although they have never bothered to analyse how this works in practice, or to bring evidence to support such a proposition.
There are two other lines of criticism of Jugoslav developments which are less fundamental or substantial than the one implied in Polish scepticism.These are, in the first place, the attacks emerging from China? which have something of the persuasive efficiency of a steam-siren. There are also secondly those criticisms contained in the well known essay by Paul Sweezy and Leo Huberman4 which Jugoslav politicians regard as far more serious and damaging than the "proof" supplied in China that there has been a restoration of capitalism in their country.
The Chinese argue that there is a growing private capitalist sector in petty-commodity production such as crafts, services and catering. The private sector in agriculture still accounts for 85 per cent of land ownership. More important, there are wide fluctuations in economic activity, including inventory cycles, so that "truly this is a living picture of capitalist reality”. Workers' self-management, runs the most important of the Chinese criticisms, is a device for allowing a system of bourgeois co-operatives to develop, industrial co-operatives controlled by managers acting on behalf of a new "bureaucrat-comprador" bourgeoisie whose political face is the League of Jugoslav Communists. This new social class, we are told, does not allow even these self-managed enterprises any genuine autonomy since they take awav at least three-fourths of their net income before tax. On the ideoiogical plane, the Chinese accuse the Jugoslavs not only of putting forward revisionist doctrines on the nature of contemporary capitalism, but of peddling a phoney version of Marx's concepts of alienation and humanism under the slogan "everything for the sake of man".7 The introduction of "payment to work" and "material incentives" into Jugoslav principles of income distribution encourages a profit motive fetish and brings about attempts to "replace the Socialist economic principles of planning by the capitalist economic principles of profit, paving the way for the liberalization of the economy and the degeneration of Socialist economy". As part of this process, "Jugoslav theorists are becoming more and more receptive to the fashions and vogues of bourgeois economic theory".
After reviewing these Chinese criticisms, Sweezy and Huberman rejected the suggestion "that a restoration of capitalism has taken place in Jugoslavia", but argue that "the present system is developing towards a kind of corporate capitalism likely to resemble in many respects the present French system". The political foundations for this have been laid by an absence of ideological content in education, by the growth of apathy and selfishness among the population and by the failure to put forward political concepts appropriate for the new society. The economic preconditions for the new trends were set "when it was decided lo restore production for profit as the prime mover of economic activity. Without the institution of private property, production for profit is not yet capitalism. But inevitably it generates capitalist mentality".ll The number of issues raised here is, of course, very large and their interaction is most complex. To assess the Chinese and Sweezy-Huberman polemics, discussion needs to centre on the following questions :
What were the real origins of (a) workers' self-management and (b) market forces in Jugoslavia? How does the economic system today compare with what it was in the more centralized period of planning 1952-60? What have been the results of the swing to economic liberalism since 1960? To what extent does Jugoslav reality correspond to Jugoslav political and economic theory? What is the actual character of the new system? Is it an instrument to accelerate productivity in the period of transition to a Communist society? Or is it a kind of corporate economy controlled by workers in their role as managers? Or a new kind of capitalism? What is its future? Are there any important lessons, positive and negative, in Jugoslav experience with self-management and "market Socialism"? Or is Jugoslav experience the result mainly of local conditions and traditions, and the size of the country?
---II---
The System at December 1960
After the split from the U.S.S.R. in 1948, the Jugoslav leaders were forced to strike out on their own and to develop what they conceived to be a rival model to that which they criticized in the U.S.S.R. The elements of this model were derived from two sources. In economics, Boris Kidric, President of the Economic Council and the Federal Planning Office, stated simply that practical considerations required the widespread use of supply and demand rather than centralized planning.l"n politics, Tito promoted anti-bureaucratism with the twin doctrines of the "withering away of the state" (beginning soon after the revolution was established) and workers' control of productive property.
The analysis of bureaucracy tended towards a full scale re-examination of the nature of the Soviet society, which at one stage was labelled as state-capitalist by leading theorists.13 Later it also meant the revival of the theories of Trotsky, Gorth, Gatz, Korsch, Makaiski and others.14 In 1958, Bukharin's Notes of an Economist was circulating in roneod form in the Federal Jugoslav Planning Office.
From the beginning of the new system, it was obvious that there would be difficulties in combining "plan" and "market". Divergencies between planning goals and the allocation of resources resulting from the operation of the market were bound to arise. The problem of the nature of prices-their hybrid character as a mixture of equilibrium prices and operational prices-remained unsolved. The danger of unplanned movements in the demand for capital, where undistributed profits and depreciation reserves remained with enterprises, required a careful investment policy. Yet until 1960, these problems were not allowed to get out of hand: a number of "pegs" were constructed which held together the system of enterprises responding to market signals within the framework of a general plan. These "pegs" included (a) centralized control over the sectornl distribution of investment funds, covering 60 per cent of the annual investment fund; (b) control over the distribution of income via fiscal measures: a tax on the value of fixed and circulating capital, taxes on enterprise income, taxes on excess profits, turnover taxes;16 (c) control over distribution of "income after tax" within the enterprises : the proportional distribution of this income between bonus wages, investment in housing and amenities, and depreciation reserves and ploughed-back profits; (d) price control over products in monopolistic industries and over essential wage-goods (food and fuel). Above all; there was the active role of the League of Jugoslav Communists at the enterprise and commune level and the Socialist Alliance at the national level. A halfway house had been achieved, institutionally, between the demands of planning and the strategy of growth on the one hand, and the relative autonomy of enterprises and communes on the other. In agriculture, State farms were encouraged to develop with a generous provision of funds, technicians, equipment and seeds, and production and marketing co-operatives were encouraged. A centralized banking system allowed some evening-out of regional disparities in economic development. Foreign exchange and import controls held the consequences of a persistent balance of payments deficit in check.
The Swing to Economic Liberalism 1961-5
In 1961, this "half-way house" was deliberately abandoned under the slogan of "more decentralization", "increased autonomy of units" and "the need for real prices". The policies to achieve this were introduced suddenly, even capriciously, during 1961. First, it was decided to eliminate all controls over the rights of enterprises to distribute their income after tax. Next the central investment fund was reduced in size, the .proportion of investments financed by the central government being cut from 38.6 per cent in 1959 to 22.5 per cent in 1963. To this end, the banking system was also decentralized and new commune banks to finance local economic activities were established. Import controls were reduced and a foreign exchange devaluation carried out to "encourage tourism".
The sudden introduction of these changes, coupled with a low level of agricultural production in 1961-2, caused an economic recession. Stocks of unsold goods rose by 20 per cent; the total supply of goods increased by only 1 per cent compared with an increase of more than 6 per cent in previous years. Gross Social Product at constant prices in 1961 and in 1962 rose 4 per cent, whereas the annual rate of increase over the 1957-60 five year plan had been 13 per cent.16 Industrial production, which had been planned to rise by 13 per cent, rose by less than 7 per cent. The 1960-5 plan was abando-ned: the economy was to be stabilized on an ad hoc basis which included severe credit restrictions and the re-introduction of price control.17 The changes introduced after 1959 created considerable dissension inside the community of Jugoslav economists and planners. Those who saw virtues in continued central planning until such time as the economy reached a higher level of economic development, such as Nikola CobeliC and Radmila StojanoviC, dropped out of advisory work for the Planning Commission. Their places were taken by Jugoslav economists returning from post-graduate study in Britain and America. Among these was Branko Horvart, who rapidly became a leading figure in Jugoslav economic planning and policy and whose book, "addressed to fellow planners" is the work of a Western and certainly not a Marxist economist. Conservatives like Professor BiEaniC, long-time opponents of central planning,20 became increasingly influential.
As the crisis of 1961-2 developed, serious structural faults in the economy became increasingly obvious. Excess capacity and the development of an oligopolistic structure grew apace. Bureaucracy, instead of diminishing. intensified at the commune level where excessive investments in prestigious and non-productive buildings reached the dimensions of a scandal about which the political leadership protested.
By 1963 the problem of excess capacity had become serious. In the economy as a whole only 54 per cent of capacity was in use (as measured in horsepower and consumption of energy). In part this arose because machinery stood idle waiting for the raw materials and electric power that had not been developed in the great flurry over decentralization after 1959. It also arose from the increasing degree of monopoly and the growing ineffectiveness of taxes on fixed capital to counter the deliberate excess capacity arising from the reluctance of monopolistic firms to expand output and reduce prices. Monopoly power had been growing since 1954; but even at that time "many industries, including steel, non-ferrous metallurgy and heavy chemicals were not behaving competitively". After the downturn of 1961-2, it was estimated that the economy was carrying enough excess capacity to allow a 20 per cent increase in output, without any new investment.'
At the same time, industrial production after 1962 improved . rapidly, rising by 16 per cent in 1963 and 1964. It might be asked, then, how it came about that a high level of excess capacity existed side by side with high rates of investment and growth of output. The answer lies in the fact that investments were stepped up in laboursaving devices to reduce the high costs arising from under-utilization of capacity-costs which threatened the effectiveness of Jugoslav manufactured exports. There has also been heavy pressure for new investments in the underdeveloped regions. Jugoslavia is still in the phase of "extensive" rather than "intensive" investments : new factories are built rather than existing factories being extended and modernized. The amount invested in the construction of new enterprises has been running at a figure two and half times the annual average investment made in the sector of heavy industry.26 Excess capacity tends to be endemic in new enterprises with limited markets; heavy investment therefore tends to improve output at the global level of the economy, but at the industry level excess capacity means that such investment involves a low coefficient of effectiveness.
The new course in economic policy began to develop a logic of its own. If market forces were to be the operational factor in production, why not in investment, and indeed in social services and other spheres? Why have central plans at all if fiscal and monetary intervention could guide a predominantly "free" economy? In December, 1963, the General Investment Fund was virtually abolished. This had previously been crucial in holding the branches of the economy together by central allocation of funds to the sectors and industries that had to be developed, so that the main direction and structure of growth could be adjusted to the central plan. Nine months later it was announced that the level of investment was running 40 per cent above the plan, and in October 1964 a ban on investment funds for all non-productive investments was announced. In the new system devised after the abolition of the General Investment Fund, Republican Investment Banks are replaced by "economic banks" which are instructed to follow the profit motive themselves by lending to investment outlets with a high rate of return.
These Economic Banks also replaced the Investment Banks as the institutions responsible for conducting investment auctions. The rights of enterprises to obtain long-term credits have been greatly increased.
If they can provide a certain percentage "participation" specified for industrial branches (i.e. a certain share of the total investment required for a project) then they automatically receive credits. It is clear that funds will flow to those who are already strong, and that the position of monopolies will be strengthened. The only central control that remains in the system is the manipulation of the percentage participation required of the investor which however might be lowered, for example, for the electric power trusts, if an electricity shortage developed.
The Jugoslav authorities claim, in justification of the new system, that the General Investment Fund was a "centralist-administrative'' device, and that its utilization was strongly influenced by the political pressures of federal republican and commune governments, resulting in expensive construction (administrative buildings,, projects with long gestation periods and expensive "shells") as well as other noneconomic investments. Undoubtedly this happened. What is not so certain is that the new system, which encourages independent investment action by enterprises, supplemented by bank investments allocated on strict economic criteria, will increase productivity as expected.
It seems clear from what has happened already that the predictions of a number of Marxist economists (Maurice Dobb for instance) made years ago have already come about. In order to prevent unemployment growing as marginal firms go out of existence it is necessary to maintain the rate of investment at an arbitrary levelespecially as a price-cut ordered from the centre to dispose of goods is not open to a market socialist system. More important, such a system will tend to develop instability and jerkiness in its investment rate: the demand for capital from enterprises will fluctuate with the rate of growth of the economy, tending to change directly and not inversely with changes in the rate of investment. In the jargon of Western economists the "marginal efficiency of capital" schedule is not independent of the rate of investment.
Prices have also begun to increase. The cost of living index rose 7.5 per cent in 1961, 10.5 per cent in 1962 and 5.3 per cent in 1963; the three years following the swing to economic liberalism saw a growth in the cost of living greater than for the whole period 1952-7.29 Worse was to follow. The cost of living was increased by decree by as much as 24 per cent in August 196430 while minimum wages were increased by only 10 per cent.31 Between August 1964 and March 1965 prices rose another 33 per cent, wages rising 15 per cent. After pressure from the Trade Union Congress, a decision taken by the Federal Executive Council operated a standstill on the prices of goods and services at the level prevailing on the 22 March 1965.32 The decision was accompanied by the intriguing statement that "consumers are in the long run the best controllers of price".
What was the reason for the inflation after 1961 Jugoslav authorities never blame monopoly or the behaviour of enterprises. They always point to excess investment over the level provided in the plan,34 or to a type of investment that freezes capital in long-term projects, or to declines in agricultural output, or to the "wage-price spiral". One other explanation has been given that explains the direction in which economic policy is moving. The opening of a pricescissors in favour of agricultural products has been justified, despite its effects on the cost of living, by pointing to the need to compensate peasants for the previous surplus extracted from them to finance industrializationn as well as the encouragement (via higher peasant incomes) of a wider internal market for the sale of industrial and consumer goods. Such a rise in agricultural prices, by reducing the differentials between agricultural and urban wages, would also stop the drift of the younger, more productive workers from agriculture to the towns. It would also, it is thought, help to force up land prices so that peasant families will be given the incentive to invest in their farms and thus expand agricultural output. Following this line of reasoning, Jugoslav spokesmen claim that there will be no net increase in the general price level, since the alternative would be to increase the pace of industrialization in order to absorb the flow of the ex-peasants.
What is interesting about these proposals is that the obvious alternative solution namely the Socialist one, of expanding output by improving and expanding the state sector in agriculture did not even get a hearing. Yet, unlike experience in the rest of Eastern Europe, agricultural productivity on State farms has consistently been higher than in the private sector, and sometimes very much higher. The recent rise in agricultural prices is surely, then, a striking example of faith in market forces.
Above all, it is clear that there is little that is automatic or optimal about the Jugoslav price system. The abandonment of controls over income distribution within firms, and over the central direction of investment allocation, actually led to an unpublicized retreat into price control. Even in the relatively stable period 1952-60, the arbitrariness of turnover taxes and enterprise income tax was quite marked. The share of turnover taxes in "value added" (net output) in the electrical goods industry was 10 per cent in 1954, 20.5 per cent in 1955 and 12.6 per cent in 1960; in textiles it was 4.4 per cent in 1953, 46.8 per cent in 1954 and 26.9 per cent in 1960. Similar examples can be cited for ferrous metals, metallurgy, tobacco, clothing and shoes and many other industries. The excess profits tax was at first progressive in its burden upon enterprises, and then it was later levied on profits amounting to more than 6 per cent of the total value of capital stock. In 1960 it was made proportional, and this provided a windfall to wealthier enterprises. But windfalls of this kind are rarely powerful incentives to expand output. For many years the approach was simply that if a firm made large monetary gains they were to be penalized, and no rigorous means have been found to separate the profits that are actually due to windfalls or monopoly power and those that are the result of higher productivity and sales. A "fear of excess profit tax" was created in many industries, with debilitating effects on incentives and innovation.
In the absence of central intervention, the conclusion must be that prices are in fact arbitrary. This is so partly because of the arbitrariness of fiscal intervention, discussed above, and partly because many prices tend to be settled by managers over dinner with their rivals or by other forms of collusion: a process which is considerably assisted by the present organization of Jugoslav enterprises into industryassociations and chambers of commerce.
Perhaps the most important of all recent trends has been the growing reaction during 1964 and 1965 against central planning as such. The abandonment of the 1961-5 Plan is put down to "bad central planning" rather than to the too-sudden introduction of new economic measures after 1960. A growing number of articles in the Jugoslav Press advocate the replacement of central plans by "general resolutions" about the desired lines of development, leaving it to firms and communes to implement the strategy. The Parliament in the Slovene Republic refused to adopt the annual plan for 1964 and replaced it with a general resolution on economic development. In Croatia, Dr. BakariC put 'forward the view that the new trends have not gone far enough: "today we are approaching changes in the economic system from the point of view of centralization versus decentralization. To put it a little more simply this means--do I alone have the power or do five of us have it. Here the ideological basis, the basis of social and economic relations in this venture does not change. We must switch over to freer economic relation." And the most comprehensive recent statement of policy claims that "under present conditions of national income distribution, socio-political bodies still have considerable say in the management of the economy, particularly as regards the expansion of productive forces and investment decision-making. This has hindered the development of selfmanagement and the intensification of business in economic organization." This statement of aims amears in the draft resolution for the new 1 A seven year plan. It is an important economic document. In public discussion, however, it has been over-shadowed by the more dogmatic Resolution adopted by the Federal Parliament in May 1964. This was entitled "Basic Problems of the Further Development of the Economic System" and it represented a clear demand for the further development away from a planned economy: its main slogans being fewer controls, and increasing use of market forces and above all, less central planning.
Self Management, "integration" and Planning
In Jugoslavia today, economists talk about Socialist economic cycles which arise from the bunching of investments and the differently-timed replacement of capital equipment which do not have a uniform life span." It is clear, however, that part of the cycle is also due to the impact of incentives on investments which is particularly crucial in an economy in which such a percentage of investment is carried out by decentralized units, that is by enterprises and communes. Inventory cycles are part of this cyclical movement and in turn give rise to the growth of familiar phenomena: excess zeal in advertising, output-restriction, and so on.
Yet the dynamics of the economy are obviously powerful enough. Despite the economic crisis of 1961-2, the swings in investment rates and fluctuating export fortunes, the trend rate of growth is still high, and the dynamism in certain industrial branches is most impressive, reaching growth rates of 10 per cent and more above the plan in 1964-5. There are, therefore, powerful stabilizing forces in operation -although they are not always the ones most stressed in Jugoslav discussions. This stabilizing and growth-producing element is, paradoxically, based upon a certain retreat into centralism in the field of pricing and industrial administration. It is obvious that an economy as decentralized as the Jugoslav needs some kind of "peg" to hold the system together. In the past this was the ratio of 60:40 in favour of central investment allocation to the main economic sectors; with this abandoned, it is price control and the increasing official encouragement of "integration" and "concentration" in Price control forces enterprises to earn profits by expanding their sales to obtain extra revenue. Integration and co-operation raise productivity and reduce unit costs.
A recent survey analysed 2,684 "large" firms, selected for their size, measured by number of employees, value of assets, investment outlays, taxes paid and volume of retained profits. Ten per cent of the firms sampled controlled half the work force in manufacturing, and 70 per cent of the value of assets.43 This high degree of concentration inevitably raises some new problems for the economy as a whole.
The small or medium competitive firm bought its materials and sold its products at prices over which it had no control. Hence it could only attempt to maximize profits by improving its technique or its organization. In a small national market like the Jugoslav, however, the monopoly firm is large not only in terms of the industry to which it belongs, but in terms of the nation's economy (e.g., oil firms). Prices at which it sells outputs and buys inputs are not objective market data, but magnitudes depending on its own operations and on those of a small number of similarly situated enterprises. The workers' management board in such a firm will seek to maximize the flow of profit over a much longer period. It will substitute capital for labour; it may be interested in profits per worker, while the local commune to which it owes taxation will be interested only in total profit. The drive for maximum profits under these conditions no longer involves merely finding the best ways to reduce costs of production. Unless there is price control and unless responsible policies are pursued by self-managing organs, it pays to overinvest in capacity and to keep reserve machinery to supply new markets at short notice as well as to encroach on its competitors.
The trend towards integration is, however, an objectively necessary process and it also brings benefits. Modern automative industries require large scale; there is only room for one or two large plants in a small market. This objective process undermines the myth of free competition and the eLficacy of free market forces so prominent in Jugoslav ideology. It also forces a re-consideration of the actual role of self-management, the price mechanism and central planning. It is no longer necessary to promote the "market" and excessive decentralization in economic affairs. The more important issues of improving the self-management of large modern enterprises and of democratization of the planning process itself arise. Instead of a lazy retreat into a belief in the market as an automatic anti-bureaucratic force, and illusions that bureaucracy exists only in central ministries and not at the enterprise and commune level, Jugoslav theory and practice must tackle the problems of how to decide, democratically, the rate of growth and the rate of investment in conditions which favour monopolistic competition, large-scale industry and realistic, flexible central planning. The computer revolution and the improvements in planning techniques and methods in the U.S.S.R. and Poland have caught the Jugoslavs unprepared. The possibilities of streamlined, feasible central plans (which also reduce the autonomy of oligopolies) were not available to them when they struck out on a new-course in 1950.
The possibilities here are considerable. More than one million workers have experienced self-management. By and large, selfmanaged enterprises have acted with maturity and a notable response to the needs of society. This experience can now be harnessed to find the correct relationship between the processes of integration at work in the economy, and workers' self-management.44 Research has already shown a marked trend in this direction and that
"not rarely has it been proved that it is easier for representatives of the self-managed bodies of the economic organizations interested in integration than for certain chiefs and managers to find a common language in direct contacts. The working collectives almost always solve successfully the major and complex problems-the determination of production programmes, the formation and implementation of investment policy, surplus manpower, the coordination of interests of individual parts of the enterprise, the regulation of the relations between self-management bodies and the executive bodies arising as a consequence of the formation of a larger integrational economic organization."
The Jugoslav system is poised on the threshold of a new orientation. Objective processes in the economy favour concentration on improvement in self-management in large enterprises, but with the retention of price control. Developments in planning techniques favour streamlined democratically determined plans. Political changes reinforce these possibilities following the re-organization of the League of Communists in 1961 and again in 1964. These changes concentrated activity in autonomous production units within the larger units of industry and also reduce the dominance of Communists in political elections at the commune, federal and Republican level, thereby ensuring, through the provisions of the 1963 Constitution on rotation and recall in all political bodies, the possibility of more democratic decisions about planning and the economy.
The time may be near when the smokescreen of "market Socialism" and the worship of price-mechanisms will be dropped. The "fetishism of commodities" could increasingly be replaced by a self-managed economy and the democratization of the planning process. The period of market socialism would then be seen as a transitional period in which the decentralized market economy was a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for a non-bureaucratic Socialist economy.
Theoretical Implications and Assessment
If the above analysis is correct, how can the Chinese and Sweezy- Huberman critiques be assessed? The crucial questions concerning the Chinese position undoubtedly centre on the issue of whether there has been a capitalist restoration, or not.
A system of competition between socialized and self-managed enterprises cannot be fairly described as "capitalism" even where economic fluctuations and the development of a profit ethos have emerged. It could only be so described if private property was dominant and increasing, and there existed a clearly class-divided society which determined the structure of demand as well as a capitalist group which controlled the state, the government and the economic life. The U.S.S.R. had its New Economic Policy (was it really capitalism?); in Poland 85 per cent of agriculture is held by small private peasantsis it a capitalist economy? Until 1960 China itself boasted of the number of millionaires that were "helping the government", and since 1961 has introduced a very substantial market element into the output distribution of agricultural products.
On a number of minor issues the Chinese critics make valuable points. There is certainly a danger in the Western penetration of the Jugoslav economy through joint-production and marketing arrangements with West European firms, if this were allowed to develop in the importance of agriculture, not enough has been done to reduce the size of the private sector and to increase the importance of state and collective units. Both these charges are also true of Poland and Rumania, without the need to describe them as "capitalist". The Chinese mistake the inevitable distortions of a market system in the period of transition with a capitalist restoration. Above all, the Chinese seriously underestimate the socialist revolutionary content of the fifteen years of self-management and the continuing impact of the nationally inspired and successful socialist revolution of 1941-45.
Sweezy and Huberman on their side undoubtedly highlight a serious dilemma in present Jugoslav society. In an attempt to avoid bureaucratic control of society by a rejection of central planning and the choice of a market system, the Jugoslavs have experienced the logic of that situation: a growth of inequality between enterprises and individuals, a profit ethos which extends even to differential payments of social services according to the contributions of the individual. There is also something of an obsession with personal problems and an excessive promotion of material incentives. Yet what was the alternative after 1950? Do Sweezy and Huberman really believe that a society can be indefinitely run on the principles of permanent political excitement? Do they really believe better results would have been achieved by a system of obedience plus slogans rather than by the practical involvement of huge numbers of people in the administration of economic affairs coupled with productivity devices to increase the returns to workers' collectives? At no stage in Jugoslavia have "material incentives" as an operational principle in influencing income distribution matched the anti-egalitarian and piece-work methods adopted by the Soviet Union during its "transition period". Implicit in Sweezy's approach is an assumed purity of Soviet experience which is quite unreal (but which is nevertheless contrasted with Jugoslavia), and an equally unreal "all or nothing" approach which assumes an ideal that is believed to be attainable: in fact, as Lange has pointed out, all Socialist systems have so far been incomplete, even underdeveloped.
What we have seen in Jugoslavia is an excessive use of the market as a regulator of social and economic life in a period of transition. In these years the Jugoslav system emerged as an alternative model to hyper-centralism without a surrender to capitalism. The various changes in fiscal and monetary measures, and the various ways of allocating incomes were seen as means of raising productivity, not as ends in themselves. The speed and incidence with which these measures have been changed surely demonstrates that what is involved here is a re-assessment of some established Marxist dogmas rooted in the 1930's.
It has long been an article of faith with many Marxists that the early phases of the development of a Socialist economy must follow a certain broad pattern. This pattern, in the words of the Polish economist, Oscar Lange, resembles that of the "war economy". It is argued that when the productive forces of a Socialist country are underdeveloped, political and economic centralism is necessary. Rationing of scarce resources, fixed prices and controls as instruments of State policy form a centralist model akin to war-time planning in the capitalist countries. Such an economy is seen, not as a political aberration, but as an "historical necessity". The necessity for centralism then diminishes as the economy becomes more mature, more developed. In the end, the complexity of the economy, the large number of enterprises make centralism cumbersome, and freedom for Socialist enterprises with respect to trading and investment, becomes not only possible but desirable.
Jugoslav experience has, to a large extent, turned this argument on its head. It is market Socialism which is suited to the transition period as a way of getting to a society of relative abundance. As argued above, the principle of needs may fit in well with a highly developed, self-managed economy acting withn a highly elaborate central plan. Optimal solutions do not wait on the society of abundance, they are a means of getting to it and are thus more urgent and more relevant to the transition period. Naturally, even during the transition period it is important to guard against the impact of the market in disrupting solidarity and perverting self-management from a system which looks outwards tothe needs of other regions and other sections of society, to one which looks inward to an ownership relationship. Doubtless, in Jugoslavia vigilance has often been lacking. This does not however, justify a description of the Jugoslav experience as a "kind of corporate capitalism" moving towards the "French variety", with which it has very little in common. If planning itself is further democratized, its resemblance to French planning will diminish to zero. Ultimately, the alienation and the anti-Socialist ideology which emerge from commodity-fetishism need to be destroyed.
Whether the Jugoslavs could have been expected to do this completely by now is doubtful in the context of the urgent need to increase total production. At the present time, more could be done in this direction by less emphasis on "self-investment" in enterprises and price mechanisms and more on a politically free determination of planning goals and the wider use of price and other controls in the social interest. The success of this development will depend heavily on the role of internal forces; it may require changes of leading personnel as well as of attitudes. There are still many who extol the market as an alternative to democratized planning. Typical of this is the attitude recently expressed by a leading economist: "the new relationships based on self-management presuppose the separation of the functions of planning, from the functions of direct management".
If, however, the market is greatly diminished in importance by integration and planometric techniques, it will be possible to develop workers' control, self-management and democratized planning, not merely as parts of an economic system, but as a political structure which determines the priorities and policies to be considered in planning.
The sine qua non of this development is a greater competition between rival policies, and an even higher political consciousness by the councils of workers in determining national goals as well as local ones. The recent 8th Congress of the League of Communists in November, 1964 was highly encouraging in this respect. To sum up: the system of workers' self-management operating in a small country with a tradition of collectivism in the village and the experience of self-management in the liberated areas during the war is a success. Jugoslavia is a Socialist country. But the market system does represent a danger to Jugoslav Socialism unless the logic of commodity fetishism is vigorously combated in politics and ideology. The possibilities of expanding self-management while at the same time reducing the dependence on the market are increasing: and the clash of conflicting tendencies within the Jugoslav economy needs to be carefully examined and analysed by Socialists everywhere.
Originally published in Socialist Register Vol.3, 1966.
Repreinted from http://socialistregister.com
Εργατικός Έλεγχος υπό τον Κρατικό Σοσιαλισμό, Bruce McFarlane, Βιομηχανική Δημοκρατία, Κρατικές Επιχειρήσεις, Εργατικός Έλεγχος, Πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβία, ΕυρώπηTopicΝαιΝαιNoΌχι -
French25/09/15
Un documentaire sur une entreprise récupérée à Rome.
Un film de Dario Azzellini et Oliver Ressler.
33 minutes, 2015Officine Zero, Rome, Italie
Officine Zero, anciennement RSI (Rail Service Italia), s’occupait de la maintenance et de la réparation des wagons-lits. Lorsqu’en décembre 2011, il a été décidé d’arrêter les trains de nuit au profit des trains à grande vitesse, RSI a fermé. Quelques 20 travailleurs, sur les 60 employés, n’ont pas accepté cette fermeture et se sont mis en lutte. Ils ont alors trouvé un soutien parmi les participants du centre social voisin « Strike ». En février 2012, ils ont occupé les locaux. Ensemble, ils ont créé un atelier de reconversion, organisant des assemblées publiques auxquelles des centaines de personnes ont participé. L’idée « folle » de l’Officine Zero était née. Des travailleurs précaires, des indépendants, des artisans, des professionnels et des étudiants ont participé à cette occupation. La conjonction entre anciennes et nouvelles formes de travail, regroupant plusieurs situations de travail précaire, essayant de dépasser l’isolement et l’individualisation est une caractéristique essentielle du projet.
Le 2 juin 2013, Officine Zero était officiellement créé en tant qu’usine éco-sociale. Officine Zero signifie Atelier Zero : « zéro patrons, zéro exploitation, zéro pollution » comme le disait leur nouveau slogan. Ce nom signifiait aussi qu’ils devaient trouver un nouveau départ. « C’était l’idée de créer un lieu de travail sans patron » explique ainsi dans le film Miriam Freschi qui est venu à Officine Zero à partir du Centre social, « l’idée de réutiliser et recycler n’est pas une nouvelle façon de travailler mais aussi le moyen d’inventer un nouveau système. »
Dans une demi douzaine d’ateliers de menuiserie, capitonnage, métallurgie ou de réparation, les travailleurs d’Officine Zero recyclent des appareils ménagers, des ordinateurs et des meubles. Le projet est de convertir l’atelier de réparation des wagons-lits en centre industriel de recyclage et de rénovation. Officine Zero est géré horizontalement par tous les travailleurs, à partir de chaque atelier et avec les travailleurs précaires qui partagent un étage de bureaux dans l’ancien bâtiment administratif. L’ancien travailleur de RSI et responsable de l’atelier de capitonnage Giuseppe “Peppe” Terrasi souligne les procédures démocratiques de prises de décision : « Nous les prenons en assemblées, en assemblées dans lesquelles nous participons tous et pas des assemblées fermées où certaines personnes savent ce qu’il se passe alors que d’autres non. » Le métallurgiste Guido Abballe, responsable de l’atelier de soudure exprime clairement qu’Officine Zero n’est pas seulement là pour défendre un lieu de travail : « La raison pour laquelle nous sommes là, que nous progressons, avec certes beaucoup de difficultés, est que l’on essaye de construire un nouveau système, une nouvelle voie. »
“Occuper, résister, produire : Officine Zero” suit les activités des travailleurs, les discussions et initiatives pour retrouver du travail, des revenus et de la dignité en construisant un lieu de travail démocratique et autogéré.
Après “Occuper, résister, produire : RiMaflow” (34 min., 2014) the film “Occuper, résister, produire : Officine Zero” est le second d’une série de court-métrages sur les occupations de lieu de travail et de production sous contrôle ouvrier en Europe.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=1&v=WiU6pCKj2MQ
Producteur et réalisateur : Dario Azzellini et Oliver Ressler
Prises de vue : Thomas Parb et Bernhard Mayr
Perchiste : Roberto Polenta, Oliver Ressler
Montage : Dario Azzellini et Oliver Ressler
Conception sonore, bande-son et corrections des couleurs : Rudolf Gottsberger
Remerciements à Alioscia Castronuovo, Elisa Gigliarelli, Francesco Raparelli et Marina Sitrin
Ce projet a été partiellement financé par le Fonds autrichien des sciences (FWF) AR 183-G21.
Co-production: Neuer Berliner Kunstverein (n.b.k.)
Nos remerciements pour le soutien de l’Université Johannes Kepler de Linz, AustricheOccuper, résister, produire : Officine Zero
Un film de Dario Azzellini et Oliver Ressler.
33 minutes, 2015
https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=1&v=WiU6pCKj2MQAssociation Autogestion
25 septembre 2015
http://www.autogestion.asso.fr/?p=5390Ταινίες & Πολυμέσα, Dario Azzellini, Officine Zero, Oliver Ressler, Ανακτημένες Επιχειρήσεις, Κοινωνικά Ωφέλιμη Παραγωγή, Εργατική Αυτοδιαχείριση, 21ος αιώνας – Εργατικός Έλεγχος στη Σύγχρονη Εποχή, Ιταλία, ΕυρώπηExperienceshttps://www.youtube.com/embed/WiU6pCKj2MQΝαιΝαιNoΌχι -
Portuguese, Portugal21/09/15Amuay, Punto Fijo, Estado Falcón, República Bolivariana da Venezuela. 22 a 25 de julho de 2015.
O V Encontro Internacional “A Economia dos Trabalhadores e Trabalhadoras” contou com a participação de cerca de 300 trabalhadores, militantes e pesquisadores de 12 países no Complexo Cultural “Alejo Díaz”, localizado em Amuay, Los Teques, na península de Paraguaná, no Estado Falcón, na Venezuela, em quatro dias de intensos e frutíferos debates entre os dias 22 e 25 de julho.
A participação de trabalhadores e trabalhadoras de empresas recuperadas de vários países, de cooperativas de trabalhadores de distintas atividades produtivas, de serviço e consumo, de conselhos de trabalhadores, de comunas e de uma diversidade de organizações e instituições relacionadas com o que chamamos a economia dos trabalhadores caracterizou o Encontro, marcado também por posicionar-se no apoio e em solidariedade ao processo revolucionário bolivariano, submetido a uma permanente agressão e perseguição pela direita política e econômica local e pela política imperialista em nível internacional. Nesse sentido, em sua plenária final, o Encontro pronunciou-se em solidariedade à luta do povo e ao processo revolucionário bolivariano, e também emitiu declarações em solidariedade ao povo grego e à sua rede de saúde autogestionária, ao povo mexicano e contra a agressão do Estado às suas organizações populares e sindicais, como os docentes da CNTE 22, à resistência curda em Rojava e à manutenção do jornal autogestionário italiano Il Manifesto.
Durante o Encontro, ocorreram mesas de debate plenárias, mesas especiais e mesas de trabalho sobre os distintos eixos temáticos da convocatória, nas quais se apresentaram 78 expositores de diferentes países e organizações. Previamente, no dia 21, realizou-se um ato de abertura do Encontro no Teatro La Alameda, em Caracas, que também se constituiu como um ato de solidariedade internacional e apoio ao processo bolivariano. Também foram realizadas visitas às fábricas socialistas VTELCA e VIT, na Zona Franca Industrial Donato Carmona, cujos trabalhadores tiveram a iniciativa de apresentar a proposta de organizar este Encontro na Venezuela durante o IV Encontro Internacional realizado em julho de 2013, em João Pessoa, no Brasil. No sábado, dia 25, os participantes distribuíram-se em três comissões de trabalho (programática, de coordenação de lutas e de coordenação econômica) e depois expuseram suas conclusões na plenária final, onde também apresentaram propostas para a continuidade dos encontros, tanto regionais como o VI Internacional, que voltará a se realizar na Argentina, em local a ser determinado, em 2017, quando se completará dez anos do primeiro encontro realizado na Universidade de Buenos Aires.
Participantes e mesas de debate:
Este V Encontro contou com a participação de trabalhadores e delegados de mais de 90 organizações e instituições de países da América Latina e Caribe, América do Norte, Europa e África. Entre estes, estavam participantes da Venezuela, Argentina, Uruguai, Chile, Brasil, Colômbia, México, Estados Unidos, Espanha, Itália, França e África do Sul. Por conta das dificuldades que a agressão econômica à Venezuela causa às comunicações aéreas, representantes do Canadá, Turquia, México e Áustria não conseguiram chegar ao Encontro. Cabe destacar a diversidade das organizações participantes, representando distintas realidades da luta da classe trabalhadora pela gestão direta da economia e outras experiências de organização e poder popular, que no contexto venezuelano expressam-se tanto no local de trabalho, através dos conselhos de trabalhadores, como no território, através dos conselhos comunais, com plena incidência sobre a organização e o controle da economia. Por sua parte, a delegação internacional esteve representada majoritariamente por empresas recuperadas e outras expressões de autogestão e cooperativismo de trabalho. Também houve a participação de setores universitários de distintos países, que mantêm trabalhos comprometidos com o desenvolvimento da organização dos trabalhadores, como é a característica dos encontros desde seu início.
O Encontro contou com mesas expositivas e de trabalho organizadas em torno dos eixos propostos na convocatória. Nesse sentido, houve quatro mesas plenárias e 14 mesas de trabalho, que funcionaram de forma simultânea ao longo das jornadas de debate. As mesas plenárias tiveram como temas: “Crise do capitalismo global e latino-americano: análises e respostas a partir da economia dos e das trabalhadoras”; “A luta da classe trabalhadora na Venezuela”; “Experiências internacionais de autogestão do trabalho”; e “Trabalho precário, informal e servil: exclusão social ou reformulação das formas de trabalho no capitalismo global?” e contaram com a participação de expositores da Venezuela, Colômbia, Argentina, México, Itália, Estados Unidos, Uruguai, França e África do Sul.
Além das mesas, todos os dias ocorreram também apresentações de grupos culturais de relevo, propostos pelos organizadores locais, os quais desenvolveram um enorme trabalho de logística, garantindo o alojamento e a comida aos participantes durante os quatro dias do Encontro, acolhendo com enorme companheirismo e solidariedade a todas as delegações.
Também foram apresentados os documentários “El barquito de papel”, de Sergio Stocchero, que narra a recuperação do Diário del Centro del País, da cidade de Villa María, na província argentina de Córdoba, e dois episódios da série Redes de Trabajo y Autogestión, do grupo Alavío da Argentina, dirigida por Fabián Pierucci, sobre experiências de autogestão e recuperação de empresas neste país (sobre as empresas recuperadas La Casona e Molino Osiris).
Além disso, foi apresentada a Biblioteca “Economía de los Trabajadores”, coleção de livros especializados, que incluem trabalhos de encontros anteriores e livros diretamente relacionados com os eixos temáticos debatidos no evento.
(Anexamos ao final uma lista das organizações participantes).
Trabalho em comissões:
No dia 25 de julho, data de encerramento do Encontro, foram realizadas três comissões, que produziram um balanço geral e trataram das linhas de trabalho a serem seguidas posteriormente ao encontro. Estas comissões se dividiram em: programática, de coordenação de lutas e de coordenação econômica.
Comissão programática:
Essa comissão desenvolveu o debate sobre a importância da continuidade, não apenas dos encontros como instâncias a serem realizadas a cada dois anos (os internacionais e, nos anos intermediários, os regionais), como também da necessidade de se estabelecer mecanismos permanentes de coordenação, que assegurem o vínculo entre as organizações que os compõem, e que avancem no debate de uma visão comum dos problemas tratados nos eixos do encontro, respeitando e tendo em conta a enorme diversidade e heterogeneidade tanto de situações e contextos nacionais e regionais, como de perspectivas, de setores sociais e de tradições de uma quantidade crescente de países e organizações que têm se incorporado à construção do Encontro “A Economia dos Trabalhadores e Trabalhadoras”. Nesse sentido, tais objetivos coincidem com a necessidade da criação de mecanismos permanentes de articulação, com a ampliação e regularização da comunicação do comitê internacional, a realização de ações e manifestações de solidariedade internacional e a criação de plataformas de acesso e difusão da informação, dos trabalhos e dos debates dos encontros e da rede que o sustenta.
Esta articulação deve ser planejada tanto em termos nacionais ou regionais como internacionais, contribuindo para o desenvolvimento de elementos de formação, debate teórico, intercâmbio de experiências e práticas, coordenação efetiva de ações de solidariedade e intercâmbio, geração de uma base de comunicação, informação e pesquisa, contribuindo para gerar um desenvolvimento programático comum, tendo em conta as diferenças já apontadas de contextos e trajetórias.
Para se ter uma base nesse sentido, o comitê internacional ficou encarregado de realizar uma síntese detalhada dos debates e linhas de trabalho do encontro.
Também foi proposto o convite para os próximos encontros de organizações de trabalhadores rurais, por ser um setor que não pode estar ausente dos problemas abordados no encontro, dado o seu papel chave na disputa econômica e a sua importância qualitativa e quantitativa como trabalhadores do setor primário. Também foi proposto destacar na programação dos próximos encontros as questões de gênero e de meio ambiente na construção de una economia dos trabalhadores e trabalhadoras.
Por sua vez, a comissão aprovou quatro declarações de solidariedade: com o processo revolucionário bolivariano e contra a agressão imperial à Venezuela; com a rede de saúde autogestionária e o povo grego; com a luta do povo curdo em Rojava e o seu desenvolvimento autogestionário e resistência; e pela continuidade do histórico jornal autogestionário italiano Il Manifesto.
Por último, foi proposta na plenária final a ampliação do comitê organizador internacional, incluindo a todas as organizações participantes das distintas edições do Encontro, especialmente o comitê organizador local e as organizações convocatórias do encontro da Venezuela.
Comissão de coordenação de lutas:
Esta comissão pronunciou-se também pela importância de manter uma fluida comunicação e difusão das atividades da rede do Encontro, para a qual destacou a relevância de “apropriar-nos das novas tecnologias de comunicação”, propondo distintos meios de aproveitamento destes mecanismos, incluindo uma página web, com espaço para as lutas de cada país (foram propostos representantes de cada país para a sua implementação), incluindo também seções de formação e capacitação para a economia dos trabalhadores por país; e debates e documentos para a formação política. Também foi proposta a formação de um registro das entidades produtivas, comunas, empresas recuperadas dos países onde ainda não exista essa informação, integrando pesquisadores e estudantes a este processo com base nas experiências já desenvolvidas neste sentido; a reunião e articulação de projetos econômicos e coletivos autogestionários (para a qual os encontros regionais são um âmbito adequado); a elaboração de um comunicado do Encontro para ser levado à reunião da ALBA Trabajadores (bloco de trabalhadores da Aliança Bolivariana para os Povos da nossa América). Por último, a criação de uma rede ativa de solidariedade com os trabalhadores e o processo bolivariano.
Comissão de coordenação econômica:
Esta comissão discutiu os seguintes pontos:1) Partindo do princípio de complementariedade dos povos, gerar um sistema econômico alternativo, para o qual se propõe: a) intercâmbio de produção entre experiências da economia dos trabalhadores, com ênfase no tema da alimentação e com o objetivo de fortalecer a articulação em nível internacional (para isto há uma proposta concreta da cooperativa Textiles Pigüé da Argentina de iniciar um processo de complementariedade em têxteis de algodão com trabalhadores da região de Amuay); b) levantar experiências prévias para desenvolver um banco de saberes e de recursos técnicos, para seu intercâmbio internacional e a transferência de saberes, revalorizando o conhecimento dos trabalhadores (para formação técnica, laboral, em autogestão, em idiomas, através de estágios, cursos, intercâmbio com as universidades, etc.).
2) Criar um observatório internacional que forme um catálogo digital de experiências da economia dos trabalhadores em nível internacional.
3) Criar um fundo cooperativo de crédito (um fundo de poupança coletiva) e para isto formar um comitê organizador de tal fundo.
Plenária final:
A plenária final reuniu as três comissões, cujas conclusões foram aprovadas pelo conjunto dos participantes e algumas delas sintetizadas em uma mesma proposta. Em relação à circulação da informação e de documentos gerados nos encontros e, posteriormente, no âmbito desta rede, tratou-se do uso e da criação de ferramentas digitais a partir dos meios de comunicação autogestionários presentes. Também do uso das ferramentas já existentes, como os sítios de internet criados para o V Encontro e os anteriores, a página web do programa Facultad Abierta e o sítio workerscontrol.net., buscando desenvolver os elementos propostos nas comissões.
Também foram aprovadas as quatro declarações de solidariedade propostas e a conformação de um único comitê organizador internacional, integrando aos comitês locais que organizaram o V Encontro.
Foi reconhecido enfaticamente o enorme trabalho de organização do comitê local de Punto Fijo, do comitê de apoio nacional e do comitê organizador internacional para tornar possível a realização deste Encontro.
Por último, discutiu-se sobre as diferentes propostas para a realização dos próximos encontros regionais e o VI Encontro, em 2017.
Em relação aos encontros regionais, o II Encontro Regional da América do Norte, Central e Caribe se realizará na Cidade do México nos dias 6,7 e 8 de novembro de 2016. O II Encontro europeu se realizará em local a ser definido e data a ser confirmada no outono europeu de 2016. Para o II Encontro Sul-americano há duas propostas: a primeira, que seja realizado no Barquisimeto, estado de Lara, na Venezuela, sendo esta a proposta da Comuna Pío Tamayo; e a outra, no Uruguai, a cargo da ANERT. Ambas as propostas deverão ser avaliadas em função das possibilidades reais de organização.
Além disso, mencionou-se a proposta que chegou da Austrália da realização neste país de um encontro regional da Ásia Pacífico e Oceania.
Em relação ao VI Encontro, na plenária final, a proposta foi voltar a organizá-lo na Argentina, por completar-se dez anos do Primeiro Encontro em Buenos Aires, em 2007. Há várias possibilidades de sede, que deverá ser confirmada quando se tenha a definição clara de sua realização. Posteriormente, por fora do Encontro, porém a cargo de participantes de edições anteriores, também surgiu uma proposta de organizar o VI ou o VII Encontro no Brasil, no estado de São Paulo.
Desta maneira, encerrou-se o V Encontro Internacional “A Economia dos Trabalhadores e Trabalhadoras”, em Amuay, no Estado Falcón, na República Bolivariana da Venezuela.Tradução para o português: Vanessa Moreira Sígolo
O V Encontro Internacional “A Economia dos Trabalhadores e Trabalhadoras” contou com a participação de cerca de 300 trabalhadores, militantes e pesquisadores de 12 países no Complexo Cultural “Alejo Díaz”, localizado em Amuay, Los Teques, na península de Paraguaná, no Estado Falcón, na Venezuela, em quatro dias de intensos e frutíferos debates entre os dias 22 e 25 de julho.
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Spanish18/09/15Les deben sueldos, aguinaldos, vacaciones y sufrieron despidos masivos: unos 60 trabajadores de la empresa Petinari, en Merlo, ocupan la planta que fue vaciada por sus dueños. lavaca.org
Raúl Richieri no dudó un instante.
Pensó en sus 59 años.
Pensó en los 9 que lleva en la metalúrgica Pedro Petinari e Hijos.
Pensó en la bronca de los 6 que le quedaban por jubilarse.
Pensó en las máquinas detenidas desde febrero.
Pensó en el sueldo impago.
Pensó en el aguinaldo impago.
Pensó en las vacaciones impagas.
Pensó en su cintura.
Pensó en sus várices.
Pensó en sus hernias.
Pensó en quién mierda lo iba a contratar.
Pensó en la plata que le costaba mantener el auto.
Pensó en el auto.
Pensó en sus hijas.
Pensó en sus compañeros.Por eso, cuando a Raúl Richieri lo llamaron de la remisería para preguntarle si iba a seguir, no dudó un instante: la sucesión de imágenes operó en menos de un segundo en su cabeza.
-No -dijo, y colgó.
Raúl Richieri lo cuenta dentro de una carpa que soporta impasible la furiosa lluvia que cae sobre la mañana del jueves en vastos sectores del Gran Buenos Aires, pero que en Merlo, municipio al oeste del conurbano bonaerense, a 10 minutos de la estación del ferrocarril Sarmiento, y dentro de una fábrica tomada por 60 trabajadores, cobra una sensación particular.
“¿Sabés qué pasa?”, dice Richieri, que es entrerriano, trabajó en el campo, trabajó en la ciudad, trabajó toda su vida, se hizo la casa en Moreno, tiene tres hijas. “Pasa que para estas empresas somos un número nada más. No somos gente. A esta edad hay cosas que no puedo hacer más. Cuando me quedé sin trabajo acá, conseguí también entrar tierra en una casilla en carretilla. Una changa. Llegué un punto en que no di más. La cintura. No podía agacharme. Me tiré al pasto. Después de los 30 años uno es viejo para el sistema laboral. No consigo más nada. No te toman”.
Raúl Richieri cuenta que un dicho provincial es que los entrerrianos tienen 1000 oficios y 999 necesidades porque se meten en todo.
Raúl Richieri se metió en una toma.
El alzamientoDesde el colectivo que parte de la estación de ferrocarril de Merlo y se interna en la ruta 200 hasta Marcos Paz, se divisa un tanque de agua altísimo con una bandera con el dibujo de un camión con semirremolque que está descargando. “Trabajadores en cooperativa”, dice y recibe. Debajo, un portón semiabierto con inscripciones en rojo contra los exgerentes y patrones de Pedro Petinari e Hijos -la metalúrgica que hace más de 50 años diseña, produce y comercializa acoplados y semirremolques para transportes de cargas- es lo que separa la ruta infinita de una fábrica infinita.
Petinari es gigante. Una visión apresurada arroja un cálculo erróneo: casi dos cuadras desde el portón hasta el último galpón que se divisa. Los trabajadores dicen que es más: 400 metros. En la página web, donde la gerencia hizo su descargo contra “un grupo de ex operarios” que obtuvieron “oscuros respaldos políticos y turbios patrocinios legales” para “alzarse” con una cooperativa, especifica que el predio es de 15 hectáreas y cubre 33 mil metros cuadrados.
Las persianas semibajas o cerradas, las máquinas paradas, los vehículos sin batería. El silencio más ensordecedor para un trabajador es cortado por el choque de las escobas contra el suelo. Los trabajadores se turnan para limpiar y dejar todo en perfecto estado para cuando sea la hora de reactivar la maquinaria silenciada desde febrero, cuando comenzó el paro, cuando comenzó todo.
Cuando comenzó un sueño.
Un fiscal, un comisario, una disculpaMetros antes de la entrada al primer galpón (que es enorme, como todo en esta fábrica) está la carpa, el punto de encuentro de la toma. Hay bidones de agua, pan, yerba, bolsas de papas, una TV pequeña, aceite, una pava eléctrica que sostienen con una maderita porque -si no- no prende, termos, detergentes, mazos de cartas. Camperas, mochilas y cascos de moto cuelgan de los ganchos del toldo. Los rostros son de cansancio, de alerta, de dudas, de decisión. Sobre la mesa circulan actas, firmas, documentos, carpetas, preguntas, cigarrillos, nervios.
De fondo, la tele encendida muestra los spots de los candidatos para las PASO.
Una pregunta en el cuaderno congela esa foto: “¿Cuál es la verdadera política?”.
En medio de todo el tramiterío que los más de 60 trabajadores de Petinari están iniciando para constituirse legalmente como una cooperativa de trabajo, el obrero Luis Becerra (32 años, 9 en la fábrica, dos hijos, tatuaje en el brazo derecho) tiene la delicadeza de pedir perdón por retrasar la entrevista. Horas antes cayó el comisario Obregón, de la Comisaría 1° de Merlo, y el fiscal que instruye la causa por usurpación que los patrones iniciaron contra los trabajadores. Se mostraron receptivos, amables, hicieron chistes, y explicaron que debían constatar por protocolo que los que estuvieran en la fábrica fueran efectivamente trabajadores. Sacaron fotos, y dijeron que tenían que hacerlo para comprobar que las máquinas estuvieran en buen estado.
En medio de todo este nuevo universo, Luis Becerra se disculpa por retrasar la entrevista. Con vergüenza, le decimos que por favor.
El teatro de SMATACuando se pregunta hasta dónde se remontarían para explicar el presente de la futura cooperativa, el primero que responde es Hernán Noir, 31 años, con 10 en la empresa: “La lucha fue desde el primer día que entramos acá. Porque lo cotidiano de la empresa era un maltrato hacia el trabajador. El cuento arrancó en 2012 con un paro arreglado entre la empresa y el sindicato (SMATA) para que pudieran cobrar unos bonos del gobierno. Se nos pagó los 47 días del paro, del primero hasta el último. Se nos puso a Giorgi (Débora, ministra de Industrias), a Tomada (Carlos, ministro de Trabajo), a todo el mundo, y después el SMATA presentó gente para gerenciar la empresa. De a poquito la fueron tirando abajo. La idea era hacer un cierre fraudulento”.
Eran aproximadamente 330 trabajadores. Hoy son 60, y se extiende a 100 los que podrían formar parte de la cooperativa (advierten que, incluso, el número puede seguir aumentando). Los reclamos eran parecidos a los de este año: falta de pago de quincenas y vacaciones. Noir: “En diciembre de 2012 hubo retiros voluntarios. Muchos no querían arreglar porque no eran al cien por ciento y, después, despidieron a 24 personas. A partir de ahí, hubo retiros voluntarios o despidos semanales o quincenales. Capaz llegabas un lunes y a cinco personas le decían que estaban despedidas, arreglaban y se iban con la indemnización”.
Luis Becerra: “La empresa arreglaba con el sindicato. Los hacían elegir a quién despedir. Nos empezó a llamar la atención: el sindicato siempre nos apoyaba, pero de un día para el otro se cortó”.
Noir: “A mediados de junio del año pasado vino Gustavo Morán, secretario gremial de SMATA. Armó literalmente un teatro: puso 200 sillas en el sector de tornería, se sentó el gerente de la empresa, Ricardo Grégori, y dijeron que pensemos en la posibilidad de estar suspendidos dos días por semana sin goce de sueldo. Nosotros elegíamos qué días”.
Alberto Daniel Gimenez, 58 años, 19 en Petinari, armado de piso, ironiza: “Ese es el que nos defiende a nosotros”.
Noir: “Días después se nos comunicó qué días no teníamos que ir a trabajar. ¿No era que teníamos que elegir nosotros? Hubo problemas con el aguinaldo, que las cuotas, que sí, que no, que nos suspendían 30 días hábiles sin goce de sueldo, que cada uno a su casa, y terminó saliendo un acuerdo de estar suspendido una vez a la semana durante 5 meses. De julio a diciembre. El aguinaldo nunca lo cobramos. El cuento del sindicato era que la empresa no se iba a aguantar otra vez dos meses de paro. ¿Hasta cuándo vamos a estar así?, nos preguntamos. La empresa seguía laburando. Pasó que en la segunda quincena de enero cobramos por la mitad. Y ahí se decidió el paro. Ya no había plata para vacaciones ni nada. Desde el 5 de febrero acá estamos. Estuvimos 20 días adentro y el 25 de febrero se salió a la calle. Y desde ahí, estuvimos literalmente en la calle. Hasta el lunes. Nos desalojaron en marzo. Nos cortaron la obra social. Muchos compañeros quedaron sin cobertura. Nos sacudieron por donde quisieron. Y acá estamos. Firmes”.
El cambio¿Cómo se sostiene estar tantos meses en la ruta? ¿Cómo se soporta esa violencia? Walter Romero, 48 años, 12 en la empresa, hincha de River (exhibe orgulloso su camiseta frente a la flamante Libertadores): “Gracias a la solidaridad de la gente. Pusimos la olla en la ruta y la gente colaboraba de un peso, de a dos, de a cien. Algunos dejaban, sí. Y al fin del día se junta y los compañeros que están se llevan para la comida a la casa. Es la única forma en la que estamos subsistiendo. Muchos están haciendo changas. Pero los que no estamos trabajando, nos arreglamos con eso. Camioneros, colectivos. Los de Ecotrans nos nos cobran boletos: nos hacen viajar gratis”.
Miguel Ángel Colazo, 48 años, 6 en la empresa, reparaciones: “Mi señora trabaja. La estamos peleando. Sale una changa y la hago”.
¿Y el sostén personal, interno, por dónde pasa?
Gimenez: “Si bajás los brazos acá, fuiste”.
Romero: “A mí mi señora me manda a buscar trabajo todos los días. Soy sincero y lo digo. Pero mi meta está acá, porque no quiero abandonar el barco. Hace 12 años que estoy y no se los quiero regalar. Entonces le doy para adelante y me peleo con mi señora. Mis hijos me bancan porque trabajan. Tengo 8 hijos. Una hija con diabetes. Y estábamos con este tema de la obra social que nos dejó de lado. Muchos están con esos problemas, porque tienen hijos, nietos. Son cosas que uno está viviendo hoy y nunca vivió. Yo me voy de casa, pelea; llego, pelea. La voy llevando así. Nunca te pasó por la cabeza vivir esto. A mis compañeros no los voy a abandonar”.
Jorge Gutiérrez, futuro presidente de la cooperativa: “La lucha es por los compañeros. Hay mucha gente grande. ¿Dónde consigue hoy? La idea es mantener la fuente de trabajo. Cada paso es un logro y ojalá siga así. Sin darnos cuenta tomamos la cooperativa solos. Sin darnos cuenta, estamos donde llegamos, con 60 tipos que dijeron ‘vamos a entrar’, y entramos”.
Luis Becerra: “Nos cayó la ficha. Nosotros estábamos esperando que caiga un papel o que llegaran 300 tipos, y cuando entramos, caímos. Fue un paso enorme. Porque acá adentro, sinceramente, nunca hubo organización. No hay militancia, con el sindicato nos arreglábamos a las patadas, la sobrellevábamos. Fijate: te proponían suspender dos días, pero estábamos todos juntos y seguíamos laburando. Hasta se aceptó la propuesta de pago de cuotas de los aguinaldos. Pero antes de que empezaran las clases, los compañeros no tenían con qué mandar a sus hijos a la escuela. Es muy doloroso, pero nos tuvo que pasar esto para empezar a organizarnos de otra manera. Y encima lo estamos haciendo solos. A las patadas, pero nos están saliendo bien”.Becerra reflexiona: “Cada día, además, se va notando un cambio entre nosotros. Nos cuidamos. Éramos todos compañeros, sí, pero ahora la palabra compañero va tomando de a poco otro valor. Te das cuenta que si tiramos todos para el mismo lado, vamos bien. Se van a conseguir resultados. Antes pensábamos: cobro la plata y chau. Hoy empezamos a pensar en los compañeros. Mi señora es docente. Tiene la madre enferma: cáncer. Es complicado todo. Y nos tenemos que poner fuertes, porque si nos ponemos débiles, algunos se bajan. Tenemos montones de presiones, y capaz uno se encierra en su casa para descargar. ¿Nos está costando un montón? Sí, olvidate. Pero es lo que día a día nos mantiene más unidos: saber que estamos tratando de organizarnos y hacer las cosas bien. Escucho a los compañeros: hoy tienen otra actitud, y son los primeros que se ofrecen para darte una mano. Todos cometimos errores, pero día a día nos vamos convirtiendo en mejores personas”.
Una experiencia hermosaJorge Gutiérrez explica que la maquinaria legal está en marcha. Los trabajadores de Textiles Pigüé -ex Gatic, empresa recuperada transformada en cooperativa que obtuvo la expropiación- estuvieron en la toma y los asesoraron. El proyecto de expropiación ya fue presentado por el diputado Miguel Funes (FpV) en la legislatura bonaerense. De todas maneras, desde el lunes hay una guardia permanente mañana, tarde y noche por parte de los trabajadores para estar alertas ante cualquier amague de desalojo.
Becerra no habla de colores ni banderas políticas: “Cuando esto triunfe, pintamos la fábrica de todos los colores. Primero, que ayuden. No nos ofrezcan abogados si mis compañeros están pidiendo monedas. La prioridad es que tengan para comer y no se caguen de frío acá adentro”.
Daniel Alberto Castagna, 51 años, 5 en la empresa, sector hidráulica, profetiza: “Todos vamos a ser cooperativa a la larga, vas a ver. Al gobierno le conviene: quita de en medio al sindicato y a los empresarios”.
Carlos, un vecino de la zona, hombre grande, es introducido a la charla por los trabajadores. Cuentan que los ayudó mucho. Trajo impresos 2 mil volantes sobre la peregrinación encabezada por el obispo de Merlo que saldrá el viernes a las 9 desde la fábrica hasta una iglesia cercana en apoyo a la toma. “Para mi es un hecho importantísimo para la zona”, dice Carlos, que no pierde de vista el significado geográfico de la movida: los trabajadores están a punto de conformar una cooperativa en el municipio que desde 1991 gobierna Raúl Othacehé. “Yo vengo de otras experiencias. Una de las cosas que facilita el proceso, además de lo que cuentan los compañeros, es el apoyo del barrio. Estuve en Zanón, y ese apoyo fue parte del triunfo. La gente felicita a los obreros de Petinari. Es una experiencia hermosa”.
Superman y el aviso
Afuera, los obreros distribuyen los volantes con la misma metodología que utilizaron todos estos meses de protesta y movilización: cortando un solo carril de una ruta transitada.Algunos de los trabajadores agarran la olla grande y la depositan encima del fuego que encendieron con papeles de diarios, volantes y maderas. Es la hora del almuerzo. Al lado del fuego, buscando caricia y atraído por el aroma a guiso, se acerca Negro. “En cada toma siempre hay un perro”, suelta como una máxima Francisco Manteca Martínez, obrero de Textiles Pigüé, que se acercó a la carpa. El cocinero toma un pedazo de madera grande: es la cuchara para la olla. Dentro: carne, papa, arroz blanco, arvejas y salsa de tomate.
-¡Manos arriba! -le bromea uno de los obreros al cocinero, como el jurado del programa MasterChef les dice a sus participantes cuando se les termina el tiempo para cocinar.
-Sí, chef. Sí, chef -le responde, entre risas, respetando el código.Previo a comer, en una recorrida por la fábrica, un cartel premonitorio llama la atención. Dice: “AVISO: La seguridad depende de usted”.
Nunca mejor dicho.
Nunca mejor aplicado el concepto de “seguridad”.
Nunca mejor entendido que por estos trabajadores.
Seguridad es igual a mantener las fuentes de trabajo.
Mantener las fuentes de trabajo implicó la toma.
La toma implica una cooperativa.
La cooperativa depende de todos.
Alberto Gimenez también lo entiende perfectamente: “Yo tengo 19 años acá. La voy a seguir hasta que pueda. No somos Superman, pero la vamos a seguir peleando más que nunca”.
Pregunta: ¿seguro que no son Superman?
Hernán Noir: “Superman tiene poderes. Nosotros no, pero tenemos fuerza: estamos todos juntos”.
Publicado en www.lavaca.org el 07/08/2015
Αργεντινή, Συνεταιριστικό Κίνημα, Ανακτημένες Επιχειρήσεις, 21ος αιώνας – Εργατικός Έλεγχος στη Σύγχρονη Εποχή, Λατινική ΑμερικήTopicΝαιΝαιNoΌχι -
Spanish18/09/15“Jaque al patrón, todo el poder al peón” (Afiche pegado por los trabajadores de Grissinópoli en la cartelera)
A lo largo del 2002 había cobrado fuerza y repercusión política un fenómeno social que si bien tenía antecedentes históricos en el mundo y en nuestro propio país, de poco servían para analizar lo que estaba sucediendo en la Argentina ya que no formaba parte de una ofensiva general de los trabajadores ni tampoco de una política de Estado1.
Si bien la caída del gobierno neoliberal de Fernando de la Rúa había sido producto de la movilización popular del 19/20 de diciembre del año anterior, la resistencia, movilización y la lucha popular comienzan mucho antes en las localidades de Tartagal, Cutral Có y Mosconi, en los piquetes que cortan las rutas a lo largo del país, los paros generales, la lucha de estatales y docentes, etc.
Este proceso permite pegar el salto de la resignación, del irse para la casa y ceder conquistas, a tomar las empresas y garantizar el empleo.
Las organizaciones sindicales habían tenido escasa participación y el gobierno peronista de Duhalde que sucedió a la Alianza radical-frepasista lejos estaba de alentar este tipo de experiencias.
Los movimientos de trabajadores desocupados organizados a lo largo de la segunda mitad de la década anterior concentraban sus demandas en la necesidad de ayuda oficial y en el mejor de los casos en micro-emprendimientos autogestionados que limitaban su repercusión a los participantes directos.
Había surgido un multitudinario movimiento asambleario que nucleaba a vecinos de la Ciudad y el Gran Buenos Aires, pero sus demandas se orientaban a reclamos ciudadanos de índole diversa y, lo más importante, los trabajadores ocupados se mantenían pasivos bajo el control de la burocracia sindical, a pesar del impacto de la devaluación que había reducido sus salarios a la mitad y de condiciones de trabajo que habían empeorado bajo la espada de Damocles que representaba la amenaza de la desocupación que afectaba de una u otra forma a más de la mitad de la población económicamente activa2.
En medio de este panorama fueron ocupadas y puestas a producir por sus trabajadores, con distintos grados de efectividad, más de 150 empresas medianas y pequeñas3 que habían intentado cerrar sus patrones mediante procesos de quiebra o el llamado a convocatoria de acreedores.4 En 2001 se producen aproximadamente 1000 quiebras, se calcula que en los últimos 25 años el 90% de las quiebras fueron fraudulentas.
En la consideración de los trabajadores aparece en primer lugar como motivo de la ocupación, la falta de pago de sueldos. La quiebra o concurso de acreedores y el proceso de vaciamiento de ubican en 2º y 3º lugar. Recién para 2004 éstos dos últimos fueron los motivos principales.
La precarización de las condiciones de trabajo, los despidos y el atraso salarial forman parte de la maniobra empresaria previa al abandono y conforman el contexto en que se dieron estas quiebras.
Entre 2000-1 se dieron el mayor número de fábricas recuperadas (más del 40%), lo cual demuestra que los procesos de crisis y recuperación de empresas son anteriores a los hechos de diciembre 2001 y más que sus efectos son parte de las causas.
Pero es a partir de ese momento que se configuran modificaciones de importancia:
- mayor visibilidad pública y apoyo social.
- aparición de nuevos actores sociales apoyando las tomas como las asambleas.
Es cierto que la toma de empresas por sus trabajadores fue resultado de la necesidad, no de la ideología, y tuvieron por objetivo inmediato la defensa del puesto de trabajo y en ese sentido asumen una postura defensiva frente a la situación de cierre o vaciamiento de la empresa. Pero una vez tomadas las fábricas, los trabajadores más politizados propusieron, en asambleas, organizar la producción y las ventas sin los patrones. Estas experiencias atrajeron a profesionales y estudiantes quienes ofrecieron consejo técnico. La lucha y la práctica de la autogestión fueron creando más conciencia de clase después de la ocupación y desde este punto de vista aparecen también como formas ofensivas a diferentes niveles:
a) la gestión de la producción por parte de los trabajadores dando lugar a la intervención en decisiones tales como la inversión en equipamiento tecnológico, las condiciones de trabajo, la administración de los tiempos de descanso y los ritmos productivos.
b) se construyen una serie de demandas que exceden el reclamo puntual y apuntan a la definición de una política pública orientada al sector para acceder, por ejemplo, a la seguridad social. Por otra parte se extienden los reclamos a la definición de políticas públicas orientadas a la industria nacional.
Esta reacción como clase nos señala un cambio frente al cierre de miles de empresas durante los noventa. Uno de los aprendizajes más destacados de las empresas recuperadas será el hecho de demostrar que los trabajadores pueden llevar adelante la producción por sí mismos y no dependen de la patronal.
Tengamos en cuenta que solo el 15/20% del personal jerárquico y profesional se mantuvo en este tipo de experiencias y en el caso del administrativo entre el 33/45%.
Aquí aparece la centralidad de la clase obrera, diluyéndose el mito de la función social de los empresarios y gerentes en cuanto a su capacidad de organizar la producción.
Los trabajadores se vieron en la necesidad de crear una organización que no solo fue capaz de garantizar la producción, distribución y venta, sino que pudo resistir los embates de los distintos poderes del Estado que buscaron por diferentes medios sofocar estas experiencias a través del hostigamiento, las amenazas de desalojo, etc.
Al retirarse los capitalistas de la empresa y ocuparla los trabajadores, éstos quedan frente a otro adversario para la defensa de sus puestos de trabajo -el aparato estatal-, en primer lugar, el poder judicial. La tarea del juez es cumplir con el mandato que surge de la ley de concursos y quiebras: debe rematar los bienes para efectivizar los pagos a los acreedores y, para hacerlo, debe poder disponer de aquéllos, cosa imposible si los trabajadores ocupan la planta.
Como prueba de lo dicho, en abril de 2011 una sentencia del Tribunal de la Cámara Comercial-Sala A, declaró la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley de expropiación Nº 2969 sancionada por la Legislatura de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires en diciembre 2008 dando la tenencia provisoria del inmueble a los trabajadores de IMPA, a pesar que la ley fue aprobada por 52 de los 54 legisladores.
El 23 de diciembre del 2012, el Jefe de Gobierno de la CABA, Mauricio Macri, vetó la Ley 4008 que había prorrogado por 6 años la vigencia de normas que dejaban en manos del Ejecutivo de la Ciudad la expropiación definitiva a favor de los trabajadores donde funcionan las empresas de gestión obrera, afectando a 29 empresas y poniendo en riesgo más de 2000 puestos de trabajo directos.5
Al comienzo, en general, el desempeño de la Legislatura porteña y la bonaerense había sido favorable a los trabajadores. También los jueces, intendentes y demás funcionarios. Los jueces otorgaron en algunos casos a los trabajadores la custodia de los bienes. Los municipios otorgaron subsidios, cajas de comida, etc., aunque esta actitud no implicara un respaldo incondicional. Las definiciones fueron regionales y no se expidieron oficialmente en contra del derecho de propiedad.
Finalmente, el 63% obtuvieron la expropiación a favor de la cooperativa, pero solo el 19% son definitivas (2010).
El único caso de rechazo explícito a la expropiación es el Hotel Bauen donde no solo fracasó un proyecto de ley en la Legislatura porteña sino que, a instancias del bloque del PRO, se aprobó una ley en contra. En el Congreso Nacional tampoco han obtenido resultados hasta el momento.
Otra situación preocupante es el caso de La Toma de Rosario (ex Supermercado Tigre) que el pasado mes de agosto cumplió 13 años, donde un fallo de la justicia declaró inconstitucional la ley de expropiación conquistada en la Legislatura provincial luego de largos años de lucha.
Luego de cumplirse doce años de gestión obrera en la fábrica neuquina de cerámicos Fasinpat (fábrica sin patrones), más conocida como Zanón, sus trabajadores consiguieron este año la promulgación de la ley de expropiación sancionada por la Legislatura de Neuquén.
El gobernador Sapag dilató tres años la finalización del trámite de expropiación impidiendo, entre otras cosas, el acceso a créditos para la renovación de tecnología.
En el caso de Zanón cabe destacar que en la actualidad ocupa 430 trabajadores sin haber recibido ayuda provincial ni nacional como sucedía con sus anteriores propietarios privados. Tienen 40 trabajadores imputados en causas judiciales.
En la provincia de Neuquén también funcionan bajo control obrero otras tres fábricas de cerámicos: Cerámica del Valle, Cerámica Neuquén y Cerámica Stefani (CER.SIN.PAT). Esta última cumplió en mayo de 2014 dos años de gestión obrera, siendo el único establecimiento fabril sobreviviente en la localidad de Cutral-Có donde antes funcionaba la petrolera estatal YPF. Allí son 9 los trabajadores que enfrentan causas penales y 35 los procesados. Un referéndum por la expropiación recibió el apoyo masivo de la población.
El pasado 18 de diciembre el Instituto Nacional de Economía Social (INAES) aprobó la Cooperativa Confluencia (ex Cerámica Neuquén).
En junio de 2011, después de ser aprobada casi por unanimidad en ambas Cámaras del Congreso Nacional, se promulgó la Ley 26684, que introduce importantes cambios al proceso de concursos y quiebras, en especial para los casos de empresas en proceso de recuperación por sus trabajadores, dándoles la oportunidad para que puedan llevar adelante la explotación mercantil de la empresa, tanto en la instancia del concurso preventivo como en la quiebra, ya que las deudas del empresario con los trabajadores (salarios, indemnizaciones, etc.), pueden servir como capital para la compra de la empresa por parte de la cooperativa obrera.
No obstante, delega las decisiones fundamentales al criterio de jueces y síndicos con gran margen de discrecionalidad ideológica en base a fundamentos técnicos de viabilidad. De allí que en el período 2010-3 solo un 16% logró la sanción de una ley de expropiación a su favor.
Al respecto, el Informe del IV relevamiento 2014 del Programa Facultad Abierta afirma que: “la reforma de quiebras no está operando como facilitador de los procesos de recuperación sino estirando los procesos conflictivos al judicializar todos los procesos y alargar los conflictos, sin resolverlos, por lo general, a favor de los trabajadores. Además, parece haber producido el efecto de obturar la vía de resolución legislativa (política) de los conflictos, al crear la falsa idea de que el problema de las recuperadas “se resolvió” con la reforma de la Ley de quiebras”.
La lógica del mercado
La limitación que este proceso es incapaz de superar por sí mismo es la lógica del mercado y su anarquía.
Las empresas autogestionadas tienen la ventaja de no pagar todo el trabajo improductivo de gerentes, representantes, etc., pero a su vez, dada la necesidad de supervivencia, se encuentran envueltas en la lógica del mercado y de la competencia y pueden actuar generando condiciones de auto-explotación, trabajando por bajos salarios, en condiciones insalubres, con altos ritmos y condiciones de flexibilidad por debajo del convenio colectivo de la rama o directamente explotando a terceros.
Un buen ejemplo de esta situación lo constituye el trabajo a façon (el 50% trabaja bajo esta modalidad) donde la explotación es ejercida por parte de un patrón que aparece enmascarado como “cliente” y es aceptado por los trabajadores a falta de una mejor alternativa en el mercado. En algunas ramas ésta es una política habitual pero en la mayoría de las empresas bajo gestión obrera se convirtió en una necesidad durante un largo período ante la ausencia de capital de giro y de no tener acceso al crédito bancario que le permitiera financiar la producción propia. Esta suerte de patrón oculto, entrega la materia prima y retira el producto terminado, fija el precio de la mano de obra y los gastos generales e impone también los ritmos de producción, así como controla toda la cadena de distribución.
En la medida que la gestión obrera logró sostener la producción en el tiempo y formar un pequeño capital como para financiarla ya son muchos los casos que en distintas proporciones combinan trabajo a façon y producción propia.
La recuperación representa un momento re-fundacional en el cual los trabajadores se hacen cargo de las fábricas en situaciones muy desfavorables y traumáticas. Las empresas han sufrido fuertes procesos de desinversión, se encuentran endeudadas con clientes y proveedores, a la falta de capital inicial se suman los largos procesos de desgaste durante la toma o las negociaciones, fuerte incertidumbre jurídico-legal, sin acceso a capital de trabajo o subsidios estatales, con clientes que desconfían del nuevo proyecto, la recomposición productiva será un proceso lento y dificultoso. El 60% incorporaron maquinaria con fondos propios. Solo el 10% lo hizo exclusivamente con subsidios estatales.
Siguen siendo pocas las que han logrado alcanzar cuotas de producción acordes a la capacidad de la planta a nivel de la actividad anterior. El problema de la inserción en el mercado surge como la causa más destacada de los problemas productivos.
También se abre el desafío de desarrollar el proceso de trabajo mediante métodos en los que se considere y reconozca el saber obrero, se tienda a recalificar los puestos de trabajo, revertir las estrategias empresarias que fomentan formas de explotación a otros trabajadores como son la tercerización y subcontratación, y a desarrollar una política que tienda a la eliminación de los accidentes de trabajo y que tenga en cuenta la salud de los trabajadores.
En una mirada más estratégica las empresas recuperadas trascienden la producción y se constituyen, en algunos casos, en ejes de organización popular a partir de la articulación de distintas formas de lucha. Así encontramos la formación de centros culturales, bibliotecas, centros educativos, proyectos de construcción de viviendas, etc.
A su vez, en algunas empresas se piensa en darle una nueva orientación a la producción.
Ya no basta producir mercancías porque se colocan en el mercado, sino que empieza a generarse una producción orientada hacia las necesidades sociales, como la provisión de alimentos para comedores populares y la confección de indumentaria para trabajadores de la educación y la salud.
"Ocupar, resistir y producir"
IMPA constituye una de las referencias centrales del Movimiento Nacional de Empresas Recuperadas (MNER) que se organizó en los primeros meses del 2002, reuniendo unas 100 empresas.
Defienden la forma jurídica cooperativa ya que según uno de sus voceros, "facilita el acceso al crédito y el reconocimiento legal necesario para desarrollarse como empresas rentables".6
En la provincia de Buenos Aires lograron que se sancione la Ley 5708 que permite al gobierno expropiar los bienes inmuebles y cederlos en comodato a los trabajadores y, según sea el caso, en donación. A setiembre del 2002 se habían realizado unas 20 expropiaciones bajo esta legislación.
Por aquel tiempo, también la Legislatura de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires votó la expropiación de dos fábricas que funcionaban autogestionadas por sus trabajadores: la imprenta Chilavert y la fábrica de materia prima de postres helados Ghelco. Estas nuevas leyes dispusieron dos tipos de expropiaciones: a) temporaria -por 2 años-, de los edificios donde funcionaban y b) definitiva, en el caso de las maquinarias y otros bienes imprescindibles para la producción. Los equipos son cedidos en comodato a las cooperativas de los trabajadores y durante dos años el gobierno pagará el alquiler de los edificios a los acreedores de cada quiebra, luego de este período las cooperativas tendrán prioridad en la compra de la fábrica.
Frente a las cooperativas autogestionadas por sus trabajadores estaban las que reclamaban la estatización bajo control obrero, como fueron los casos de Brukman y Zanón.
Jorge Abelli, otro de los dirigentes del MNER, luego alejado del movimiento, sostenía que la propuesta cooperativa supone no delegar las tareas de dirección en instancias ajenas al colectivo obrero, que pasa por asumir todas y cada una de las responsabilidades y riesgos, incluyendo la comercialización de los productos y enfatizaba: "no parece oportuno entregarle las empresas que hemos recuperado y puesto en funcionamiento con mucho esfuerzo a este Estado mafioso", al mismo tiempo, marca los límites del movimiento: "Nosotros siempre tomamos empresas quebradas, nunca las que todavía están funcionando, porque nuestro objetivo es librarnos del destino marginal que significa estar desempleados".7
Precisamente, al ser una experiencia restringida y al no generalizarse al conjunto de la industria y los servicios, está siempre presente la amenaza de perder la posición conquistada. Tal vez en este sentido, el planteo de Zanón y Brukman sobre la estatización fue un salto en relación a las experiencias de las otras ocupaciones que organizaron cooperativas.8
Más allá de esta valoración, es indudable que todas estas experiencias, se trate de formas cooperativas o no, demuestran que sus protagonistas comienzan a librarse de las viejas costumbres de pasividad, sumisión y obediencia dentro de la vida económica. Afirman la cooperación y la solidaridad, superando el sentimiento de impotencia frente al patrón. Se inicia un proceso de desajenación, de emancipación en el sentido real del término y ponen en discusión la cuestión del dominio del capital sobre las máquinas y el trabajo. En ese sentido tienen un enorme valor pedagógico.
Fábricas abiertas a la comunidad
"La Fábrica, Ciudad Cultural", centro cultural autogestionado en IMPA, en el que funcionan talleres, cursos, un canal de televisión, una universidad, se realizan fiestas, funciones de teatro, cine, etc., representa un buen intento de articulación con la comunidad. Este espacio funciona desde 1999.
El 5 de mayo de 2011 dieron comienzo a las actividades de la Universidad de los Trabajadores con la clase inaugural del seminario “Historia del movimiento obrero” dictada por su coordinador, el ex rector de la Universidad de las Madres de Plaza de Mayo, Vicente Zito Lema. También funciona un bachillerato popular con 250 alumnos.
En los salones del Hotel Bauen se realizan actividades promovidas por organizaciones sociales y políticas.
Otro buen ejemplo es el Centro Cultural de La Toma que funciona en el ex supermercado Tigre de Rosario, “puesto en funcionamiento por sus trabajadores en lucha por los puestos de trabajo” en julio de 2001 a partir de un proceso de vaciamiento iniciado por su propietario, Francisco “Don Pancho” Regunaschi, presidente de la Cámara de Propietarios de Supermercados, tres años antes.
En este caso utilizaron el dinero que el Estado destinaría para los subsidios de desempleo en la creación de un supermercado comunitario. Luego concretaron la apertura de un comedor universitario y popular avalado por las autoridades universitarias.
Actualmente funciona un Centro de Comercialización de la Economía Solidaria con la participación de artesanos, instituciones y organizaciones de emprendedores. Asimismo, albergan a una serie de cooperativas de trabajo y organizaciones: El Puente (psicólogos en La Toma), Mesa Coordinadora de Jubilados, Asociación Argentina de Actores (delegación Rosario), Sindicato de Guardavidas (CTA), Cooperativa de Trabajo del MTL, una Librería Obrera instalada por la Fundación Federico Engels, el Instituto Movilizador de Fondos Cooperativos tiene un local de atención al público, funciona un teatro, una radio, etc.
Ya en un plano político, la constitución de la Mesa Coordinadora del Alto Valle, que agrupó a los obreros ceramistas de Zanón con el Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados (Neuquén), el Sindicato de Televisión, gremios docentes de la zona, universitarios, personal de los hospitales y organismos de DD. HH., si bien de alcance regional, fue central en la defensa y apoyo a la lucha por la expropiación de la fábrica.
Aunque debemos resaltar que los intentos de coordinación a través del MNER, los Encuentros de Fábricas Ocupadas y Trabajadores en Lucha organizados por Brukman y Zanón o las Asambleas de Trabajadores Ocupados y Desocupados organizadas por el Bloque Piquetero Nacional, se mostraron insuficientes y de hecho agruparon a las distintas experiencias de acuerdo a referencias políticas que en más de una oportunidad actuaron como verdaderos "corralitos" que impidieron a los trabajadores una verdadera solidaridad.
Nuestra Lucha, periódico de los trabajadores de Brukman y Zanón, con la intervención del Cuerpo de Delegados de Luz y Fuerza (Córdoba) y de Supermercado Tigre (Rosario), fue otra expresión de los esfuerzos por vincular las fábricas autogestionadas por sus trabajadores con los movimientos de desocupados, asambleas barriales y el movimiento obrero ocupado.
Una instancia de articulación actual fue el IV Encuentro Internacional “La Economía de los Trabajadores” organizado en julio del 2013 por la Incubadora de Empreendimentos Solidários – INCUBES, de la Universidad Federal de Paraiba y el Programa Facultad Abierta, de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, en Joao Pessoa al nordeste de Brasil. La primera edición se realizó en Buenos Aires en julio de 2007 con el tema “Autogestión y distribución de la riqueza”, convocado por el Programa Facultad Abierta de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Buenos Aires y coorganizado por instituciones académicas, sociales y de trabajadores de la Argentina y de varios países, surgió como un espacio de intercambio entre académicos, militantes y trabajadores acerca de los problemas y las posibilidades de la autogestión y la regeneración de un proyecto político, económico y de sociedad por parte de la clase trabajadora y los movimientos sociales, así como debatir críticamente las prácticas de investigación académica en estos temas. El próximo se realizará en julio del corriente año en la fábrica de comunicaciones VTELCA en la zona franca de Paraguaná, Estado Falcón, Venezuela.
El 3 y 4 de octubre estas experiencias autogestivas se dieron cita en la localidad de Pigüé en la provincia de Buenos Aires. Allí se realizó el Primer Encuentro Regional Sudamericano. Fue la sede del evento una fábrica recuperada y puesta en funcionamiento como cooperativa de trabajo por los antiguos trabajadores de la empresa Gatic (Adidas): la Cooperativa Textiles Pigüé.
La recuperación de empresas por sus trabajadores continúa
En la actualidad, el proceso de recuperación de empresas continúa llegando a agrupar 350 empresas que emplean25.000 trabajadores (Fuente: Ministerio de Trabajo de la Nación), según precisó el vicepresidente de la Unión Productiva de Empresas Autogestionadas, Eduardo Montes, en diálogo con la agencia oficial de noticias Télam.
A modo de ejemplo, en enero del 2013, los trabajadores de una cadena de restaurantes ocuparon cuatro conocidas parrillas porteñas: Don Battaglia, Mangiata, La Soleada y Alé Alé, manteniéndolas en funcionamiento ante el riesgo de ser cerradas por sus patrones.
“El 4 de enero un supervisor les avisó a dos compañeros que iban a cerrar el restaurante”, reseña Andrés Toledo, uno de los 40 trabajadores de Alé Alé. “La noticia corrió y el viernes, cuando entramos a trabajar, reclamamos a la empresa que vinieran a darnos una explicación de qué estaba pasando. No vino nadie. Paramos todo el fin de semana, pero siguieron sin presentarse.” El lunes decidieron pedir asesoramiento a la cooperativa que administra el Hotel Bauen recuperado por sus trabajadores y volver a trabajar.
“Así empezamos a autogestionarnos. Buscando información sobre la empresa, nos enteramos de que había entrado en convocatoria de acreedores y tenía el contrato de alquiler vencido desde hacía siete meses. Incluso habían hecho un convenio de desalojo para el 31 de diciembre, es decir, que la intención era irse.”
En Don Battaglia tomaron la misma decisión el 10 de febrero cuando vieron que la gente de la administración estaba sacando carpetas y libros contables del restaurante. Faltaban vinos, hasta ingredientes para preparar ensaladas. Cuando tomaron la decisión de ocupar el establecimiento vinieron de La Soleada y Mangiata y al otro día ellos también empezaron con las tomas.
Los cuatro locales emplean a más de 200 personas. El INAES les abrió un expediente para que pudieran conformarse legalmente como cooperativas de trabajo, detalló Federico Tonarelli desde el Hotel Bauen, uno de los ejes de Facta, la Federación de Cooperativas de Trabajadores Autogestionados que nuclea 47 cooperativas y 2000 trabajadores en todo el país.
Un dato diferencia la historia de estos restaurantes de la mayoría de las recuperadas, y es que sus trabajadores no esperaron a encontrarse en la calle para pensar en la autogestión. Tuvieron como antecedente el cierre de La Zaranda, perteneciente a la misma cadena de restaurantes -que no volvió a ser abierto- y eso los decidió a actuar antes de que la historia se repitiera. Ese alerta, junto al conocimiento acumulado en los años que lleva la recuperación de empresas, resultó clave para que no se perdiera ningún puesto de trabajo.
El pasado mes de setiembre, dos locales de la popular cadena de comida rápida porteña Nac&Pop fueron tomados por sus trabajadoras y trabajadores en defensa de sus puestos de trabajo. Luego se agregaron dos más. Sueldos atrasados, vaciamiento y maltrato patronal fueron los empujones que posibilitaron que hoy estén a punto de conformar cooperativas.
Una de sus trabajadoras, Laura, sostiene que ya no es un motivo económico lo que los impulsa a seguir. “Si fuera eso, no podríamos estar armando todo lo que estamos armando. Cuando es solamente la guita lo que se pretende, se busca otro laburo. Desde que estamos acá no sacamos un peso. Por suerte comemos, la yerba y el azúcar lo compramos entre todos. Todo se está colectivizando. Creo que eso es lo que pasó en este local, y espero que pase en todos. Es una cuestión de dignidad. Hemos trabajado días enteros, 16 horas todos los días, o sin franco, no me puedo ir agachando la cabeza diciendo ‘Sí señor, gracias por haberme maltratado’, no le puede enseñar eso a mi hijo.”
En noviembre comenzó a producir en la localidad de Azul, la Cooperativa Textil Nueva Sudamtex, bajo el control de sus 40 operarios.
Azul es una ciudad de 60.000 habitantes, a la vera de la Ruta Nacional 3, en medio de la llanura bonaerense, a 300 km de la Casa Rosada. El acto formal tuvo lugar en el Parque Industrial 2, donde funciona la recuperada, puesta en marcha por los obreros ante el abandono de la patronal, el fallido grupo empresario Arias que los dejó en la calle. En defensa propia los obreros la ocuparon y pusieron a producir. La textil elabora fibras plásticas y venderá la materia prima a otras recuperadas como Alcayana, cuyo presidente estuvo en Azul y entregó casi 30.000 pesos del fondo de huelga del Movimiento Nacional de Empresas Recuperadas.
En el caso reciente más resonante, el 3 de octubre, luego de dos meses de gestiones y movilizaciones, el juez Gerardo Santicchia, cedió la locación de la planta de la multinacional gráfica estadounidense Donnelley, a los 400 trabajadores organizados en la Cooperativa MadyGraf. Fueron los trabajadores quienes denunciaron desde un principio que la empresa no tenía crisis ni deudas significativas, y la quiebra era una maniobra planificada. La misma Presidenta de la Nación tuvo que denunciarla como "fraudulenta" y la AFIP pedir el rechazo a esa quiebra.
El principal capital político y simbólico es su modo colectivo de gestión
Si bien estos trabajadores no fueron la vanguardia social del proletariado, concentrado en las grandes empresas de la siderurgia, automotrices, las alimenticias, los servicios y el transporte, actuaron como su vanguardia política, superando la división entre economía y política en el seno de estas experiencias y dando un salto en la conciencia obrera muy importante.
Notas
1. En Bolivia, surgió de la revolución popular de 1952 el control obrero sobre las minas entre 1953/63. También en Alemania Oriental (1945-53). La autogestión fue la doctrina oficial del régimen socialista yugoslavo entre 1950 y la desintegración de la Federación. En Chile, bajo el Gobierno de la Unidad Popular de Allende (1970-1973), a pesar de la oposición institucional, más de 125 fábricas estaban manejadas por obreros, organizados en Cordones industriales y Comandos Comunales, que aunaban las ocupaciones de talleres e industrias y de tierras abandonadas por latifundistas. En Argentina, hay que recordar que en 1964, en el marco de una gigantesca huelga general se producen las ocupaciones de fábricas más importantes en número y en calidad de participación realizadas en estos años. Los investigadores Celia Cotarelo y Fabián Fernández estiman que entre mayo y junio de 1964 se ocuparon 4.398 empresas, dándose el caso de que en las mismas participaron principalmente obreros fabriles de las principales industrias (metalúrgicas y textiles, sobre todo) y en las grandes ciudades del país, lo que le confirió un carácter proletario genuino y lo dotó de un grado de disciplina y organización sin igual.
2. Para la toma de empresas, al comienzo, el sindicato resulta el principal ausente en la mayoría de los casos adoptando una posición crítica que deslegitima la ocupación. En pocos casos, algunas seccionales resultan un actor central que impulsa la recuperación, como es el caso de la Unión Obrera Metalúrgica (UOM) de Quilmes o la Asociación de Empleados de Comercio de Rosario a través de su Comisión Gremial. La Federación Gráfica Bonaerense, a pesar de no haber tenido una postura originariamente de apoyo, se ha transformado en una de sus principales impulsores, a través de la Red Gráfica Cooperativa. Una actitud similar asumió la Unión Obrera Gráfica de Córdoba, donde el sindicato mantuvo plenos derechos para los trabajadores, incluso la obra social.
3. La enorme mayoría están en la categoría de PYMES. El 75% emplean menos de 50 trabajadores. Son escasas las que ocupan más de 100 y solo el 2,35% superan los 200.
4. De acuerdo al Programa Facultad Abierta de la UBA, coordinado por Andrés Ruggeri, en su último relevamiento (2014) el total de empresas recuperadas son 311 y ocupan a 13.462 trabajadores. En una entrevista realizada a Eduardo Murúa, referente de IMPA, en FM La Boca de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, declaró la existencia de 330 empresas recuperadas que agrupan a 15/16000 trabajadores. Sostuvo que: “Este nuevo método de lucha está instalado en el movimiento obrero argentino. Cada vez que cierra una fábrica los trabajadores están preparados para quedarse con la empresa. Quizás fue lo mejor que hicimos: crear conciencia”. Entrevista realizada por el autor para el programa radial “Metrópolis”.
5. En la mencionada entrevista, Eduardo Murúa (IMPA) aclaró que: “Este veto no anula la Ley de expropiación que sigue vigente”.
6. El 95% de las empresas recuperadas se conforman bajo la forma jurídica de cooperativa. Según Andrés Ruggeri, es el tipo de organización legalmente válida de mejor adaptación a las características autogestionarias adoptadas por las empresas recuperadas, de fácil trámite y de ciertas ventajas impositivas y jurídicas. Además, posibilita ejercer el control de la planta sin heredar las deudas dejadas por los empresarios.
7. En la entrevista ya mencionada Eduardo Murúa sostuvo: “Nosotros no participamos nunca dentro del movimiento cooperativo porque siempre quisimos y estuvimos dentro de la lucha del movimiento obrero. Dentro del marco de las cooperativas hay de todo. Algunas se adaptan totalmente al sistema y son de productores. Aunque es un sistema superior al capitalista algunas se adaptan totalmente. También siempre fuimos muy críticos de la autogestión porque no creemos que sea la salvación. Nosotros creemos que los medios de producción más importantes deben estar en manos del Estado y planificados por nuestro pueblo. No creemos en la cooperativa como salida para un nuevo modelo. Ahora en el caso de estas 330 empresas pequeñas la autogestión puede servir como una semillita para ver lo nuevo, para instalar conciencia en el pueblo que no hacen falta patrones para producir y que el trabajo es más importante que el capital que solo es trabajo acumulado. Me parece que cuando los pueblos aprendamos eso podemos tener una salida”.
8. Una serie de empresas se nuclean en torno al Movimiento Nacional de Empresas Recuperadas (MNER), constituido en 2001. A comienzos de 2003 el MNER sufrió una fractura interna de la que surgió el Movimiento Nacional de Fábricas Recuperadas (MNFR), constituido luego en ONG. A diferencia del primero donde “una fábrica recuperada se convierte en un espacio de resistencia”, en el MNFR el eje está puesto en la recuperación de las fuentes de trabajo frente al desempleo por sobre el carácter cuestionador del proceso.
Por otro lado, una serie de casos se nuclean en torno a la Federación de Cooperativas de Trabajo (FENCOOTRA), que se integra con cooperativas de trabajo en la provincia de Buenos Aires a fines de la década del ’80 y recupera una tradición ligada al cooperativismo y al mutualismo. Otro nucleamiento es la Federación Nacional de Cooperativas de Trabajo Reconvertidas (FENCOOTER) más cercana a los organismos gubernamentales como el INAES, constituida en agosto de 2002 y con un alcance reducido en lo que respecta al número de fábricas que alberga.
Finalmente, encontramos una serie de casos que articularon su discurso en un fuerte cuestionamiento a la propiedad privada y al sistema capitalista, con la significativa participación de algunos partidos políticos de izquierda, distintas organizaciones de derechos humanos y vinculándose también a distintas organizaciones de desocupados. La estrategia de este sector, representado por Brukman y Zanón, se centró en la constitución de un frente de unidad entre los sectores de trabajadores ocupados y desocupados y la estatización con control obrero de las fábricas.
Bibliografía
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Mario Hernandez: Licenciado y Profesor en Sociología. Periodista y escritor.
Compilador de "Produciendo realidad. Las empresas comunitarias", Editorial Topía, Buenos Aires, 2002 y autor de "El movimiento de autogestión obrera en Argentina", Editorial Topía, 2013.
Editor responsable en español de www.workerscontrol.net
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